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Abstract
COMMITTING TO THE WAVES: EMERSON'S MOVING ASSIGNMENTS
by
Karinne Keithley Syers
Adviser: Joan Richardson
Committing to the Waves: Emerson's Moving Assignments reads Ralph Waldo Emerson 
as a writer of assignments for living and working whose senses can be taken up across a wide 
array of creative and exploratory fields. Shifting between an interdisciplinary array of contexts 
ranging  from  philosophy  and  poetics  to  dance,  performance,  and  somatic  movement 
experiments, I join the practical sense of creative inquiry embodied in these fields to the abstract 
images of Emerson's assignments. I argue that Emerson's descriptions of intelligence and power, 
and so his approaches to navigating skepticism and loss, as well as the non-possessive sense of  
what “self” actually means to this thinker of “self-reliance” can be illuminated by reading from 
the non-dualist perspective that embodied inquiry offers. 
The dissertation also enacts the self-reliance that Emerson calls for by taking up my 
response to Emerson through my sense of his assignments. The first half of this study uses this  
embodied  work as  a  resource for  reading Emerson,  situating his  sense in  relation  to  extra-
literary and extra-philosophical research.  The second half  of the dissertation makes a pivot, 
taking Emerson as a resource for performance assignments, first in the form of a chapter written 
with  poetic  constraints,  which  approaches  the  question  of  how philosophical  commitments 
might animate theater and actual performance, and finally by following Emerson's instruction to 
the scholar to dive into her  “privatest presentiments” to find where that privacy meets a public 
intelligence and intelligibility. The dissertation concludes with the documentation of  Another  
Tree Dance, an original performance generated from that Emersonian private dive. 
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1INTRODUCTION
I put some amount of my being into this picture. 
ONE. Backgrounds
I did not mean to spend all this time reading Emerson. I set out to write a dissertation on 
a  life  commitment  to  experimenting  read  through  a  series  of  American  writers  for  whom 
Emerson forms a philosophical background. I set out to write this dissertation because I have 
made a life commitment to experimenting, and I wanted to keep the company of these writers. 
The  texts  I  wanted  to  spend  time  with  all  produced  an  imaginative  space  of  intense  quiet, 
disorientation, and delight, something I once tried to describe as a form of serenity-bewilderment 
(imagine  it  as  German  compound:  Fassungslosigkeitruhe)  that  conditions  one's  thinking  by 
stimulating an aesthetic appetite for this feeling, which could also be described as “wonder,” the 
sensation wherein philosophy is said to begin. This is overlay of serenity and bewilderment is 
something I continually attempt in my own creative work, which is set in the interdisciplinary 
spaces between text, speech, sound, singing, movement, and projection. The intervals between 
each  of  these  modalities  lend room for  disorientation;  the  serenity  results  from finding  the 
pleasing harmonics of those intervals, as if discovering a previously unheard overtone of a note. I  
meant to write a dissertation that would give a literary and intellectual background to this project.  
“A series  of accidents  led  you to  this  book,” writes  the Matthew Goulish,  an  artist-
scholar and member of the important performance group Goat  Island,  in  the opening of  39 
Microlectures in proximity of performance (Routledge, 2000), a book that gives one of the better 
2statements  of  my  performance  world's  ways  and  experiences  of  thinking.  “We  thrive  by 
casualties. Our chief experiences have been casual,” writes Emerson in his essay, “Experience” 
(EL 483). These sentences uncover the fact that it is not plot but chance that reveals the pathways 
we  take  into  what  might  become significant.  But  what  intensity  must  traverse  those  casual 
experiences to transform them from accidental to chief, becoming structural points around which 
a life organizes? In reading, I experience this intensity as an attraction—to an idea, a phrase, an 
image—which reveals itself by a sudden, intense, associative memory. The newly encountered 
sentence now seems to carry the grounding of association with it, and an analogical enlargement 
of  meaning  moves  in  both  directions.  Emerson  instructs  students  to  read  by  collecting  the 
passages that prompt this feeling, to read “actively and not passively; to esteem his own life the 
text and the books the commentary” (EL 239). This is how to read Spinoza, Newton, Stein. This 
is  how to read Emerson. This is how to read.  To take this charge seriously is not as wildly 
hubristic  as  it  seems.  Rather  Emerson is  suggesting  that  reading  is  a  commons:  an  area  of 
exchange to which all are entitled, in which each is her own center: “The world exists for the 
education of  each man” (emphasis added 239).  The texts in this reading commons carry value 
not for their own sake, but because they might add to the practical store of images or ideas 
through which one or several readers come to lead a more empowered life—by offering practical 
commentary on the life of the reader through the process  Emerson calls “domestication.” The 
monuments of the commons are the texts that speak most widely, that take root in the greatest 
number of lives. Emerson's active reader experiences this speech not as command or instruction 
but as recognition—not tuition but intuition. 
Before I ever read Emerson I read this way, and even the discipline of graduate study did 
3not do much to shake this habit of reading as a collector on my own behalf. That experience of  
recognition, which makes a book seem to comment on or echo the commitments or experiences 
of my own life, has always figured in the texts I choose to linger on, to own. I have not found 
that  this  pre-determines  what  I  read,  or  even  consolidates  what  I  think,  because  these 
recognitions or attractions often commit me to strange places, and I have found that my sense of 
what is happening in the analogies I make—what commonalities form recognition's basis—has 
been  mutable.  That  sense  remains  open  to  revision,  willing  to  undergo  mutation,  precisely 
because of the feeling that I am somehow called to take this text personally, into the private 
space  of  my thinking and feeling.  It  seems to  lay  a  claim on me  and  demands  my honest 
response. This has been the case with my reading of Emerson, and is how I accidentally came to 
write a dissertation about him. 
My impulse to stay with Emerson had to do specifically with the recognitions I had in his 
essays  of  certain  scenes  from  my  thinking  life  outside  of  the  discipline  of  English—of 
improvising  in  dance  studios,  of  engaging  in  somatic  research  into  embodied  patterns  of 
intelligence, of building or participating in the building of performance works, of creating sound 
or image pieces. Those scenes are all marked with the experience of finding myself making or 
doing something strange and maybe wonderful: something I had no idea was coming, something 
that might even be alien to my habitual temperament, but which landed with a feeling of clarity 
and ease that I can only describe as a kind of felicitous self-possession. I would feel perfectly at 
home in a place I had not anticipated finding, and this feeling of being at home gave me what 
Emerson might  describe as  a  compensation for  the  undercurrent  of  darkness  or  loss  or  just 
weirdness  in  the  place  (image,  sentence,  action)  I  found  myself  describing.  I  offer  as  an 
4illustration of this mood two examples from The Ghost Host Pigeon Post,  a series of cutups I 
made in the year before I began my doctoral studies as a kind of morning ritual. It happened to 
collect many images whose consonance I would later find in Emerson's writing. (See figs. 1 and 
2.) 
Fig. 1. “Everything Worthy” from The Ghost Host Pigeon Post (2007)
5Fig. 2. “Our Compensations” from The Ghost Host Pigeon Post (2007)
The only language I have found to describe this experience of being at home on a shifting ground 
of loss or indirection is “first person strangeness,” the fruit of a mode of exploration that treats  
the I—who speaks, who makes, who thinks—as a  moving position that can be taken up in a 
semi-virtual ludic environment (the imaginative register, the arbitrary material and rules from 
which it is made, the real context of private recognitions). There is, in this ludic relationship to 
the first person position of making, an analogy to gaming's avatars, which allow a player to take 
a game experience personally (with physical excitement, with glee or frustration) despite the 
differences of biography between the player and the avatar. Entertaining in the imagination a self 
not tethered to my own biography, sounding the experience of that strange me against my body's 
register of all my private experience, I find myself composing experiences in which the strange 
6me invites the biographical me to feel at home in a new space. In the Pilot storyboard of Another  
Tree Dance (the performance text that concludes this dissertation), I record this same invitation: 
“I put some amount of my being into this picture.  I put some amount of this picture into my 
being.” In my experience, getting underway with this invitation involves cultivating an attention 
to the material at hand (“this picture”) that responds empathetically to its possibilities (of entry, 
of combination, of transformation, of significance), following the tracks of these changes without  
trying to calculate their directions in advance. This experimental and empathetic way of moving 
with a flow of thought is, in Emersonian terms, thinking naturally. 
Although I don't tend to improvise in performance, I think of myself as an improvisor in 
the way that I work, which is to find somewhere (often arbitrary) to start, pay attention to what is 
happening, and then keep following that happening until  the piece seems to be done.  I  was 
educated in this way of working by years of movement improvisations in empty studios. What I 
learned from my practice of dance improvisation is how to listen deeply to my body to discover 
something  already  happening,  how  to  follow  that  happening  with  my  wit  or  cleverness  or 
rational mind as much out of the way as possible, often by persisting with the improvisation until 
my wit or cleverness or rational mind has tired. This can take place over the course of, say, a 30-
minute movement session,  or it  can take place over the course of the season it  takes me to 
complete a piece of writing. I have found that I cannot live happily in the world without being 
inside an improvisation, but that inside of a process I am not just not unhappy: I am enlivened by 
the  world,  attracted  to  it,  attuned  to  it.  Although  I  have  a  professional  relationship  to 
performance, the terms in which I understand my commitment to it have to do, more so every 
year, with performance-making as a vehicle for finding that blending of compensation, surprise, 
7strangeness, attraction, and ongoingness.
These key-words are also present in Emerson's essays, and figure strongly in the readings 
of Emerson that most draw me, like those of Stanley Cavell, Branka Arsić, and Joan Richardson, 
whose seminar and thinking is the “radiant and productive atmosphere” in which my encounter 
with  Emerson is  rooted  (the  line  is  from Wallace  Stevens,  and  forms  one  of  the  seminar's 
refrains). These images also crop up in many other places, not insignificantly in accounts of 
creative process. Deborah Hay, a choreographer whose presence as a teacher, maker, and thinker 
in the dance community1 over the course of the last 50 years makes her something of a local guru 
(I like to say a presiding genie), is one of the field's most effective communicators of the strange 
explorations it undertakes as well as a thinker who has committed to developing methodologies 
of  practice  to  sustain  those  explorations  over  time.  In  My  Body,  The  Buddhist  (Wesleyan 
University Press, 2000), she describes the same kind of blending, approached through a rigorous 
daily improvisatory practice of listening to the body understood as her “teacher.” She writes:
My body, dancing, is formed and sustained imaginatively. I reconfigure the three 
-dimensional  body  into  an  immeasurable  fifty-three  trillion  cells  perceived 
perceiving, all of them, at once. Impossibly whole and ridiculous to presume, I  
remain, in attendance to the feedback. At such times Deborah Hay assumes the 
devotion of a dog to its master; reading the simplest signs of life, lapping up 
whatever nuance my teacher produces. (emphasis added, xxiv)
Remain in attendance to the feedback could be a paraphrase of one of Emerson's  tuitions to 
1    The “dance community” I refer to is one that is centered in “downtown” New York and comes out of the modern  
dance tradition, but is particularly identified with the renewal of modern dance by Merce Cunningham, John Cage,  
Ann Halprin (based on the West Coast but an influential teacher), Judson Dance Theater, and the “release  
techniques” that grew out of that generation's work. Many strands of thought and influence connect here, and 
downtown New York is only one of its scenes though it is historically an important place of convening. A 
community-based organization that presently acts as a hub for this scene is Movement Research. 
8rethink  knowing as  reception, one of the moving assignments I hear in his essays, both in his 
direct exhortations and his descriptions of the world.
In Emerson I find a “commentary” that elucidates the relationship between the practices 
of the dance and performance world where I have situated myself, the inheritance of dancing's 
habits and experiments, and the inheritance of philosophical literature bearing on the question of 
how to live an engaged, fulfilling life. The language of “inheritance” of philosophy comes to me 
from Cavell, by which he means something like allowing the philosophical text, which addresses 
a generality called “the human,” to address the human in me. I should add that, with Cavell, I 
take the question of how to live as a philosophical question, take Emerson as a philosopher, and 
take his writing in terms of that project. 
I began taking dance seriously around the same time I began taking philosophy seriously 
(around my first year of college), and intuited almost from the beginning the consonance of what 
I think of very generally as “choreographic thinking” (a particular variety of openness to the 
spatial  sense  of  ideas,  and  to  the  pleasure  of  sequencing  them in  complex  and  unfamiliar 
relations) with the passages of philosophy that I had collected, and would have recorded in my 
commonplace  book  were  I  a  reader  of  another  century.  The  first  philosophical  text  of 
choreographic importance to me was Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's  A Thousand Plateaus 
(University of Minnesota Press,  1987), especially its chapters “On the Refrain,” “Becoming-
Intense, Becoming-Animal” and “The Smooth and the Striated,” which describe in various ways 
the energetic and logical attributes of a lived space (a “territory”) coming into and out of relative 
stability,  visibility,  or  affective  force.  This  text  was joined by movement-oriented  thinkers  I 
found through Deleuze, like Henri Bergson, and through Bergson, T.E. Hulme, as well as by the 
9philosophically  committed  literature  of  Italo  Calvino  whose  Invisible  Cities  (1972)  and 
Cosmicomics  (1965) each distill  anatomical or structural  analysis of the elements of moving 
systems (cities, planets) into contemplative miniatures, tiny animations. It is not insignificant that  
A Thousand Plateaus, my philosophical primer, opens with an invitation to the reader to read as a 
collector rather than a student, to read the book as one might play a record, repeating some tracks 
and skipping others. 
While  that  intuition  of  the  complementary  sense  of  choreographic  and  philosophical 
thinking has long been privately fruitful, it is only through the work of this dissertation that I  
have learned to articulate it as bearing on non-dualistic thinking, and to understand dance as 
offering philosophy a much-needed experience of thinking within a project of giving ongoing, 
primary attention to  embodied intelligence.  In the course of  this writing,  I  have located the 
intellectual  historical  context  of this  joining of  dance  and philosophy in the  commitment  of 
process philosophy and pragmatism to education as an unending process of growth. In this way 
my private  pairing has  come to be a vehicle  for understanding the values that animate very 
public, social commitments. 
The  argument  of  this  dissertation  then,  is  that  embodied  creative  process  offers 
something fundamental to what Emerson calls “the conduct of life,” using the electrical imagery 
of conduction to signal the flow of intelligence and power through any individual “conductor.” 
The assertion I carry forward from this research is that creative process deserves to be considered 
pedagogically not as a form of “enrichment” on top of more essential skills, but as a practicum 
for the most essential fluencies of thinking. 
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TWO. Methods
Join the form to the processes of the mind and body.
Call this join Sense.
How then do we inhabit the music?
— Matthew Goulish, “A Transparent Lecture”
My method in this study has been one of joining. I have been concerned in particular with 
joining Emerson's  descriptions of the strange ongoingness inherent in thinking with practical 
occupations within which it is possible to take up a moving way of being or doing or working. 
As Robert Richardson describes in  First We Read, Then We Write: Emerson on the Creative  
Process (University of Iowa Press, 2009), Emerson was also concerned with this joining, but 
took pains to remove specific references. Richardson's study of Emerson's writing methods, the 
short  complement  to  his  much  longer  intellectual  biography,  demonstrates  the  “enormously 
practical”  side of Emerson,  both in  his  interests  and in  his  methods of  reading and writing. 
Richardson  describes,  for  example,  the  image  sense  underlying  Emerson's  seemingly  fluffy 
sentence, “hitch your wagon to a star”: the operations of the tide mills built in the Massachusetts 
bay,  which,  through  the  lunar  regulation  of  the  tides,  harnessed  a  practical  instrument  (a 
waterwheel  grinding  corn)  to  a  heavenly  body,  an  observation  which  highlights  the  critical 
importance of commonplace, ordinary, and practical experience in Emerson's appeals to the laws 
of  nature  (23).  Emerson's  customary  elision  of  reference  leaves  his  sentences  suggestive  of 
cosmic-scaled degrees of import, blending with his extraordinary enthusiasm to give his writing 
its urgent and often prophetic cadence. But his finest readers redirect his abstractions toward 
daily experiences.  This is  possible because these sentences are  grounded in observed things, 
things that work—his words are, in Emerson's phrase, “fasten[ed] … to visible things” (EL 23).
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My method has been to coax practical senses out of the abstract patterns of Emerson's 
figures  by  reading  his  sentences  in  the  light  of  the  particular  practices  that  figure  in  my 
“recognitions”  of  his  ideas.  These  practices  include  somatic  movement  investigations, 
choreography,  and  the  writing  or  devising  of  energetically-oriented  theater.  This  joining 
accomplishes  two  things.  First,  it  offers  new  resources  for  understanding  Emerson  and  for 
sounding his  essays  for  their  calls  to  action.  I  have  continually  tried  to  ask  of  his  abstract 
formulations, what does this look like in action? What is a case where this happening? Given 
Emerson's constant query about what it means to participate in nature, I found it fruitful to ask 
these questions in terms of physical, bodily practices, taking our bodily life as a natural condition 
never made obsolete  by cultural  development,  technological interventions and augmentations 
notwithstanding. These extra-literary, extra-philosophical,  materially-oriented disciplines bring 
to the discussion much needed testimony of the embodied patterns of thinking as they relate to 
natural  history  and  the  nonhuman  world.  This  is  especially  the  case  in  my  discussion  of 
Emersonian  “impersonality,”  marked  as  a  necessary  region  for  any  contemporary  study  of 
Emerson by Sharon Cameron's work. Her  Impersonality: Seven Essays (University of Chicago 
Press,  2007) devotes two of its seven chapters to Emerson, and in its sharp criticism of the 
ethical implications of his impersonal announces itself as a text to which anyone must respond 
who argues that Emerson offers valuable input to ethical thinking. One of the projects of this 
dissertation is a response to Cameron from the standpoint of what I understand as impersonal, 
embodied experience. Embodied sensibilities as conditions of ordinary experience are implied in 
the readings of Cavell and Arsić, and explored with special respect to findings in neuroscience 
and the materiality of thought in the scholarship of Joan Richardson, but my study offers a direct 
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link to research into thought's embodiment through the specific, experiential practices of somatic 
exploration, and so, I hope, enlarges our understanding of the natural intelligence which Emerson 
advances. 
The use of creative disciplines as resources for expanding upon Emerson's sense is the 
explicit method of my first two chapters. I do this by appealing to the experiments and findings  
of the somatic disciplines of Body-Mind Centering and Ideokinesis, as well as to artist accounts 
of creating literary and performance work. Performance as an area of thought and skill also acts 
as  an  imaginative resource in  the sense that  my immersion in the varieties of attention that 
belong to  performance-making has  made me  unusually sensitive  to  the  patterns  of  physical 
intelligence that exceed the work of reflective thinking (concentrated in the brain), leading me to 
what we could call a proprioceptive registration of Emerson's figures. Proprioception is the sense 
that tells us where and how our bodies are positioned in space, and I mean to suggest quite 
literally  that  with  a  heightened  attention  to  proprioceptive  feedback,  Emerson's  figures  and 
images of thinking take on striking physical sensations. This registration led me to give special 
attention to the spatial features of Emerson's descriptions of intelligence, especially with respect 
to the thinking that goes on at the edge, beyond, or behind what we can see. 
In the third and fourth chapters I allow images that arose in joining Emerson with my 
own fields of creative work to guide the questions and structures of the chapters themselves,  
directing them toward the compositional processes of creative work and especially to the least 
legible and most disoriented parts of those processes. In other words, whereas in the long first 
half  of  the  dissertation,  I  introduce  performance  disciplines  as  a  resource  for  Emerson 
scholarship, in the second half I pivot so that I might introduce Emerson to artists as a resource 
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for making or thinking about performance. The dissertation ends with the documentation of a 
performance I generated in the course of writing this study, prompted by Emerson to publish this  
experience, to rewrite his texts in my own idiom. 
This encapsulation, that we must “rewrite the sacred texts in our own idiom,” comes 
from Joan Richardson's  American Aesthetics seminar. It is her distillation of one of Emerson's 
moving assignments—an assignment because he demands that reading, absorbing, learning as 
the merely dutiful student, is not enough; a  moving assignment because every new generation 
must take up the transmissions it preserves in the sound and cadence that strikes its ear, and 
furthermore  must  actively  discover  that  sound in  order  to  do  this.  Meeting  Emerson in  the 
environment of Joan's seminar initiated this sense that to read Emerson is to be provoked to 
answer him in my own idiom and with my own figures. What comes forward and what is new? 
What does a literary (or any other) inheritance do? Considered in this way, Emerson becomes not 
just a figure from literature and philosophy's history, but a relative, a forgotten Uncle, part of a 
long relay. I take up Emerson, adding my own scenes and contexts, with the license that Joan's 
seminar practices: to understand the transmission that takes place in an intellectual genealogy as 
a kind of light that can bounce both forward and back, not only creating lines of influence but 
amplifying itself  in the array of affinities described by family resemblance,  as if  intellectual 
history is a body of water whose waves break in all directions. This is an approach to history and 
to the body of texts preserved from the past that is not concerned with describing a unidirectional 
progress,  but  rather  with  a  series  of  present-tense  experiences.  Reading  this  way,  the  still-
resonating figures of the recorded past can be understood not only as backgrounds but also as 
present presences.2
2    One of the ghosts within this dissertation is Henry James's story The Jolly Corner (1908), which dramatizes this 
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Taken as a whole, this series of chapters attempts to read and respond to Emerson as a 
writer of  assignments, moving assignments whose shapes continue to shift each time they are 
answered. These assignments offer a second sense of what it means to “read actively”: to hear in 
the cadences of his  description a call  to attention,  to action.  Sometimes the assignments are 
generated as ways of experientially testing the essay's statements. Sometimes they are responses 
to  direct  exhortations.  This feeling of responding to assignments,  instead of responding as a 
traditional critic or historian, will be apparent in my prose, and accounts for the ongoing refrain 
throughout this dissertation of asking what it might actually look like to take Emerson seriously 
in the present, to take him personally. I don't mean to make a straw man out of the figure of the 
historian or critic, but I do think that criticism habitually concentrates around the idea that it is  
possible to find a distance from the affect of the things it studies. The critique levied against this 
habit—by feminism, by post-colonial criticism, by auto-ethnography—brings perspective and a 
healthy friction to critical practices. Still, I find that the frankly earnest and personal admission 
that I make in relation to my investment in reading and writing positions me outside the critical 
project. 
Responsiveness to reading as a way of locating assignments is something that I link to 
my experience making things, which forms the longer-term commitment of my own working 
life, and therefore the larger environment in which my doctoral study sits. This responsive way 
of reading is to look for suggestions and implicit tasks in any description of any portion of life, 
and is, I think, typical of makers of what is these days called “devised” performance, which 
presence of past figures through the attempt of a man to hunt down the alter-ego that belongs to the untaken path 
from an earlier moment of his life. This attempt is made by occupying the building, the old home, where that other 
life would have played out. The idea that we could make ourselves receptive to these past figures, that we gain  
friction and vibrancy from the effort to bring that encounter into happening, a vibrancy that not only explains but 
also transforms where we find ourselves, inspires my reading of Emerson. 
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refers to the construction of a performance event, often by groups instead of individuals, without 
a  pre-existing  single  text,  usually  drawing  from a  wide  constellation  of  sources,  and  often 
generative of unique propositions for what exactly goes on in a piece of theater. Devised work 
can be created by building material in response to tasks, challenges, or questions. For example 
Pina Bausch, the great German choreographer and one of the founding artists of the hybrid genre 
known  as  tanztheatre (or  dance  theater,  an  important  cousin  and  background  to  devised 
performance),  would  begin  a  new  work  by  asking  each  company  member  to  respond  (in 
movement, song, skit, speech) to a question, building the piece by directing and compiling these 
responses  into  a  complex  structure  in  a  fantastic  environment  (one  piece  famously  has  a 
mountain of carnations onstage). Goat Island, the Chicago-based performance group active from 
1987 to 2007 to which Matthew Goulish belonged, worked with a similar process, but with a 
greater emphasis on using texts as potential sources for generative tasks. This sourcing approach 
is a variety of active reading, a constant registration of the images and structures of a text as 
suggestive of an etude or exercise, a “commentary,” to recall the opening phrase, on something 
to be done.3
Goat Island's  compositional methods can be also felt  in  the architecture  of  Goulish's 
essay writing in general, which he describes in one subtitle as “in proximity of performance” and 
which could be characterized as concerned with compensation, surprise, strangeness, attraction, 
and ongoingness, the Emersonian key words described above. A member of a fine arts faculty (at 
the School  of the Art Institute  of Chicago),  his  writing,  though often orbiting around an art 
object, traverses many thinkers and regions of thought that are dear to the critical or theoretical 
3    See director Lin Hixon's comments throughout Small Acts of Repair: Performance, Ecology, and Goat Island  
(Routledge, 2007), for specific examples of such sourcing. 
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exponents of the humanities.  But as an artist-scholar he takes an idiosyncratic  freedom with 
respect to the shape of his essays, and they do not come across as works of “theory,” but rather 
something more like intelligent events. That is, their theoretical interests are not so much given 
as statements or arguments, but rather animate the ways the essays unfold in time, the kinds of 
attention they demonstrate, and the perceptions they record. In “A Transparent Lecture,” a work 
that considers the composer Morton Feldman, catastrophe, and notation, he indicates the logic of 
his strangely-shaped structure: 
Join the form to the processes of the mind and body.
Call this join Sense.
How then do we inhabit the music? (179)
Goulish is describing an approach to talking about Feldman, as well  as to talking about the 
notation and realization (or inhabitation) of music (a question to which Feldman brings new 
strategies by abandoning certain music-historical forms of control). But these lines also strike me 
as an assignment to be taken up more generally: join compositional form to the patterns we can 
discover by giving attention to thinking and moving, to growing and/or dying. Build something 
from the structural logic of those intelligent material processes. (Goulish elsewhere describes this  
as an ecological approach to composing.) In calling this join “Sense,” Goulish suggests that 
form, or structure, carries sense—carries meaning, value—by virtue of its enmeshed joining with 
sensory attention, physical processes. 
 If their senses are understood as being grounded in these bodied, intuitive processes, 
how then do we inhabit the music of Emerson's essays? That is, how might an enlarged capacity 
to sense and an enlarged comfort with what even constitutes sense, lead us to read in a new way? 
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I  cite  Goulish  alongside  these  questions  to  bolster  the  license  I  take  in  joining  Emerson's 
preservation of forms—his condensations of natural law into suggestive sentences, his recurrent 
images—with processes of mind and body that in my particular experience have been accessible 
through the work of making dance and performance. Since the processes I bring to bear are not  
simply  objective  phenomena  I  have  studied,  but  are  articulated  registers  of  my  embodied 
experience, this joining allows Emerson's tuitions to appeal to my  intuitions, which is what I 
think Emerson wants of his readers.  My method, the assignment I heard and took, has been to 
inhabit the music of Emerson's essays by allowing them to rest in the intelligence of these other 
disciplines, to register that music there, and try to move with it.
THREE. Chapters
CHAPTER ONE.
“Where do We Find Ourselves?” Thinking and Locating in Emerson's “Experience.”
In  this  chapter  I  explore  intelligence  as  the  experience  of  the  incursion  of  nature's 
patterns into a moving attention, and the idea that those patterns are not registered first as visible,  
rational concepts, but rather come through us from behind, which is to say, come from pathways 
we cannot see or predict in advance.  I open this exploration with a reading of “Experience” 
(1844), an essay notable for its pragmatic grounding in what Emerson calls “the temperate zone,” 
even as it attests to the continual unsettling of knowledge and habit produced by the co-presence 
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of loss to growth. Widely acknowledged as one of his most important, if most unsettling essays, 
it  seemed a necessary starting point for my own pursuit.  Although many studies of Emerson 
concentrate on his opening salvo, Nature, published in 1836, and although I find strains in that 
book that continue into “Experience” and the other essays I rely on, my impulse is to situate my 
study  in  the  less  enthusiastically  transcendentalist  Emerson.4 Stanley  Cavell  articulates  the 
difference between Nature and Emerson's later writing (separated only by four or five years), as 
between a feeling that skepticism was solvable and a feeling that it was not: that doubt is not ever  
to be solved but only to be lived with. “Experience” suggests that living in these conditions is not  
necessarily  demoralizing  or  alienating,  but  rather  that  creative  response,  acquiescence  to 
transition,  and a healthy revision of anthropocentric concepts offer ways to find ourselves at 
home in the always-moving world. In this home, there is both growth and death. “Experience” 
says we must identify with both. 
Though I had read other essays of his before I came to “Experience,” I count this as the 
first essay that struck me with the surprise and delight that underwrites my making such a long 
commitment to Emerson. Much of this had to do, at  first,  with reading it  alongside Cavell's  
“Finding  as  Founding:  Taking  Steps  in  Emerson's  'Experience'”  (collected  in  Emerson's  
Transcendental Etudes) which gave me my first lesson in the fruitfulness of turning Emerson's 
words over, like rocks in my palm, for their weight and their multiple senses. Inspired by Cavell 
to  linger  on  Emerson's  formulations,  and  frankly  astonished  by  the  discovery  of  the 
simultaneously tender and bracing mood of this thinker whom I had previously thought of as 
merely  an  inspirational  speaker  of  a  bygone  era,  I  made  a  sound  recording  of  actor  Scott  
4    What transcendentalism signals is a complex discussion, and I take up a range of its senses throughout this 
dissertation. Here, I refer to the popular image of transcendentalism as a kind of head-in-the-clouds romanticism that  
predicts the great success available to the thinker. 
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Shepherd reading the essay, abridged to about half its length, which I then used as a sound score 
for an animation I was working on called “American Studies.” In the course of editing that  
animation I listened to the essay over and over, picking it up out of order, repetitively replaying 
small passages, and in the process committing many of its passages to memory. This relationship 
to a text, of having it in ear, creates an intimacy that lends itself to a slowly deepening registry of 
its sense, and seems retrospectively to have determined this essay as my starting point. As Cavell 
reminds, “in philosophy, it is the sound which makes all the difference” (“Must We Mean What  
We Say?” 36n31).
Cavell  reads  Emerson's  description  of  “the  evanescence  and  lubricity  of  all  objects, 
which lets them slip through our fingers then when we clutch hardest” (EL 473) as Emerson's  
notation of the signal condition of both knowing and having. He finds in the essay Emerson's 
“response” to the skepticism that recognizes the evanescence of all things, including of the life of 
Emerson's son Waldo, whose death is referred to in the essay's opening pages, a reference Cavell 
reads as initiating a set of images of both death and birth. In my reading, I lean toward a different 
emphasis, seeing the essay as recording Emerson's grief and recovery from the loss of a Platonic 
worldview that cannot survive the event of Waldo's death. The essay moves on from this opening 
event to address the question of how to live in a world of evanescent objects, one in which “all 
things swim and glitter” (471). 
My chapter follows Emerson in his project of skating on surfaces, which he decides is 
“the true art of life” (478). Emerson asks questions about a life understood without idealism to 
undergird  it:  how  do  thinking  and  understanding  occur  in  the  material,  vital  life  actually 
experienced, within its currents and surprises? How do I locate my own thinking, and how much 
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of it is really my own? Does ownership even pertain to thinking, or is it more a question of how I  
find myself experiencing thought? Where does power come from, and what happens when I get 
the sense of participating in it? I follow these questions, interrogating the images with which he 
describes moments of illumination and power for their rhetorical as well as their bodied, spatial, 
and  rhythmic  senses.  I  find  that  Emerson  threads  images  of  humility  and  accident  into  his 
descriptions of power and illumination in order to assign cautions against calculation, against 
feeling settled in any truth. These cautions reveal, in relief, the kind of thinker that Emerson 
proposes as a wise respondent to the evanescence of life: the wanderer. The wanderer, I argue, 
could be emblematic of an artist in the family array of John Cage, working back to Thoreau or 
Stein,  or forward to  contemporary choreographers  like Deborah Hay or Susan Rethorst  who 
describes making dances as a process of seeking out a stranger, of interviewing the body and 
responding to unanticipated prompts (a figure that also arises in Nietzsche). What joins these 
artists is a sensibility educated by availing themselves to the environment in which they find 
themselves,  as  well  as  a  strong  aversion  to  overly  pre-determined  structures  or  forms.  To 
articulate the distinction between this open process of structural discovery and the determinations  
or  calculations  associated  with  the  artist  as  designer  of  well-made  objects,  I  draw  upon 
experiential  anatomy,  a  somatic  approach to  learning,  which  offers  an  alternative  model  for 
accessing structural knowledge about life's patterning. I build from this somatic framework a 
new look at Emerson's descriptions of intelligence and illumination. 
I  link  this  appetite  for  experiencing  intelligence  to  what  I  call  the  “participatory 
practices” of artists working with chance, receptivity, and surprise in daily forms, and who value 
art-making for its process as much as or more than its products. These participatory practices can 
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be understood as projects of what Emerson describes as “husband[ing]” moments of being (EL 
479), which he names the object of philosophy. For the chapter's conclusion, I turn to Gertrude 
Stein's process-oriented writing practice, examining “Rooms” from Tender Buttons (1914) as an 
example  of  the  philosophical  work  of  navigating  ordinary  life  with  a  receptive  attention  to 
felicitous moments. With the lightness and pleasure of Stein's domestic perceptions, I invoke the 
uncertain condition of skepticism not as a cause for despair, but as a shifting ground of delight.
CHAPTER TWO
It thinks, I move: An Embodied Approach to Impersonality
Emerson is identified by historians and philosophers both as a transcendentalist and as a 
forerunner of pragmatism. These two terms seem at the outset to suggest very different images of 
the man: one, the ecstatic prophet of elevation, the other the skeptical thinker who knows he 
cannot get at any one true reality. In the many slopes and leaps of his writing, which speaks from 
a panoramic variety of moods and confidences, it is possible to construct an Emerson of either 
emphasis. But taken together, which is what an honest appraisal of Emerson must do, these two 
relationships to thinking, as ebb and flow, revise each other. In particular they revise the implied 
elevation of “transcendence,” and the implied sobriety of “pragmatism.” The impersonal is one 
of Emerson's names for the transcendent. It is also the larger context through which power flows, 
and so a critical field of pragmatic action. In this chapter, I enter into the discussion by wagering 
that a non-dualistic approach allows for a resolution of the apparent opposition between person 
(the pragmatist who does) and the impersonal (person-transcending life).
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This chapter was formed from a seed of discontent provoked by Cameron's reading of 
Emerson's impersonal, which hinges on an assessment of Emerson as seeking ownership over 
impersonal  intelligence.  This  discontent  was  grounded  in  my  recognition  of  Emerson's 
descriptions of impersonal intelligence as what in somatic research is thought of as patterning, 
and so something that is  accessible to all persons, but uncontrollable by them. Responding to 
what  I  felt  was a  dualistic  reading of  Emerson's  terms, this  chapter  lays out  a  rationale for  
thinking about  the  impersonal  through the  intelligent  instrument  of  our  persons:  our  bodies. 
Thinking from this perspective,  I  attempt  to  offer an evaluation of  what  it  means to  “own” 
impersonal  intelligence,  not  along  the  lines  of  ownership  as  private  property,  but  rather, 
ownership as a recognition of kinship and belonging.
With help from Herwig Friedl's excellent elaboration on Emerson's description of life as 
“circular power returning to itself,” which Friedl aligns with ongoing natural history, I argue in 
this chapter that the astonishingly complex patterns and systems of the human body, understood 
as  the  still-changing  inheritance  of  our  natural  history,  give  us  a  venue  to  explore  our 
“impersonal” intelligence that does not leap over or away from our individual selves, but rather 
explores physical selfhood as an instrument to experience more generally distributed material 
patterns  of  organization.  I  argue  my point  by  pursuing the  remarkable  consonance  between 
Emerson's descriptions of the flow of impersonal thought (observed in the course of his efforts to 
give attention to “the mode of our illumination”) and the descriptions of pattern and intelligence 
that arise in somatic work, represented here particularly by the work of Mabel Todd (in what 
came to be called Ideokinesis) and Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen (in Body-Mind Centering (BMC), 
which develops the Ideokinetic practice in combination with several other modalities). I argue 
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that thinking through and with the body is a critical element of understanding what Emerson is 
writing about. 
I bring the concrete activities of somatic work to bear on the question so beautifully 
articulated by Friedl, that of power depending on the continuous recuperation of the “it-self” or 
the natural history of any being. Friedl's description is enormously persuasive, but it is situated in 
the  ontological  terms  of  the  philosophical  vocabulary.  Somatics  is  a  field  of  highly  refined 
investigations into embodied intelligence, one that in its experiential vantage (open to anyone 
with a floor to lie on and time to spend listening to their body) is much closer to Emerson's  
methods of giving attention to thinking through the  journaling process than either the technical 
vocabulary of philosophy or the methods of neuroscience which study the brain as an object, 
even though these studies too are helpful. (I do not mean to suggest an exclusionary opposition 
between these methods, but rather to suggest that Emerson's reading in science supported his 
experiential findings, which he gives more authority to. Likewise in BMC, objective medical 
study augments the practitioner's  instruments, but the experiential work remains the primary 
scene  of  discovery or  therapy.)  Using a  somatic  framework to  draw philosophical  questions 
toward venues of actual practice, I locate approachable situations in which to ask the questions 
that Emerson assigns. Drawing the impersonal—as the intelligent and always-changing natural 
history of the body—to meet the practice of a person moving, I find a non-opposition between 
transcendent and pragmatic knowing. I locate the Emersonian appetite for transcendence as the 
hope for an experience of  participation in the active patterns of intelligence and the flows of 
power that belong to nature, and belong also to me insofar as my body is natural. 
The background concern of this chapter, then, is the question of what nature and natural 
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might mean to a person in the twenty-first century. Somatic work, its field of exploration in the 
moving, sensing body, can be taken up as easily in the city as the country, and so stands to offer  
the contemporary urban person a venue for the recuperation of nature, not figured as a return to 
nature or off-the-grid abandonment of civilization, but as a recuperation of mental and physical 
health. The pioneers of the field understood it as a response to the anxiety and dis-ease of the 
industrial, technological world, and so in many ways somatic work addresses itself particularly 
to the city dweller. 
CHAPTER THREE
Fragment Assignments: Eight Approaches to the Sound of Philosophy
“To work deliberately in the form of the fragment can be seen as stopping or appearing to stop a  
work closer, in the process, to what Blanchot would call the origin of writing, the centre rather  
than the sphere.” —Lydia Davis, “Form as a Response to Doubt”
This chapter, which unfolds in eight parts, germinated in the space opened up by Cavell's 
idea that Emerson calls for philosophy by suppressing his own authority in order to make room 
for that philosophy.5 One of the questions that arises for Cavell is what philosophy sounds like 
and  where  we might  find  it  outside  of  the  texts  which  announce  themselves  in  their  form, 
vocabulary,  or  intertextual  elements,  as  part  of  the  discipline  of  philosophy.  This  question 
5     See “Thinking of Emerson,” collected in Emerson's Transcendental Etudes, for an extended discussion of this 
question. 
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jumped  out  at  me  immediately,  given  my  own  ongoing  combination  of  philosophy  with 
choreographic thinking, and my continual attraction to philosophical literature as a source from 
which to begin creative work. Cavell suggests that philosophy could be thought of not as a body 
of literature per se, but as a commitment one finds (or does not find) in one's own thinking. This 
shifted criterion—asking simply whether there are philosophical commitments present in a text 
or work—allows for a relaxing of the internal criteria of philosophy as a genre or discipline. My 
chapter  begins  by  signaling  its  philosophical  commitments,  and  proceeds  by  orbiting  the 
question of what philosophically committed writing looks or sounds like, when written outside of 
the protocols of disciplinary philosophy. 
Emboldened  by  a  negatively  capable  comfort  with  the  possibility  of  traversing  the 
interval  between two widely separated things  that  both  evidence  philosophical  commitments 
(Emerson's essays, my theater), I composed the chapter as an eight-part etude whose sections are 
constrained  by  the  addition  of  a  third  “separated  thing”:  a  set  of  fragments  from  Emily 
Dickinson. My method was to take the language from Dickinson, and use it as a sounding line in 
two directions:  into the pool of Emerson's  philosophically committed language,  and into the 
body of theater and poetics practices that form my own education as an artist. Toward the end of  
the chapter, I allowed this sounding line to drop into the pond of my own work directly, as a  
means of introducing both the license I took and the commitments I held while making Another  
Tree Dance, the Emersonian performance piece documented in my fourth chapter. 
The chapter calls on Cavell to articulate what he calls “the arrogation” of the voice of 
philosophy that  must  be  taken up when writing it.  From there,  it  glides  without  conclusion 
through the rest of its series (of stairs? of islands? of pools?), picking up interlocutors for brief  
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duets, including Antonin Artaud and the performance work made in the wake of his influence, 
Goat Island, John Cage, Mac Wellman, Big Dance Theater, Susan Howe, Joan Retallack, Anne 
Carson, and of course Dickinson herself. Framed as a set of approaches into the neighborhood of 
the question, how does an artist write philosophy?, the chapter advances its argument, we could 
say, atmospherically. Certain preoccupations recur: what happens to the structure of an argument 
when it  is free to take a non-expository form? How does the experience of thinking in non-
illuminated  regions  (in  sleep,  in  trance,  in  weird,  wild  spaces)  hover  behind  or  around  our 
rational daylight thinking?
Aside  from turning to  face  theater  more  directly,  this  chapter  takes  on  strategies  of 
addressing and creating significance that belong to the strand of theater I practice. Goat Island 
represents these strategies as ecological: the significance varies according to the member of the 
audience  because  each  member  brings  a  very  different  set  of  backgrounds  to  the  work.  In 
allowing the  chapter  to  ring  its  separated  elements  as  a  set  of  bells,  looking for  sonorities, 
dissonances, sound-wave cancellations even, it opens itself up to new elements of association 
from its readers in turn. Thus the space between chapters two and three is not simply one of 
moving  to  a  new question  or  area  of  investigation,  but  a  span  over  which  the  linearity  of 
traditional  academic argumentation crosses  a  point  of  inflection  (in  the  algebraic  sense of  a 
change in a line's curvature). The line moves off into a curve, away from the writer-responsible 
prose  of  the  American  academic  and  into  a  reader-responsible  prose  that  begins  to  bear 
resemblance to something more like a choreographic relationship to making sense. 
It  is  worth  noting  here  that  the  designation  “reader-responsible”  comes  out  of  the 
Composition and Rhetoric strand of English, and refers to prose cultures that value ambiguity, 
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suggestion,  and  the  primary  role  of  the  reader  in  making  sense,  in  distinction  to  writer-
responsible prose cultures that expect the writer to lay out an argument and its explication in a 
hierarchical arrangement. I first met the distinction in a pedagogy class I was taking to prepare 
for teaching English 1 at Brooklyn College, where the student body includes many for whom 
English  is  their  second  language.  It  was  introduced  to  us  as  a  way  of  understanding  and 
responding to the kinds of prose we were likely to encounter from students of some non-Western 
cultural backgrounds. As I learned the designation, I recognized my preference for these non-
Western  rhetorical  modes.  The  longing  to  follow a  curving  path  from writer-responsible  to 
reader-responsible that has been present for me during the entire process of dissertating could be 
thought of in relation to what Cavell describes as Emerson's “eastern longings” that led him to 
the texts of Hinduism and Buddhism. As I briefly explore in my second chapter, the subculture of  
dance  and  art  practice  where  I  locate  myself  is  influenced  by  its  affinities  with  Buddhist 
approaches to living. Transitioning into reader-responsible prose, then, is also evidence of my 
desire to domesticate my scholarship, to bring it fully into the place where I find myself. 
The text itself is not purposefully obscure, although it does practice economy; rather, the 
relationship between the scenes or approaches is not explicated. The interval is embraced as a 
productive space. This embrace understands the suggestiveness of the fragment that Emerson 
also practiced in his paragraphs composed of sentences each of which could be the center of its 
own orbit, none subordinate to the argument of another. The islands of sense that give the reader 
orientation in this  chapter  are  the Dickinson refrains:  the words of each refrain become the 
corresponding scene's assignment and the language becomes more concrete in the light of that 
close focus. The scene is not finished until those words have been “fastened” to both Emerson 
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and the scene's visiting artist. As soon as that linkage is effected, the scene is over. The chapter 
declines to offer a conclusion; rather it ends in transition.
One of the effects of this chapter, I hope, is to recast Emerson within a different family 
array:  to  rethink  the  relations  we  assign  to  him  in  scholarship;  to  welcome  him  into  the 
bibliographic pantheon of the contemporary artist. The implicit argument I mean to make, is that 
in calling for philosophy, Emerson calls for a way of living and making that has been taken up,  
among other places, in art. 
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Fig. 3. “Something to Do” from The Ghost Host Pigeon Post (2007)
CHAPTER FOUR
Another Tree Dance: An Essay in the Form of a Room
The  fourth  and  final  chapter  of  this  study  is  the  documentation  and  text  of  a  solo 
performance  piece,  Another  Tree  Dance,  that  I  developed  and  performed  in  October  2013. 
Originally conceived of as an alternative form of publication for the dissertation itself, it only 
slowly announced itself as central to the work of this study, progressing with that realization 
from the  status  of  side  project,  to  epilogue,  to  chapter.  The chapter  begins  with a  ten-page 
account of the creation of the show, which provides a basic dramaturgy for its organizational 
structures and situates the work of making it in terms of the Emersonian commitments, and the 
commitments to Emerson, that animate the dissertation.  So I will  not repeat that background 
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narrative here, but rather try to indicate where I found the license and support for taking my 
scholarship down this very strange avenue. I want to invoke a small pantheon of heroes from 
whom I derive my encouragement, and for them to appear here as a sudden crowd. (This puts me 
in mind of the opening of A Thousand Plateaus where Deleuze and Guattari write that already 
they were several.) I list them here in the order that they come to mind. 
1.
Emerson  names  the  task  of  the  scholar  as  taking  of  a  “dive”  into  his  “privatest 
presentiments” at the bottom of which he hopes to find something “universally true.” This hinge 
between the private  and the universal  (or  human) is  where Cavell  derives his  notion of the 
“arrogation” of the voice of  philosophy (the act that enables an individual  person to speak 
philosophically  on behalf  of  the human),  as  well  as the locus of  a text's  potential  to  act  as  
“commentary”  on  a  life.  In  Joan  Richardson's  account  of  her  experience  reading  Cavell's 
autobiography, she cites a restatement of this idea from Cavell: “a certain strain of philosophy 
inescapably takes on autobiography … I speak philosophically for others when they recognize 
what I say as what they would say … As in Emerson, and in Thoreau, this turns out to mean that  
the philosopher entrusts himself or herself to write, however limitedly, the autobiography of a 
species; if not of humanity as a whole, then representative of anyone who finds himself or herself  
in  it”  (qtd.  in  Richardson “It's  About  Time”  123.)  Richardson writes  of  this  process  that  it  
“redirect[s] philosophy back to its therapeutic power,” continuing: “We, his readers, are led back 
home to recover our own mother tongues in order to get what he is talking about; translating his 
idiom into our  own ordinary  language,  we catch  his  pitch.  His  provocations  yield our  self-
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reliance” (137). The act of translating Emerson's idiom into my mother tongue of performance 
has been a ceremonial process of marking my own passage from reader to writer, yielding, we 
could say, my own self-reliance. Emerson declares that scholarship is tied to diving into one's  
own ordinary experience. Reading scholarship is tied to finding oneself prompted to recuperate 
oneself (in Cavell's articulation, to recuperate the “unthought known” that psychoanalysis seeks) 
through the recognitions of something representative in the private dives of others. 
I found license in this circling exchange of speaking and recognizing to do the work of 
scholarship-as-diving  until  I  located  the  private  imaginative  space  from where  I  recognized 
Emerson. It is important to note here that Another Tree Dance was composed of the stuff of my 
own creative past, not as a fictional or speculative construction but as a kind of revisiting and 
replaying of the images that animate my creative work—it really was a private dive and did not 
attempt to present or dramatize Emerson's essays. Whether or not that dive made it as far as even 
a  limited  “autobiography  of  a  species,”  it  did,  by  virtue  of  taking  place  in  the  room  of 
performance and with attention to the exchange of identification that happens in performing and 
witnessing, generate some kind of meeting place between the private and the public. 
2.
The writing of Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray helped me understand and articulate my 
orientation to literary studies, to thinking ethically about elemental parts of speech. I read them 
in the early stages of  my doctoral  work,  and their  thinking around what  it  means to  take a 
speaking position (to  say  I,  to  say  you,  to  say  we)  has grounded my own thinking and has 
underwritten my ability to understand one of the consonances between what I do as an artist and 
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what I think that I hear in Emerson. Cixous and Irigaray have different names for the relational  
interchanges that form the ways we can think through language's first person pronouns. If given 
only surface attention they can seem to be speaking in opposition to Emerson insofar as the 
feminism of which Cixous and Irigaray are exponents is involved in explicitly critiquing the 
“universal” position, a word to which Emerson assigns the highest value. However they are not 
speaking of the same “universal”; Emerson does not invoke something normative so much as 
something vast, ever-changing, and pluralistic.
I recently came across some old notes on Cixous's essay on theater, “Aller à la Mer,” 
from which I had transcribed this long passage:
It will be a text, a body decoding and naming itself in one long, slow push; the 
song of women being brought into the world … All it requires is one woman who 
stays beyond the bounds of prohibition, experiencing herself as many, the totality 
of those she has been, could have been or wants to be, moving ever more slowly, 
more quickly than herself, anticipating herself. It is coming to pass, this arrival of 
Woman into the world; I hear it from so far away, and no other stage/scene but  
this space with a hundred simultaneous scenes/stages where she moves, several 
women, unchecked in this place expended by her look, her listening. And if this 
scene/stage is movement, if it extends to where everything happens and Woman is 
Whole, where instead of being acted out, life is lived, women will be able to go 
there  and  feel  themselves  loving and  being  loved,  listening  and  being heard, 
happy as when they go to the sea, the womb of the mother. (547)
In my notes under this passage I wrote: Where everything happens: where life is lived, not acted.  
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Proposal for theater as a space of  presence—how does this relate to script? A technique of  
performance based in the room. New dance answers this. What does the script demand? This is  
the transition into script as manifesto itself,  as requiring a convergence of performance and  
living. This “convergence of performance and living” has something to do with the permission I 
gave myself to respond to Emerson from a highly unstable, oceanic position Cixous describes, 
writing by staying “beyond the bounds of prohibition, experiencing [myself] as many, the totality 
of those she has been, could have been or wants to be, moving ever more slowly, more quickly 
than [myself], anticipating [myself].”
3.
William James describes thinking as a stream, and notes our intellectual predilection for 
the rests, the substantives, the perches. He reminds there is a feeling of if, of why, of and. These 
transitional spaces in which thought flows in the course of making arguments: what are they? 
How might they be addressed? How might they be the scene of writing? Emerson too names life 
as  taking place in  transition.  Can writing persist  in  transition without  landing in  a  stopping 
place? Performance, especially non-narrative performance can offer a space to foreground the 
feeling  of  transitioning,  of  staying  alongside  a  moving  thought.  This  could  be  true  of  any 
discipline, but the special element of performance that, to my mind, makes this possible, is the 
way  that  the  experience  of  a  performance  is  always  moving in  an  energetic  feedback loop 
between performer and audience,  heightening the  feeling of  moving alongside that  which is 
changing. This is especially true of working in a small room, where presence can be taken in 
physically without the subordination to vision of a larger proscenium hall.6 (In the same way, 
6  It takes a truly magnificent performer to accomplish this in a large hall; the technology of projection is its vehicle.  
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working  non-linearly  or  non-narratively  declines  to  subordinate  present  events  to  narrative 
architectures, so that the audience cannot “see” where a story is heading.) I chose to write about 
(or better, inhabit and move alongside) the Emersonian material on transition by taking up the 
most transitional and ephemeral medium at hand. So I made an essay in the form of a (delicately 
and continuously changing) room. 
4.
I had the good fortune to take a class with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick before she died. The 
class was called  How to do things with words and other materials and was organized around 
making artist books. We met in two small sections of six students each, at Eve's house, where she 
set up tables with bowls of chips and we cut, glued, drew, sewed, or pasted, making free use of  
her  wall  of  ephemera  and  crafting  supplies.  Eve  was  a  great  scholar,  a  brilliant  critic,  an 
incredible teacher. She presented this course in bookmaking and bookthinking as an equally valid 
a form of inquiry or training to the more standard reading and writing seminar. What is a tactile 
exploration of this thinking we do in literary studies? What is the material object we work with 
and tussle over? Eve never asked us to articulate our assemblages in the form of a rationale, 
never suggested that we owed a critical formulation of what we were doing. We worked with 
material. 
One week was devoted to the altered book: a thing made out of a book but not necessarily  
remaining in that form. That week I began to make objects that became the elements of the 
One season I  was an extra in the Met  Opera's  dance company, for  a specially commissioned  Rite of  Spring.  I 
remember the ridiculous feeling (having only ever performed in intimate theaters before that) of looking out at the 
audience—just a sea of dots and reflective glasses. I felt nearer to my dog, who I knew was at home listening to the  
live Saturday afternoon broadcast of the opera, than I did to those 4000 people. As a result, the performance work 
was almost entirely focused on executing the choreography, relying on the large spatial pattern of the spectacle to do 
what, in smaller venues, we do with the play of energy and attention.
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animation I made of Emerson's “Experience”: first books turned into little stages, with hollow 
spaces  and  contraptions  for  rolling  transparencies,  then  finely  shredded  dictionary  pages  to 
accumulate into a small hill in the animation, then a puppet auditorium with chairs made out of  
glued-together and reshaped pages of Emerson's  essays (see fig.  4).  This is one approach to 
reading, to citing, to publishing. 
Fig. 4. Still from “American Studies” (2008)
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Fig. 5. Still from “American Studies” (2008)
My point is, if as remarkable a scholar as Eve Sedgwick felt there was value in making material 
objects without theoretical elaborations, that is a form of permission. 
5.
Before I started doctoral studies, I went through an MFA program at Brooklyn College, 
studying playwriting with Mac Wellman. The program happened to be situated in the English 
department  as part  of  creative writing,  rather  than in  theater  (a  departmental  reassignment I 
maintained in doctoral work). In addition to workshop and tutorials, we were to take an elective 
each semester. One semester I decided to take a class through the Anthropology department at 
Columbia.  It  was  taught  by  Michael  Taussig,  and  was  centered  around  Walter  Benjamin's 
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Arcades Project. I found it on the recommendation of a friend who thought I would like Taussig. 
The course was called Profane Illumination, and its questions were about how do scholarship in 
a vital, excited, illuminated vein. In the essay on Surrealism from which the course title comes,  
Benjamin writes, “In the world's structure dream loosens individuality like a bad tooth. This 
loosening of the self by intoxication is, at the same time, precisely the fruitful, living experience 
that  allowed [the surrealists]  to  step outside the domain of  intoxication.  …the true,  creative 
overcoming of religious illumination certainly does not lie in narcotics. It resides in a  profane 
illumination, a materialistic, anthropological inspiration to which hashish, opium, or whatever 
else can give an introductory lesson” (179). 
The Continuing Studies Dean, whose permission I needed to register, told me with a 
mildly condescending tone that Taussig was “sui generis.” I found myself perfectly at home in 
the environment of the class,  which was conversational,  open-form, and openly in search of 
profane illuminations. This was my introduction to doctoral studies, the first time I was in a room 
with doctoral  students,  and the first  time I  estimated that  I  was capable  of  the undertaking.  
Perhaps if I had taken a more traditional academic course, I wouldn't have felt comfortable or  
performed  as  well.  Taussig's  response  to  my  writing  was  perhaps  the  most  important 
encouragement that I should pursue doctoral studies. He encouraged us to dive into images in our 
writing, in a way, now that I think of it, that resembles Erik Ehn's image-activated playwriting 
pedagogy. It was assumed in that class that the position from which to speak critically and the 
sound of  that  speech was a  wide  open question—something I  now understand in  the  larger 
context of anthropology's self-criticism of the ethnographic genre and its conventions. In that 
class,  I  wrote  as  myself:  as  a  person seriously  committed to  thinking who wanted  to  script 
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wandering experiences of thinking and illumination. I experienced the process as full of profane 
delight. It called me. This environment was what I was thinking of when I decided to get a Ph.D. 
The image was, from the beginning, imbued with freedom to entertain the full range of contexts 
in which we found ourselves thinking (which always, for me, includes performance). The first 
essay we read was Benjamin's “Unpacking My Library, a Talk About Book Collecting.” In its 
final passage, which I remember Taussig returning to over and over again as an exemplary image 
of the scholar, it reads: 
O bliss of the collector. … For inside him there are spirits, or at least little 
genii,  which  have  seen  to  it  that  for  a  collector—and  I  mean  a  real 
collector, a collector as he ought to be—ownership is the most intimate 
relationship that one can have to objects. Not only that they come alive in 
him; it is he who lives in them. So I have erected one of his dwellings, 
with books as the building stones, before you, and now he is going to 
disappear inside, as is only fitting. (67)
Disappearing  inside  the  dwelling  built  from  my  collection  of  Emersonian  images,  I  made 
Another Tree Dance.
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FOUR. Committing to the Waves
I think I have offered an account here of how I came to feel committed to Emerson, and 
of the impulses that guided me in trying to join my reading of his essays to the thinking that 
comes out of a life in performance, but it remains to be said why it matters that I have done this,  
beyond my own sense of reconciliation or the novelty of the linkage. To answer this question let 
me  explain  why I  named  this  study “Committing  to  the  Waves.”  I  became sensitive  to  the 
suggestive richness of wave images from reading Joan's chapter on William James in A Natural  
History  of  Pragmatism.  In  that  chapter  she  notes  that  James  played  on  the  link  between 
vagueness, in English, and the French “la vague,” meaning wave. James gives an image of the 
self as a “storm-center” in a sea of thought without definite edges where we can say that one  
thing (I) ends and another thing (it) begins. The regions likely to produce surprise (for better or 
worse) are these margins of being—the vague outer district that haloes the familiar habits of 
character. These margins, vague in the sense of having indistinct location, are also vague in an 
oceanic sense: open to incursion and excursion, crossed by traveling waves and atmospheric 
advances. In a following chapter on William's brother Henry James, Richardson notes Henry's 
repeated use of the word “vague” in describing the speculative and intense process of thinking 
that  is  the  scene of  character  transformation in  his  stories,  culling the  image of  thinking as 
navigating from both James brothers. Emerson's writing too is replete with wave imagery, not 
only watery, but electric. The movement of electricity stands behind his naming “polarity” one of 
the primal conditions of being.
A commitment to the waves stands for a commitment both to the fact of this vagueness at 
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the edge of every I and it, and for a commitment to navigating the wave space where we find 
ourselves. The wave as pathway occupies a dual register in this study's name: both a material  
description  of  the  way energy travels  through matter,  and as  a  figure  for  the  movement  of 
thinking. Taken in a philosophical pitch,  the waves, as name for a field of thought, a field of 
sound, or field of material energy, stand for what is active and what might change in nature, in 
the material world. 
The  image  of  committing  to  the  waves  is  not  supposed  to  be  morbid.  There  is  a 
navigational vessel implied in the Jamesian image, dramatized as an “I,” a thinking self. The 
burial  at  sea  that  “committed  to  the  waves”  invokes  can  be  thought  of  as  the  small  and 
continuous burial of the present self in an unfolding life. This is not only a figure of loss, but also 
of  gaining  unforeseen  capacities.  In  Thoreau  it  is  the  relationship  between  mourning  and 
morning.7 In  Emerson's  images,  committing  to  the  waves  paraphrases  his  speaking  for  the 
necessity  of  suffering the process  of  transformation  by undergoing unsettlement.  Just  as  the 
navigator  steers  by  working  within  the  larger  pulses  of  the  waves  and  tides,  the  thinking, 
transforming  person undergoes  unsettlement  in  Emerson's  images  by  opening  herself  to  the 
transit of power through and beyond her person, via “subterranean turnpikes” not mappable by 
the  will.  In  the  vocabulary  of  John  Dewey,  committing  to  the  waves  is  a  commitment  to 
education as a process of growth, not limited to early years, but synonymous with the full term of  
life.  
It matters greatly today to avail ourselves of Emerson's words—nature,  power. A close 
reading of Emerson rescues those words from their fate as fixed symbols in an outdated and 
7    See Cavell's Senses of Walden (Viking Press, 1972) for an elaboration of this convergence, as well as Daniel 
Peck's development of that reading in his excellent Thoreau's Morning Work: Memory and Perception in A Week on  
the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, the "Journal", and Walden (Yale University Press, 1990).
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suspect  order  of  thinking  and  demands  that  they  be  renewed,  considered  as  the  welcome 
inheritance of all living things. It can be hard for a contemporary ear to hear these words in this 
valence, given the sustained critique of power that has taken place over the last half century 
along with the suspicion of the designation of the “natural.” In  Mythologies, Roland Barthes 
describes the “naturalization” of concepts as a way of taking them outside the domain of critique, 
a process by which things come to be understood as just “how it always was.” Nature here stands 
for the malignant retrospective rationalization of the status quo, for a refusal to dismantle the 
political and cultural investments, contingencies, and inequities concretized by the naturalized 
concept. Nature in this sense becomes a cultural shorthand for something that does not change, 
for a dead-end for critical opposition. Likewise, power became a malignant word in the domain 
of critical theory, standing for a power that surveils, represses, that orders, a power identifies 
with the State or with capital, and with the effort on the part of the powerful to retain power 
against the upsurging plurality, variety, and difference of life. But if we will hear him, Emerson 
argues that nature is a process of unrelenting change, and power is the “sharing” of this natural  
pulse or force over which no body may retain dominance in the longer term. Emersonian power 
is neither malignant nor beneficent even though its energy is always to some degree violent. 
Emerson's vision of experiencing power is of participating in a natural intelligence that includes 
but exceeds all human constructions. Through the receptive, responsive activity of the individual 
self  as  instrument,  Emerson envisions participating in nature's force by moving alongside its 
never-arrested oscillations between building and dismantling.
Taking this picture of power, the world is not ruled by an opposition between a powerful 
normative  center  and  a  disempowered  queer  margin,  though  a  temporally  and  intellectually 
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limited politics might try to reinforce such an opposition and bar the incursion of the outsider 
(deny the vagueness of its edges). Emerson suggests that if we would try to look from the deep-
historical perspective that knows no political consolidation is permanent, then we would see that 
the  main  stream of  life  is  process,  is  unsettlement.  (This  does  not  mean,  as  some  read  in 
Emerson, that we can simply be complacent with the problems of our politics. We must speak 
and act against such reactionary reinforcement where it degrades life, using violence to block 
change or stifle mobility.8) To belong to the world,  in Emerson, is not to belong safely to a 
normative center, but rather to experience the embrace of the world in our moving through it, to 
experience  belonging  as  an  accompaniment  by  the  stream  of  nature's  unpredictable  and 
unsettling process: “Nothing is secure but life, transition, the energizing spirit” (EL 413).
Sanity, says Emerson, consists in circulation, not consolidation—a security found only in 
transition.  It  is  my  frank  understanding  that  it  matters  to  avail  ourselves  of  Emerson's 
descriptions  of  nature  and  power—to  understand  these  not  as  fixed  entitlements  but  as 
descriptions of a process of growth undergone by all living things, unhealthy when stifled—in 
order to recuperate a health and sanity which is imbalanced or thwarted by the technological, 
industrial,  social  world  in  which  we  find  ourselves.  Pioneers  of  somatic  work  like  F.M. 
Alexander  and  Mabel  Todd described what  they  were  doing  in  such  high-stakes  terms,  not 
merely physical therapy for bodily injury, but a way of adjusting the instrument of the intelligent 
body to the strains of twentieth-century life, to rising anxiety. I do not think these problems have 
gone away in our century. I count myself among those who diagnose part of this imbalance as 
produced  by  dualism's  long  underestimation  of  embodied  intelligence  and  the  concomitant 
8    Laurence Buell's discussion of Emerson's relationship to abolitionism, in his excellent monograph Emerson 
offers a tempered analysis of how and where Emerson felt drawn into political work, as well as an account of  
different takes on Emerson's commitments to this cause and conflict.
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malformation  of  its  therapeutic  tools.  The advocacy that  grows from attending to  embodied 
intelligence as an instrument of natural power points me toward scenes of education which create 
space for the exploration of all the weird intelligences we can experience.
The therapy Emerson proposes is a commitment to experience ordinary life as natural 
process, one productive of strangeness and wonder, loss and gain, leading to new identifications 
of where or how we belong in the world. What this dissertation advances is an argument that 
Emerson's circulatory images can be translated into specific activities of physical exploration and 
creative process, in and through which individuals can entertain images and “share” in nature of 
those images by following their transfigurations. Instead of taking “individuality” as indicating a 
possessive form of originality, these activities instead approach originality in the temporal sense 
of liveness and present-tense sensing that Emerson evokes when he asks, “Why should not we 
also enjoy an original relation to the universe?”  (EL 7). These activities frame a space and time 
to experience ourselves as instruments of sense, and to experience the sense that patterns the 
space in which we move. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
“Where do we find ourselves?” Thinking and locating in Emerson's “Experience”
1. FROM “REALITY” TO EXPERIENCE
I’ve been reading Emerson closely now for six years. Often this has meant traveling and 
re-traveling the same essays, and in fact in all that time I still have not finished reading through 
his entire catalog. The essay that I come back to, and whose sentences have taken root in my 
mind, that ring out on occasions in my life when I am trying to make sense of both abundance 
and loss, is “Experience” (1844). Perhaps it was an accident that this became Emerson’s primary 
essay for me. I began turning over its phrases as a reader of Stanley Cavell, assigned when I was 
a new participant in Joan Richardson’s American Aesthetics seminar, which I joined in 2007 by a 
kind of homing instinct because the course description mentioned both Jonathan Edwards and 
Susan Howe, two writers my mentor Mac Wellman had directed me toward as I was beginning to 
think about doctoral study. In the years leading up to this present project, I have given a great 
deal of attention to the family resemblance between all those sentences, images, and remembered 
scenes  of  experience  that  have  rooted  themselves  into my thinking,  and become references, 
containers, koans really, that are amplified annually by the way their persistence in my memory 
makes them attractors, or sorters: ways to file impressions, convictions, and illuminations in my 
mind. In the way that so much allegiance comes from an accidental encounter that strikes chords 
of deep affinity, I have taken this to essay. 
As  Lawrence  Buell  notes  in  his  monograph  on  Emerson,  tracing  the  widely  variant 
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affinities with and images of Emerson that his contemporaries and his critics drew, there is no 
single reading to be drawn from Emerson. Emerson himself acknowledges the degree to which 
one’s  thinking  is  not  systematic,  nor  without  inconsistencies  or  even  logical  oppositions. 
Thinking comes in moods, and “our moods do not believe one another”(EL 406). Although there 
are many returning temperaments that emerge and retreat over the course of Emerson’s essays, 
upon which one could sustain claims to “Emersonian” ideas—of self, of nature, of intelligence—
different readers draw very different emblems from his texts. Within the shifting tonal plane of 
his essays, the ideas that seem a grounding melody to one reader strike another as a secondary 
harmony. It has occurred to me that I like the mood of “Experience” more than Emerson’s other 
moods;  it  strikes  me  as  familiar  and  offers  frameworks  for  recognizing  and  deepening  the 
patience required to live through a sustained process, be that creative, critical, or private. I would 
characterize its mood as tending toward the low and the quiet. Its optimism takes its sea level 
from a position of loss, of finding oneself a beginner again, in the mid-stream of life. It is marked  
by a reflective relationship to the passage of time, not meaning that it has no present-tense, but  
simply  that  its  improvisations  play  against  a  field  of  retrospection,  whereas  elsewhere  (for 
example in the agitating and exalting “Circles” or his  1836  Nature) he enacts the ecstasy of 
illumination as if finding his words for the first time. 
Although there is  an obvious  critical  voice that  doctoral  study steers me toward,  the 
adoption of which is part of the credential of a junior scholar, as an artist-scholar, I find myself 
compelled to admit the more personal stakes of my interest in reading. I read to find out, in the 
title  of  Wallace  Stevens's  poem  (which  rephrases  Emerson),  “How  to  live.  What  to  do,” 
specifically what to do within the course of a creative process, which is how I have chosen, for 
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the most part, to live. Most of what I have invested time in as a scholar have been texts that 
resonate  with  my  experience  of  creative  process  or  the  navigation  of  private  crises  (both 
processes seem to share a set of cautions and methods for going on). Because both art-making 
and examined living are projects of growth, the third term of my personal commitment to texts is 
pedagogical. “Experience” is also a project of growth: it describes process, addresses how and 
where “we find ourselves,” and how one moves,  in medias res,  in  play.  But  there are other 
reasons  to  propose  “Experience”  as  the  turf  on  which  to  think  through  Emerson  in  this 
dissertation. Composing for experience instead of theme or “aboutness” is basic to the kinds of 
performance and literature that I am trying to join with Emerson's body of thought. Inquiring into  
varieties of experience instead of privileging one type is basic to the kinds of philosophy those 
literary and performance projects practice. 
Consonant  with  the  emergent  dominance  of  scientific  method that  characterizes  later 
nineteenth-century  thinking  across  many  disciplines  and  continues  to  shape  contemporary 
paradigms of verification, Emerson’s essay on experience is more an account of observations 
than a logical argument. Inquiring into the things that seem to structure his experience, he makes 
a sequential report. Identifying the grains, or “lords,” of life, he writes: “I dare not assume to 
give their  order,  but  I name them as I  find them in my way” (EL 491).  “Experience” is  an 
exemplary  essay in the word’s sense of an attempt,  or foray: beginning somewhere,  moving 
through other places, ending on a new prospect, it nowhere stands outside of itself, has no thesis. 
There  are  arguments  to  be  found distributed  across  the  essay,  but  it  is  not  structured as  an 
argument  and  explication,  and  in  fact  explicitly  rejects  claims  to  completeness  (and  so 
conclusion). What generalizations, what tenacious and perennially applicable sentences are here, 
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have arisen as fruits of attention,  from occasions within Emerson’s train of questions.  These 
arguments,  when  they  occur,  are  not  usually  found  in  the  leading  positions  of  thesis  or 
conclusion. Rather, one happens upon them in the middle of a paragraph, as if rounding the bend 
to discover a striking scene. 
The essay opens with the image of human being as a condition of gliding, initiating, with 
the  question “Where  do we find  ourselves?”,  a  project  of  attempting  to  locate  oneself  as  a  
moving point in a continually moving flow. Although Emerson refers early on to the death of his  
son, I do not read the essay itself as about this private mourning, as many others have, including 
Barbara Packer and Sharon Cameron, but rather about the loss that marks any transfiguration 
(and the transfiguration that marks any loss). Cavell, too, brings forward Waldo’s death in his 
reading  of  “Experience,”  noting  a  series  of  “phantasmic  experiences  of  pregnancy”  in  the 
essays’s images which weave together, in their invocation of early childhood, with a number of 
buried references to Waldo’s death—buried by Emerson's resistance to explicitly naming Waldo, 
thereby joining Waldo to Being which also “refuses to be named.” Converting Waldo's proper 
name to the more vague “it,” Emerson writes of both his grief and the “lost estate” of his son: “I 
cannot get it nearer to me” (EL 473). Cavell finds in this sentence one of the essay's origins of 
the “indirection” that Emerson practices, joining it to another critical scene where getting fails. 
Emerson's naming of that failure as the condition of thinking signals a reversal of Kant: “All I 
know is reception. I am and I have: but I do not get, and when I have fancied that I have gotten  
anything, I found I did not” (EL 491). Reception instead of getting, attraction instead of grasping,  
characterize Cavell's figure of indirection. These things are tied in the essay's images to the death 
of Waldo and the anticipated birth of something nameless, which is the onward assertion of being  
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(ETE 124-135). 
I do not think Cavell is wrong to tie these figures together, but still they do not figure as 
strongly in my own understanding of the essay,  which I  take to have something to  do with 
Emerson’s description, in “Self-Reliance,” of the experience of reading and recognizing one’s 
“genius”  appear  with  “alienated  majesty”  in  the  writing  of  others,  invoking  the  action  of 
recognition as an animating element of reading. This particular recognition is generally taken as 
an admonishment against waiting, against the caution or deference that leads a person to avoid 
the  engagement  with  and  publication  of  their  proper  work.  Cavell  derives  from  this 
admonishment the license for what he calls the “arrogation” of the voice of philosophy9. It is 
hard today to read about one's alienated genius without automatically applying the contemporary 
idea of “genius” as a wildly exceptional property cultivated as a product of private will. Indeed a 
critical task for the contemporary reader of Emerson is to listen for his deconstruction of that 
more exceptional notion, and recognize that when he discusses genius, he means a capacity that 
belongs to everyone insofar as they are receptive to it, something he explicitly addresses in his 
essay on Shakespeare: “Great genial power, one would almost say, consists in not being original 
at all; in being altogether receptive; in letting the world do all, and suffering the spirit of the hour 
to pass unobstructed through the mind” (EL 711). But the return, as a kind of echo, of one’s 
alienated genius—understood in its older and more modest sense as one’s household spirit—
could also simply be an occasion to recognize the set of interests that animate one’s mind, one's 
attractions.
Sounding “Experience” against my own interest in composing performances built of a 
9     See the first chapter of The Pitch of Philosophy, for an elaboration of arrogation. I also address arrogation here, 
in my third chapter. 
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subtle emergence and recession of landscapes of sense or feeling, and particularly my interest in 
creating performances that direct  attention to  the lapping transitions  from one experience of 
clarity to the next, I catch in the essay the echoes not of buried sons but of descriptions of the  
deliquescence of ideas or things that had seemed to be stable, and in turn, continuing to ask “how 
to live, what to do,” cull from the essay prompts for creating and valuing ceremonies of that 
deliquescence. These prompts I think of as Emerson's assignments, not transcendental etudes (in 
Cavell's title), but movement etudes.
“Experience” is an essay of wonderful vagueness. I am thinking of “vague” in the sense 
attended to by Joan Richardson in her discussion of William James's use of the word, where the 
English sense of “indefinite” joins with the image of a wave, which is the meaning of vague in 
French (NHP 128-131). The wave suggests both images of a power or law moving matter, as 
well as a field of moving currents without fixed borders that put everything within them into 
continuously  shifting  relationships  of  visibility  (crest)  and  recession  (trough).  Emerson's 
vagueness mirrors the “evanescence and lubricity of all objects” (EL 473) on several registers as 
a slipping away from centers, topics, or theses: in his names (the “it” that replaces “Waldo”); in 
his shifting key-words (their status as key-words submerged in constellations of terms whose 
family  resemblance  contain  the  hints  toward  their  lesson  or  tuition10);  and  his  continuous 
movement (never lingering in a scene or a reference, even one so momentous as the death of his 
son or wife). 
The vagueness of “Experience,” which allows a multiplicity of readings to resonate, not 
only suggests to me that there is no effort on Emerson’s part to create and then bury some key to 
10    Cavell's excellence as a reader of Emerson is in his attention to these constellations, not only of relation between 
words (that hand that clutches as the hand within “unhandsome”) but also of relations between different sense of  
words (success and succession, lasting as enduring and the last as a shoemaker's form).
50
the text (as with a more riddling author like James Joyce whose  Finnegan’s Wake yields its 
pleasure  through  cracked  codes  of  HCE's).  It  also  suggests  that  by  decoupling  the  essay's 
significance from the strict reference to particular experience—for instance the death of Waldo— 
it is pitched into a more pluralistic arena, allowing it to become open to the approaches of new 
readers with unanticipated echoes of alienated genius, inviting new associations with its figures 
and  images.  This  is  autobiography  committed  to  the  waves,  life  experience  refracted  and 
reflected  to  become the  material  of  something more  plural.  In  this  opening up it  gains  the 
potential to strike a wider of array of readers with a sense of surprised familiarity. The variety of  
ways that Emerson’s essays provoke that experience of familiarity—reading the essay as about 
dead sons or making dances—is a testament to his success in taking private experience so far that  
it becomes public. This public, like all publics, is pluralistic, inconsistent, multivocal. 
I sense that when Emerson points in the essay to the death of his son, he is marking the 
occasion of a different process of grieving for the loss of a concept which seems to have failed 
when put to the test of that intense experience. This lost concept, and not Waldo, seems to me the 
first  subject  of  the  essay.  The  lost  concept  is  a  belief  in  the  possibility  of  permanence,  an 
endpoint  called,  in  the  Platonic  tradition,  “reality.”  “Experience”  records  Emerson’s 
disappointment in the discovery that “reality” (so imagined within an idealist tradition as truth, 
eidos, essence, form, perfection) is not a final destination but a “romance,” an illusion. Even the 
most costly purchase—the death of a son—does not introduce him into that heaven. It is in this  
sense that he can say that “grief can teach [him] nothing” (EL 473), for clearly grief is teaching 
him something—just something different than he expected. 
The loss that is felt through the opening pages of “Experience” is one that had troubled 
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Emerson since he encountered Hume, whose “sweeping negations,” writes Emerson's biographer 
Richard  Richardson,  lead  “to  a  completely  disconnected  world,  without  energy  or  cause  to 
create” (45). This loss concentrates in the figure of Waldo's death through the discovery that no 
necessary  binding exists  between father  and son,  that  young Waldo's  death  leaves  the  older 
Waldo intact, numb. His description holds an emotional analogy for the Humean unbinding of 
cause from effect. He writes, “some thing which I fancied was part of me, which could not be 
torn away without tearing me, nor enlarged without enriching me, falls off from me, and leaves 
no scar … I grieve that grief can teach me nothing, nor carry me one step into real nature” (EL 
473). Cavell reads “Experience” as a statement in Emerson's response to Hume, not a direct 
refutation of Hume's basic shaking-apart of the human ability to know the “real nature” of cause, 
but a living, pragmatic strategy for the “recovery from skepticism” (ETE 58), a recovery which 
must begin from loss.
“Experience”  moves  on  from this  lost  romance  of  the  ideal  to  imagine  a  new “true 
romance” of “practical power” found and understood experientially as an uninhibited capacity to 
move and to act (EL 492). In this sense the essay uses the occasion of loss to initiate a turn 
toward the world for experience of renewal or recuperation. The turn invites reconsideration of 
the ways to understand the world. Thinking through experience instead of ideals, principals of 
movement arise: “Our love of the real draws us to permanence, but health of the body consists in 
circulation, and sanity of mind in variety or facility of association” (476). It trades a vision of a 
fixed form for a one of a moving system. This revision of expectation for where we will find  
beacons we might use to guide ourselves marks Emerson’s “Experience” as not just an account 
of  personal  renewal,  but  of  the  massive  shift  within  the  history  of  philosophy of  which  he 
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(among others) is emblematic: the wrenching away from idealism and toward process. Waldo is 
only one “beautiful estate” that has been or will be lost around the middle of Emerson’s century. 
Darwin’s findings herald the loss of the concept of a divinely perfected humankind; historical 
materialism rebels against the alienation of labor from its fruits; the American Civil War puts 
contradicting ideals into violent opposition, laying waste to a generation and taxing the certainty 
of ideology on all sides.
Herwig Friedl places Emerson and Nietzsche at the beginning of this major shift in an 
entire way of thinking. He names Cavell as the first within philosophy to recognize Emerson’s 
role in this shift of thinking away from ideals and toward “a way or methodos of thinking that we 
have come to understand as the slow erosion … of metaphysical systems” (Friedl 269).  This 
overturning results not from the generation of new ideas about being, but from shifts in “the way 
Being addresses thinkers” (270).  Realizing and becoming available  to  this  directionality—of 
thinking as  the  reception of  an  address  as  opposed to  a  penetration—is one  of  the  keys  of 
Emerson’s renewal in “Experience.” Methods for hearing this address, or at least cautions on 
how not to miss hearing the address, are Emerson’s primary tuitions. 
To illustrate the new way of thinking, Friedl points to Emerson’s description of life as 
process in “The American Scholar”: there is no beginning or end, only “circular power returning 
into itself.” This denial of the timeline, says Friedl, is a radical shift, and the emblem of what will  
unfold, through various thinkers, into “process philosophy.” “Experience” enacts this circularity, 
starting with the falling apart of one romance, circling around to envision a new romance in an 
ending note that is yet—to use Emerson’s language from “Circles” —“initial.” “Experience” is a 
document in the history of philosophy “charactered” (a favorite Emersonian verb) by changing 
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flows of thought: we feel a new “dispensation of Being” (Heidegger’s term, brought by Friedl) in 
the way it hangs together. 
And yet  the essay also moves along something like a train switch,  for here Emerson 
wrangles philosophical  inheritances away from philosophy and into new practical directions: 
toward work and away from philosophy as such. This trans-disciplinarity, let’s call it, perhaps 
accounts for part of what Cavell describes as the “repression” of Emerson in the discipline of 
philosophy. Cavell looks at this repression in terms of ordinary language (the non-philosophical 
sound of Emerson's writing, its buried puns and inverted sense, the refusal to propose coherent 
systems in structures of thesis and proof), as well as in terms of Emerson's self-repression of his 
own authority in his calls for the reader to arrogate philosophy for themselves.11  Buell  also 
writes about this self-repression, labeling Emerson an “anti-mentor” who essentially says to his 
reader, “don't take it from me! Find out for yourself,” thereby directing the reader away from the 
author's own authority.12 The sense I am interested in is the way Emerson situates philosophical 
thinking in the project of “liv[ing] the greatest number of good hours” and “doing your work” 
(EL 479, 310). Relocating the scene of philosophy's questions into the scene of work, he doesn't 
ask to be read in the context of philosophical literature, but rather as a public intellectual, a 
pragmatist whose sense is relevant to a wide variety of ways to live and work.  
Another way in which the philosophical value of Emerson can be missed is that his essays 
are  experiential  rather  than  classically  argumentative.  He writes  in  a  vague  first  person:  he 
engages the “I” but not always in reference to himself. Rather it feels more like a seat, or a 
window, left open as an invitation to experience the essay’s thinking, to take it personally. This is 
11    See Cavell's essay “Thinking of Emerson” for an extended discussion of these themes.
12     See Chapter Seven of Buell's intellectual biography, Emerson.
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neither a rationalist nor empirical kind of rhetoric, but a performative one, offering an immersion 
in a path or train of thought as it submits itself to the weather of thinking, reaching for intuitions 
of pattern, or what Emerson calls “law.” Instead of defining a model of thinking (for if eternal 
ideals  are  gone  then  it  makes  no  sense  to  describe  fixed systems),  Emerson builds  moving 
pathways in which to give attention to “the mode of our illumination”—the intensity of insight in 
the formation of the grooves and tracks of our thought, the yielding of those tracks as they are 
overflowed by new ideas, producing new channels, re-charactering the mind. 
In “Experience,” Emerson asks, how do thinking and understanding occur in the material, 
vital life actually experienced, within its currents and surprises? Where does power come from, 
and what happens when I get the sense of participating in it? Observing his sequence of moods 
and ideas, he finds that there is no escape from subjectivity, that “Man thinking” (as he termed 
the  mindful  explorer  in  “The  American  Scholar”)  will  always  exist  in  a  fabric  he  cannot 
transcend. Abandoning the rationalist dream that reason can calculate and penetrate, his own 
accounts of the experience of both power and illumination reveal attitudes of reception, and not 
deliberateness. He points the philosophical mood away from fixity and toward process, although 
he does not use that word. Belief keeps expanding, he says (echoing the earlier essay “Circles”); 
what  is  true enlarges,  and we only have hope insofar  as  we acquiesce to such unsettlement 
ourselves. 
As a  work of  epistemology,  “Experience” points  to  our  inescapable  contingency,  and 
relativity of perspective, but it balances empiricism and rationalism through the retention of his 
hopes for participation in an expansive experience that shares a sense of intensity with the old 
vision of a penetrating rational acuity, revising it to an experiential, participatory sense of clarity 
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grounded in an intuition of the way the partial is charactered by patterns or laws that exceed it.  
For Emerson this expansive experience is a form of natural divinity, but here as in other essays,  
particularly “The Over-Soul,” he turns God out of the old figurative container,  tossing out a 
multiplicity of names and images that transition toward secular forms of awe. Referring to “that 
within us which changes not,” he gives a list of the “quaint names, too narrow to cover this 
unbounded substance”: “First Cause … Fortune, Minerva, Muse, Holy Ghost,” the symbols of 
air, water, thought, fire, love, the term from “The Chinese Mencius,” “vast-flowing vigor,” as 
well as “Being” (EL 485). This power we are invited to imagine in moving images as a series of  
circles opening outward, or a bird moving from perch to perch. 
“Experience”  ends by  imagining a  perfect  reception  of  that  expansiveness,  man as  a 
vehicle for “practical power” (492). In its circling action it does not promise attainment of that 
power; the circling path will not be arrested. But it retains a desire for a feeling of participation 
as union, participation as a kind of continuousness with God, or nature, or the “not-me,” the 
unnamed “it.” He cannot get it nearer, but maybe, in his “passage into new worlds,” it will draw 
him close (492).
BY WHAT KIND OF LIGHT?
Emerson’s early writings suggest the probability of euphoric success for the thinking man 
within the world, a becoming figured in his first book, Nature (1836), as a “transparent eye-ball” 
that  dissolves “all mean egotism” and rises up into a knowledge unified with natural law (EL 
10). “Experience,” published in 1844 in his second essay series, seems to recast that prediction. 
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Transparency, a broad daylight piercing through the operations of nature, is not ours to get and 
keep, and by correlation, transcendence to any kind of pure plane of mind is not ours to expect. 
Emerson’s essays continuously track, as “polarity,” the oscillation between “mean egotism” and 
a  dissolved  ego,  but  over  the  course  of  his  writing,  the  teleological  aura  of  an  endpoint  in 
dissolution gives way to a vision of living in that oscillation. The development of Emerson’s 
essays can be seen, in part, as an accounting for the pull between that old vision of purity and the 
subjectively bound record of Emerson’s experience as “Man thinking,” documenting success as 
only one among many moods, an occasional triumph caught in hints and glances. 
The image of a realm of pure mind as an approachable space has circulated at least since 
Plato’s  “Allegory of the Cave,”  and with it  the correlation of that space  to  a full  and ever-
replenished light. In Plato, the realm of ideas is “the true day of being” (Book VII). Light here is 
converted from a mere physical phenomenon to the light of virtue: form, or  eidos, is not just 
notation but law itself, immaterially bodied like some holy ghost. The “ascent from below, which 
we affirm to be true philosophy” (Book VII), proceeds via the transmutation of the organ of 
vision, from the perception of shadows in the realm of the senses, to the sight of the mind’s eye, 
visualized in sensory terms as a pathway taken from a dark cave below into the upper reaches of  
sunlit air, whether by a kind of magic, or a disunion of a soul from its material body. This bright 
space is the home of all law, and comes forward in the history of philosophy with the name 
“reality,”  denoting not  our  current,  casual  sense of  “reality” as  a  synonym for  “actual,”  but 
derived from “res,” things: Platonic reality (the “reality” Emerson will refer to) is the home of 
the  laws that  govern  things,  more  permanent  than  the  world of  the  senses.  (Although Plato 
confirms the rarity of access to this region, the “best minds” are supposed to be capable of the 
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trip. Those who reach the region, however, must be compelled to return, and bring the superiority  
of their perception to the world of senses, where they will act as ministers of the State.) The 
belief in the actual existence of this realm configures the ideal as a kind of heaven, and seems to 
underwrite  the  ongoing  philosophical  anxiety  that  the  world  of  experience  is  somehow 
quarantined from another, truer reality, an anxiety that culminates in Kant’s description of mind 
and requires God as a solution.13 
Like Plato’s  allegory,  Emerson’s  “Experience”  also  takes  up  the  image  of  an  ascent. 
“Where do we find ourselves?” he begins, continuing, “We wake and find ourselves on a stair. 
There are stairs below us, which we seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a 
one, which go upward and out of sight” (EL 471). The painful acquiescence of the essay is the 
relinquishment of the expectation that these stairs lead to an end. Even those drastic losses which 
rend our lives—the death of sons and lovers—are nothing but further stairs. “I grieve that grief 
can teach me nothing, nor carry me one step into real nature,” he writes. “We look to [death] with 
a grim satisfaction, saying, there at least is reality that will not dodge us”(473). “Reality,” as 
either  height  or  depth,  is  not,  in  the  contemporary  sense,  real:  not  even  the  most  intense 
experiences introduce us to it, and our only remaining hope for reaching this reality lies in the 
event  of  death,  or  after  it—either  way,  a  zone of  which  the living cannot  benefit  from any 
accounting. Our lives take place on surfaces, and in series. If we have craved the ideal as an 
13     The a priori categories of thinking, as divinely created elements of thinking, settle that anxiety by a kind of gift 
from God: a sense of belonging that eases the irritant of skepticism regarding our ability to know anything “truly.” 
One of the reasons I say this culminates in Kant’s description of mind, is that historically these empirical questions 
transferred after Kant to the emergent sciences, and particularly the kind of experimental, observational psychology  
that became neurobiology, which has completely redirected the terms of our exploration of the relationship of 
perception to matter, effectively delegitimizing the binary opposition and undermining the sense that perception is 
either on the one hand transparent and passive, or on the other, uncoupled to what we would commonly call “the 
world.” Emerson’s “Experience” is right there with this change, with its clear acknowledgement that there is no 
transcendence of perception, no kind of knowledge that exists separately from the subjective act of thinking.
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eternal, and hoped that access to it would allow us to map our place in nature, we have been 
mistaken, he seems to say. It is for us only to “glide through nature” (471). Nothing is definite; 
our awakening is  partial,  and we cannot fix our surroundings:  “All things swim and glitter” 
(471). 
How to live in this glittering, slippery world is the project of Emerson’s communications, 
and the concepts which imply a deferral or reward—most notably heaven, eternity, and the time-
keeping figure of a personal, deliberate god—are absent from his images. But if “Experience” 
begins by mourning the loss of faith in these images, it does not rest in that grief. Instead he 
engages the failure of profound loss to “carry” him into “the reality” as an occasion to unhitch 
himself from the habit of awaiting such an awakening into perfection. Unhitched, he is free to  
turn away from this vision, to wonder at the condition of a more daily awakening to the world 
where we find ourselves, resting in the “train of moods” that is the continuing condition of our 
capacity  to  perceive  and to  experience  (473).  Indeed,  our  tools  of  vision,  now turned from 
idealistic sites and committed to the waves of mediated experience,  must be able to operate 
functionally within this ceaseless flow. “We live amid surfaces,” he writes, “and the true art of 
life is to skate well on them” (479).  
Process, or “Succession,” is one of the “lords of life,” and wisdom is not attained by 
Platonic ascent to a realm of forms, but is a capability to fruit and flower within Succession's  
series of stairs. “To finish the moment, to find the journey’s end in every step of the road, to live 
the greatest number of good hours, is wisdom,” he writes (478-9). This sense of wisdom as a 
practice of daily life, and that practice as an experimental form of lived virtue, is a large part of 
what Thoreau will take up as he translates Emerson’s essays into what is arguably an instance of 
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what has come to be called “process art,” and what we might also call “experiential philosophy.” 
Emerson suggests that the ministerial office is not a project reserved for a clerisy, but one that 
belongs to everyone, an office of self-culture. Echoing Matthew’s verse, “by their fruits you shall 
know them,” Emerson situates wisdom in a domestic context. “Since our office is with moments,  
let us husband them,” he writes (479). His philosophic images trade the retreated scholar for the 
mindful participant, suggest a modest, democratic, and daily project that is quite different from 
Plato’s “ascent from below.” 
In this redirection of philosophy’s fruits,  from ahistorical knowledge or definitions of 
being to practices of living good quotidian hours, Emerson participates in the larger transition of 
his religious and philosophical traditions toward terms and values that resonate with what I will  
call “participatory practices”—forms of dailiness and ceremony that aim to participate in a sense 
of the larger world’s intelligence and bounty, displacing religious doctrine without displacing one 
of its basic aims of locating one’s place in the world and receiving some share of grace. Since his 
opening question in  Nature, he has been continuing the project of the Protestant reformation, 
placing  a  mandate  on  the  individual  to  discover  and  maintain  “an  original  relation  to  the 
universe” (7). Anticipating the dissolution of the necessary vehicle of religion as a means to 
contemplate  immanence,  he  ushers  in  a  focus  on  presence,  and  in  doing  so  refigures  the 
directional appetite of “man thinking” away from an attainment conceived of vertically, as an 
ascendance or elevation, and toward the lateral plenitude of the experiential world. Furthermore, 
if wisdom is bound up not with atemporal truths, but with felicitous husbanding of moments, 
then wisdom and its concepts of truth and value also stand to change with changing conditions: a 
key axiom of pragmatism.
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In Nature Emerson criticized his era for its retrospection, for deference to the articulations  
of the past for our codes of conduct. Now in “Experience,” after two series of essays wherein he 
has worked as an “experimenter” to locate that “original relation” as a moving target, he has also 
relinquished the traditional deferral to the rewards of heaven. “Five minutes of today are worth 
as much as five in the next millennium,” he writes, continuing, “Let us be poised, and wise, and 
our own, today.” Justice and virtue are not ahistorical ideals, but ways of working substantially in 
the present: “Men live in their fancy, like drunkards whose hands are too soft and tremulous for 
successful labor. It is a tempest of fancies, and the only ballast I know, is a respect to the present  
hour” (479). To respect the present hour we must “do broad justice” to the “actual companions 
and circumstances” in which we find ourselves, “as the mystic officials to whom the universe has 
delegated its whole pleasure for us.” The implication of this tuition is the radical equivalence of 
contexts, the sufficiency of the ordinary: “A day is a sound and solid good” (479). 
2. SURPRISE AND ILLUMINATION
WANDERING, CHANCE, EXCELLENT REGIONS
In affirming the sufficiency of the ordinary, Emerson rejects the vision of a deliberate and 
steady progress toward a realm of light, but he does not deny the possibility of experiencing 
illumination  within  the  series  of  days  that  make  up  a  lifetime.  Indeed  the  craving  for  this 
euphoric experience could be designated the primary motor of his essays, and his primary tuition 
that  this  arrival  into the  light  is  not  an  endpoint  but  a  transitive,  ongoing  possibility.  Since 
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Nature, his descriptions of illumination have hinged on the surprise that comes from an attitude 
not  of  deliberateness but  of receptivity  toward nature,  an attitude exemplified by childhood. 
Childhood here is a capacity to receive illumination not only in an analytical sense, but, notably, 
affectively. His description of illumination recalls Jonathan Edwards’s embrace of illumination 
as “delight,” and delight as activating “the sense of the heart” as a necessary animation of a true 
understanding. Edwards, drawing on his reading of Newton’s Opticks, found in the working of 
light a perfect metaphor for grace. In particular, the event of light striking and so  exciting a 
surface, reproduced the process that words could have on the receptive listener.14
Emerson translates the image of affectiveness from the action of light, to the reaction of  
the child. “The sun illuminates only the eye of the man,” he writes, “but shines into the eye and 
the heart of the child. The lover of nature is he whose inward and outward senses are still truly 
adjusted to each other; who has retained the spirit of infancy even into the era of manhood.” This 
spirit of infancy is a capacity to be “in the presence of nature.” In that presence, “a wild delight  
runs through the man, in spite of real sorrows” (10). Presence, Emerson suggests, is a kind of 
openness, a capacity to be struck, and its test might be that openness is maintained alongside 
adult griefs that might otherwise harden or distance a person. The sun striking the eye but not the 
heart  is  a  rational  condition,  offering  analytical  understanding  that  stands  outside  of  the 
reciprocity of moving and being moved that an attitude of reception structures. This sense that 
thinking is  a  dynamic  participation in  something more fleshy,  shared,  and vital  than strictly 
mental  pictures  anticipates  contemporary descriptions  of  embodied cognition  given by Andy 
Clark, among others. It also anticipates the emerging theories of the role of mirror neurons in our 
14     See Joan Richardson’s The Natural History of Pragmatism for an elaboration of this equivalence and a detailed 
discussion of Edwards’s “Sense of the Heart” and its relation to his readings in natural science.
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thinking, as well as our attention to what Theresa Brennan calls “the transmission of affect,” as a  
condition of intelligent experience. In her readings of Emerson, Branka Arsić explicitly ties this 
condition of being open to incursion, though transmissions of affect,  to Emerson’s riddles of 
unpossessed subjectivity.
It is key that the heart of the “lover of nature” is open to all varieties of experience, not 
just  gladness.  Emerson  is  often  reductively  caricatured  as  a  giddy  champion  of  optimistic 
individualism,  but  his  descriptions  of  exhilaration  most  often  conjoin  delight  and  sorrow, 
meanness and plenitude, power and insignificance. In “Circles,” he describes a “vast ebb of a 
vast flow,” transitions through moods that “do not believe each other”: “I am God in nature; I am 
a  weed by the  wall”  (EL 406).  In  Nature he  offers  as  a  first  occasion  for  the  accelerating 
expansion of illumination, a seemingly plain and dim context:  “Crossing a bare common, in 
snow puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky, without having in my thoughts an occurrence of 
special good fortune, I have enjoyed a perfect exhilaration. I am glad to the brink of fear” (10). 
Gladness and fear are necessary partners, for the very participation in exhilaration is a function 
of the loss of one’s contained, individual being. To become a “transparent eyeball” is to yield 
oneself: “I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am 
part or particle of God” (10). 
What this “I” signifies is quite different from our normal sense of the first person. This 
other “I” is not a discrete entity, but a moving point between two waves that threaten to cancel 
each other, a circuit that may be ridden but not controlled, experienced but not possessed. It is an 
experimental  “I,”  and  its  success  (“I  see  all”)  is  a  rare  occasion.  To  take  seriously  the 
experimental nature of this “I” has strong implications for what is meant by Emersonian “self-
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reliance.” The excited and focused duration of the essay form is one of Emerson's venues for 
entertaining these experiments. If it manages to act upon us, that excitement feeds back into our 
daily lives.  But we can also think of this experiment as lived over a longer duration than a 
reading session: the continuing condition of our changing selfhood, measuring our present self 
against the relief of lifespan, multigenerational epoch, or even geological time. Experiments offer  
no permanency, even as they might expand our sense of possibility. Without permanency, we 
cannot make claims to either authority or property. Rather, we must admit that “I am a fragment 
and  this  [thought]  is  a  fragment  of  me”  (491).  Though  we feel  ourselves  to  be  heavy  and 
substantial, our lives are only “a flitting state, a tent for a night” (481). The transparent eyeball is 
not a figure for mastery, for even in “[seeing] all,” there is no transformation of this experience 
into a possession, no reliable repetition of access. From his image of the transparent eyeball,  
Emerson moves his chapter to a melancholy close, admitting that the effects of delight cannot be 
reproduced either by will or by a return to the same prospect. The snow puddle was an occasion, 
but not a technology, for that surprising gladness. The power to generate that delight may be a 
function of a “harmony” between man (specifically man thinking) and nature, but the harmony is 
anything but automatic: neither “man thinking” nor “nature” is contained or consistent, and so 
we cannot rationally predict the moving point where they meet. 
In  “Experience,”  Emerson  explicitly  cautions  the  reader  to  relinquish  a  concept  of 
deliberateness in getting at that harmony, as well as any certainty in the power to reform the 
world according to thought in order to make it more productive of harmonic occasions. How, 
then, does he suggest we should live, if as he describes in “The Over-Soul,” these harmonic 
experiences of thinking are moments of intensity that structure our faith (385), and so calibrate 
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our relation to the universe, which is to say, our ethical stance? “Experience” suggests that the 
way to go forward is by wandering. This can be taken as something that happens in the process 
of writing, as Cavell says when he culls from this essay a description of writing as a “process of 
indirection” (ETE 140) by which Emerson avails himself of the world and invites it to come 
near. It can also be taken as an assignment to go out on foot, exemplified by Thoreau's self-
employment as a saunterer, in its twentieth-century echo in the surrealist “flâneur,” as well as 
methodologies  of  art-making  that  grow from a  responsiveness  to  chance  events  rather  than 
projects of expression. But already this pedestrian, open to surprise, seeking by not seeking, is 
present in Emerson’s images. 
One of the crests of “Experience” is a description of thinking as an accidental arrival in 
an “excellent region.” “Do but observe our mode of illumination,” he begins. “When I converse 
with a profound mind, or if at any time being alone I have good thoughts, I do not at once arrive  
at satisfactions, as when, being thirsty, I drink water, or go to the fire, being cold: no! but I am at 
first appraised of my vicinity to a new and excellent region of life” (EL 484). Illumination, here 
felt as neighboring quarter, involves presence in or to a landscape more than penetration of its 
laws. Furthermore, the landscape seems to control its own revelation. “By persisting to read or 
think,” he continues, “this region gives further sign of itself, as it were in flashes of light, in 
sudden discoveries of profound beauty and repose,  as if  the clouds that covered it  parted at  
intervals, and showed the approaching traveller the inland mountains” (484-5). This description, 
aligning luminous visions with uncontrollable processes like the parting of clouds, recalls the 
Heraclitean aphorism that “nature loves to hide,” and anticipates Martin Heidegger’s feeding 
forward of that aphorism into reflections on presence as a gathering force between hiding and 
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revealing, or disclosure.
Arrival into this region dissolves any idea of this illuminating thought as constructed or 
willed, and even the vision is “felt as initial,” instead of heralding completion. Where formerly 
Emerson described illumination as a capacity, a transparent eyeball, here he gives a different 
image of the delighted thinker as a wandering child: “I do not make it; I arrive there, and behold 
what was there already. I make! O no! I clap my hands in infantine joy and amazement, before 
the  first  opening  to  me  of  this  august  magnificence,  old  with  the  love  and  homage  of 
innumerable ages, young with the life of life, the sunbright Mecca of the desert” (485). Even 
with the dissociation of the transparent eyeball from the self-possessed individual, its allegiance 
with “the Universal Being” effecting a momentary reduction of individual to “nothing” even as 
the individual is swept, as particle, into “all,” the figure remains one of seeing and penetration. 
By  contrast,  the  “approaching  traveler”  of  the  second  description  enjoys  the  “august 
magnificence” from the ground, experiencing vastness all around him without also becoming 
vast. The scale of the human body is retained. I find in this a subtle shift, from the thinker as 
agent,  a maker of law or reformer of the world,  to the thinker as actor,  or better,  dancer:  a 
traveler in space. This shift heralds a transition of American philosophy from traditional projects 
of definition and systematization, toward practices of living, the husbanding of moments, which 
might also be a description of the practice of process-based performance. The spaces through 
which  Emerson  travels  are  his  literary  inheritance,  fields  of  language.  As  he  wanders  he 
overturns and renews the literary history of reckoning man's relations in nature. He persists in an 
occupation of the essay as a form of agitation, continually suggesting the out of doors and off the 
page. Get up, he seems to say to his reader, go do something. “The great gifts are not got by 
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analysis,” after all (480). Our nourishment instead will be found in the  action of thought as a 
form of co-presence to the world, and the history of literature might be taken as a record of 
successes, failures, and sifted lessons in the efforts of co-presence. 
The passage on illumination concludes with a riddle, one which suggests the figure of the 
wanderer and differentiates Emerson’s sun-bright Mecca from more idealistic visions of Platonic 
realms of law. There at Mecca, Emerson finds not a conclusion or a key, but a future. “I feel a 
new heart beating with the love of the new beauty. I am ready to die out of nature and be born 
again into this new yet unapproachable America I have found in the West” (485). What is meant 
by “this new yet unapproachable America”? How is it  possible to arrive somewhere without 
approaching  it,  and  hasn’t  Emerson  just  described  illumination  as  clouds  parting  before  an 
approaching traveler?  Cavell answers that this new America is “unapproachable by a process of 
continuity,” making “discontinuity” or “aversion” a necessary element of the journey (ETE 121). 
What is needed is an alternate sense of the word “approach” to that of an intentional progress 
toward a known point of arrival. Emerson has described the approach as a form of persistence, 
persistence  at  a  task,  to  read  or  think,  or  converse.  Joining  the  puzzle  of  the  “new  yet 
unapproachable  America”  with  sentences  from  the  essay's  opening  (“Where  do  we  find 
ourselves?”) and closing (“Patience and patience and we shall win at the last”), Cavell reads 
Emerson as saying that thinking is “knowing how to go on” (ETE 139), how to persist. He brings 
the walking figure forward by giving attention to Emerson's many invocations of stepping, from 
the stairs on which we find ourselves, to the “journey's end” found in “every step of the road” 
(EL 479), to the shoemaker's  last which glimmers behind the sense of “win[ning] at the last.” 
“An American might see this as taking the open road,” writes Cavell. “The philosopher as the 
67
hobo of thought” (ETE 139). The philosopher's task is to keep walking.
Persistence at a task that has no goal but to remain open is a description of what many 
artists refer to as “practice.”15 The choice of the word “practice” for an ongoing project that 
either does not  conclude in “product” or under which “products” are  subsumed as “pieces,” 
fragments, not final objects, is used to signify a commitment to a way of working, and not just 
the work created. The term comes from Buddhism and in that meditative context it is a more 
obviously “empty” or non-productive project. In this study I will generally restrict myself to the 
contemporary,  art-based  meaning  of  “practice”  as  a  way  of  working  that  encompasses  and 
subsumes the products of that practice, but the Buddhist resonances are not out of place in an 
Emersonian reading, given his interest in and incorporation of Eastern texts. 
Practice  requires  patience,  and  a  capacity  to  let  go  of  what  John  Keats  memorably 
describes as an “irritable reaching after fact and reason.” The negative approach described by 
Emerson  is  cousin  to  what  Keats  phrases  “negative  capability,”  and  is  I  believe  the  same 
relinquishing patience of what Emerson elsewhere calls “abandonment”: “The one thing which 
we seek with insatiable desire is to forget ourselves, to be surprised out of our propriety, to lose 
our sempiturnal memory, and to do something without knowing how or why … The way of life 
is wonderful: it is by abandonment” (EL 414).
 The practices that leave us open to illumination, these ideas suggest, involve emptiness, 
15     The term “practice”  is so common now in art circles that it has become an occasional object of derision for its  
potential emptiness or arrogance. See Alix Rule and David Levine’s essay “International Art English” in Triple  
Canopy 16 for a skewering of the language of art—Emerson might have said the words are being employed as an 
unbacked paper currency. Like most things in our culture, the idea of practice is also vulnerable to the logic of 
consumerism. (Need special pants for your Yoga practice?) The impulse to point everything toward productivity 
makes even meditation practice a potential tool, see for example “The Power of Concentration” (The New York 
Times,  15 Dec. 2012) about the value of daily meditation or concentration for productivity, emblematizing as its 
representative man, Sherlock Holmes. Despite these shortcomings, the term still signals within various art fields a 
project whose products are incidental to an ongoing commitment to spend time and energy in a certain way.
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involve  release,  and  in  particular  release  of  calculations  and  intentional  endpoints.  Our 
commitment to them is fortified by their occasional gifts, profound enough to sustain us even in 
their usual absence. In “The Over-Soul,” Emerson writes: “Our faith comes in moments…. Yet 
there is a depth in those brief moments which constrains us to ascribe more reality to them than 
to all other experiences” (385). This sense of “reality,” taken in a pragmatist sense of truth as a  
belief that forms our willingness to act, is signaled in Emerson’s description of the faith that 
comes from the moment of illumination: “I am willing to die out of nature and be born again in 
this new yet unapproachable America I have found in the West,” this land not of final reward but 
of work, future, and certainly in Emerson’s day, symbolic of unwritten potentiality. 
The  paradox  of  the  non-approaching  approach  is  resolved  in  the  empty  practice  of 
wandering—whether through a field of language, in Emerson’s practice, on foot, in Thoreau’s 
daily walking practice, or in, say, a studio process of improvisation or devising performance. A 
practice may be structured according to concepts or principles, but in its daily manifestation, 
must be allowed a freedom from both the imposition of ideas, and any necessary schedule of 
progress or attainment. In the twentieth century, John Cage is the most famous advocate of this  
kind of practice, which he tried to free from intentionality, devising his “chance methodologies” 
in order to bypass ego as a unifying will, but also, we could say, the “irritable reaching after fact 
and reason.” Such practices of non-intentionality inform the contemporary conceptual artists like 
Kenneth Goldsmith, who advocates “uncreative writing,” wherein parameters are decided upon 
in advance, and then simply executed, as in his monumental work Day, which is a transcription 
of the entirety of text in a single day’s New York Times. For Cage, the bounty of chance, as the 
hand of nature, far exceeds in complexity and beauty that which can be rationally devised. 
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There is a family of artists, for whom Cage becomes a shorthand reference, as presiding 
genie and well-known champion, who approach art as a simple, daily structure of receiving or 
recording some amount of life, with a minimum amount of grasping. Works like Day can be seen 
in this light, as can, for example, the writing of Gertrude Stein. Ulla Dydo’s study of Stein’s 
process,  Gertrude  Stein:  The  Language  That  Rises,  provides  insight  into  the  dailiness  that 
structures her writing methods, as her landscape observations were recorded in small notebooks, 
with lengths determined by the size of the notebook, and then transcribed and sifted through a 
series of notebooks until  the piece was done.  There is  something necessarily  arbitrary in  it, 
something contingent. Why one day’s Times and not the next? Why a 3x5 inch page and not a 
4x6? Why the environs of Concord and not Hartford? Why 4:33 minutes of listening and not 
4:52? As Thoreau wrote in his 1851 journal, the difference is not “what you look at, but how you 
look & whether you see” (146),  a sentiment echoed by Stein in “Composition as Explanation,” 
seventy-five years later.  This difference in seeing hinges on receptiveness to any part  of the 
world  at  hand,  and  as  such  lets  go  of  a  sense  that  bounty—as,  say,  literary  content  or 
philosophical illumination—can be predicted. 
Emerson too notes a poverty in our ability to calculate. “Power keeps quite another road 
than the turnpikes of choice and will,” he writes (482). Our hopes of experiencing power, or 
creativity, will be thwarted by our calculations; participation will come as a surprise. “Nature 
hates  calculators;  her  methods  are  saltatory  and  impulsive,”  he  continues,  in  the  images  of 
electricity.  Instead  of  trying  to  “make,”  we  would  do  better  to  ask,  “Where  do  we  find 
ourselves?” One’s practice, then, is way of directing oneself so as to release habits of calculation 
(and composition), release the pre-Copernican image of man at  the center of his events. The 
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parameters of the practice (tasks or constraints) give the form within which the artist can be 
empty  of  habit,  receptive.  In  “Self-Reliance,”  Emerson  describes  this  as  a  submission  to 
“Whim.”  In  “Experience,”  he  emphasizes  the  importance  of  being  open  to  being  taken  by 
surprise. “Man lives by pulses … the mind goes antagonizing on, and never prospers but by fits. 
We thrive by casualties. Our chief experiences have been casual” (483). Attunement to surprise 
runs through an array of artists of awakening or dailiness, from Emerson and Thoreau through 
Duchamp, Cage, Stein, and Surrealism. Surrealist André Breton gives a similar account in his 
novel of surprise, Nadja, which concludes, “Beauty will be CONVULSIVE or will not be at all.” 
In relinquishing calculation, Emerson is not abandoning intelligence, but understanding it 
as something vaster than human reason. As with many of his essays, “Experience” first attacks 
our confidence in any form of self-possessed control, before rebuilding the prospect of a humbler 
confidence in a dynamic and participatory relationship with natural  processes. Ultimately he 
does not advocate a repression of rational concepts, but rather advocates an approach to concepts 
as  tools—navigational aids and balancing poles—useful within the “subterranean and invisible 
channels of life” along which power flows. But we cannot begin to find this balance without first 
admitting the poverty of human intelligence if taken in isolation from this environment, admit 
the nature of thought as a form of co-presence to it (as opposed to a penetration or mastery of it),  
a co-presence described in Nature as the “luminous image” that rises up when we give attention 
to our own perception. The arising of images entails a kind of exposure (in a photographic sense) 
of thought's objects to the spontaneous presence of “the Original Cause”: in Nature he describes 
this as “the blending of experience with the present action of the mind” (23); in “Intellect” the 
blending  becomes  a  “conversion”:  the  “spontaneous”  thought  of  “genius”  converted  into  a 
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(communicable) picture through “a mixture of will” with that incoming illumination (423). In 
this mixture, Emerson does not grant primacy to will. Just as Jonathan Edwards, in “Freedom of 
the Will,” acknowledges an apparent freedom of will while noting that we cannot examine our 
choices all the way to their origin (because choices are nested in other choices), and so what 
seems to be free will may yet be conditioned by another will we neither see nor control (in early 
20th century psycho-biological terms this becomes “the reflex arc”), Emerson backs away from 
the triumph of this mixture of will,  continuing: “yet the imaginative vocabulary seems to be 
spontaneous [i.e. uncalculated and so from without] also” (423).
In other words, thinking occurs in a kind of company, although it is not the company of 
other men, but our own company with and as nature. I have been describing this as a form of co-
presence.  To think about  what  co-presence  might  mean,  I  want  to  introduce  a  discipline  of 
somatic study, known as “experiential anatomy.” The term was coined by Bonnie Bainbridge 
Cohen, founder of the influential somatic and therapeutic practice Body-Mind Centering (BMC), 
which seeks to understand mind as a directed form of exploration manifested as a moving body, 
and to generate an “alignment,” or dynamic balance, between sensing and action. As the term 
implies,  experiential  anatomy is a form of study in action. Although BMC benefits from the 
integration  of  medical  knowledge  achieved  through  dissection  and  other  forms  of  external 
observation, its principal modalities are the use of movement, touch, and a generous, mobile 
attention, used to discover human anatomy as expressed in a living body through movement. 
Seeking  knowledge  of  patterning,  and  curious  about  vastly  distributed  forms  of  physical 
organization  (for  example  the  ways  in  which  human  embryos  and  infants  share  movement 
patterning with other nonhuman organisms16),  BMC and its  practice of  experiential  anatomy 
16     These have to do with successive stages of development through different kinds of limb coordination, 
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generates concepts—language, patterns, analysis—through physical investigation. In the same 
way as John Dewey’s pragmatism, BMC is oriented toward growth, in particular by un-inhibiting 
growth patterns that have become compromised in the cases of developmental impairment. As a 
discipline that has had a strong influence on the physical research into movement potential in the 
experimental  dance  community,  this  growth  has  also  been felt  within  many artist's  creative 
processes.17 
The glossary of concepts generated by BMC are never removed from their environment 
of the body. Bainbridge Cohen employs the terms “body” and “mind” outside of a dualistic 
paradigm. Extrapolating from her work, in thinking about the vocabulary of concepts that form 
language (our major instrument of thinking), I find it useful to propose a moving anatomy as an 
equivalent set of ideas to a moving set of concepts. As an image, a moving anatomy is perhaps 
easier to grasp: we can visualize, say, the capacity of a joint to hinge or rotate, while it is difficult  
to visualize the pattern-completing circuit of a thought reaching conclusion. 
Experiential  Anatomy is  a  discipline  of  discovering  pattern  and organization  through 
action, an activity in which pattern and action are in continuous, inseparable feedback. BMC 
practice makes it possible to sense body patterns that are shared across a vast organic universe, to  
sense the way human bodies include reptilian architectures, or share bone structures with whales, 
beginning with naval radiation and sequencing through homologous, homolateral, and contralateral patterns. For an 
excellent explanation of this sequence, see Linda Hartley's The Wisdom of the Body Moving (North Atlantic, 1989), 
which combines description with exercises. 
17     Bainbridge Cohen founded BMC in 1973, coming out of a movement therapy training that was already 
integrated with other somatic disciplines that overlapped with dance, among them yoga and Idiokinesis (discussed at 
length in my second chapter). Over time, BMC became one of the influential somatic modalities that was 
incorporated into the teaching of many different dance artists. It is common for a contemporary dance class to  
integrate a great number of somatic disciplines into class (unlike earlier eras of modern dance that kept up the  
difference between techniques more strictly). In my own dance education, for example, I encountered BMC work  
both directly in BMC classes, as well as indirectly, as elements of a warm-up or a way of talking about the body's 
articulation, and I continue to incorporate my studies in developmental movement and experiential anatomy into my 
own technique classes. 
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or are composed of the same materials as algae. By giving attention to the shared patterning that 
informs the body’s moving coordinations—the thinking of the body, in other words—the BMC 
practitioner is  moved well  beyond a sense of embodiment as essential  individual identity,  to 
experience  embodiment  as  the  condition  of  thought,  while  simultaneously  experiencing  the 
particular instrument  that is  her  particular body. This same experiential  attention to thinking 
describes the method of William James in The  Principles of Psychology. James’s conclusion that 
thought is an activity which cannot be strictly claimed as interior, that we might more safely say 
“it thinks” than “I think,” grows from this same sense that “thought” cannot be removed from 
what  Emerson  calls  “nature,”  or  the  “it”  of  which  the  individual  human  is  a  more  or  less 
continuous element. 
What connects these commitments to non-dualistically imagined thought is, as Emerson 
foregrounded,  the  medium  of  experience,  and  the  sense  that  what  is  known  arises  from 
experience,  is  provisionally verified by,  and potentially  transformed by it.  Bainbridge Cohen 
describes BMC as a project  of “alignment”  between mind and body that creates  a  “state  of 
knowing” (Exploring 4), suggesting that thinking or knowing goes on as a kind of continual 
balance and growth. This recalls John Dewey's description of the goal of thinking as continuous 
growth. Taking up James’s “it” as the wider field in which the individual exists and moves (and 
leaving aside for now the non-opposition between the it and the individual), I propose that the 
usefulness of these articulations is the sense that ideas, and so meanings, are only ever generated 
experientially—while  moving—as a  form of  active  reflection.  Reflection  on past  events  still 
could be understood as reflective moving, as we travel the mind’s eye back through a field of 
recollected activity, sensing its patterns perhaps in new ways. Not only does this account for a 
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sense  of  literature  as  a  form of  experiential  philosophy,  allowing  readers  to  engage  virtual 
movement with maximum receptivity to thought as those luminous images arising during the 
traversal of the image, but also it signals to me the importance of Emerson’s insistence that we 
can never really get a distanced, objective look at the patterns that we experience in thinking but 
only “name them as [we] find them in [our] way.” We can only measure them proprioceptively—
experience a moving anatomy. In what follows, I will try to show how Emerson engages the 
“anatomy” of thinking within these moving currents. 
KNOWING FROM BEHIND
Emerson frequently signals the way that ideas come through us from behind. “Intellect 
lies  behind genius,”  he  writes.  “Intellect  is  the  simple  power  anterior to  all  action  or 
construction” (emphasis added, EL 417). Elsewhere this anteriority is implied through images of 
rest or repose.  “We lie in the lap of an immense intelligence, which makes us receivers of its 
truth  and  organs  of  its  activity,”  he  writes  in  “Self-Reliance,”  going  on  to  describe  the 
discernment of ideas of truth or justice as only allowing “passage to [that intelligence’s] beams” 
(269). In “The Over-Soul,” he describes that “intelligence,” as “that great nature in which we 
rest,” again describing its flow into us, and its conversion, in that passage, into thought (386).  
But if thought builds things—is “intellect constructive,” or “genius”—intellect, considered as a 
power, dissolves them.18
18     Emerson does not venture beyond the question of human intelligence here, although it is implied that 
construction is not an action reserved for man—that nature is constructive. The argument for the application of 
things we tend to think of as human, abstract attributes, like intelligence or intellect, to the larger realm of matter, is  
taken up by Gregory Bateson in Mind and Nature (Hampton, 2002) (and before him by Charles Saunders Pierce), 
where he shows that actions like computation and calculation are performed by plants, and thus that thinking per se 
does not require reflexive self-consciousness.
75
Even the dissolving agents of nature's the fluid polarity (“water dissolves wood … air 
dissolves water…”) are subject to this further dissolution by intellect. In its capacity to dissolve, 
Emerson’s intellect undoes separateness and enclosure. It abides by neither person nor thing, 
treats  person  as  a  fact  no  different  from  other  facts.  Furthermore  these  facts  lose  their 
individuality. If the world is apparently made up of discrete things, “formed and bound,” intellect 
“pierces  the  form.”  It  does  this  through  analogy,  detecting  what  is  “hidden”  in  nature:  the 
“intrinsic likeness between remote things” (417). Thought's basic action, Emerson discovers, is 
analogical, an insight upheld in contemporary cognitive science.19 The action of analogy is to 
unsettle all things in the light of thought, even while uniting them: the vision of intellect is “not  
like the vision of the eye, but is union with the things known” (417). This intelligence, as a 
power of dissolving insight unlike (anterior to) regular sight, is another of Emerson’s names for 
God. As he notes in his essay on Swedenborg, the English word “mystic” originates in the Greek 
word meaning “the closing of the eyes” (663).
But what does Emerson mean by figuring intellect, or the law of analogy, as behind us, 
when he has also described it as transparent, and united through laws of similitude with all things 
known, therefore everywhere? I see these two different spatial descriptions not as contradictory, 
but as operating on two different registers, one in reference to the material world, the other to the 
figurative habits of epistemological commonplaces, for example our expression of understanding 
in  terms  of  vision:  I  see.  On  one  register,  he  addresses  the  distribution  of  intelligence  as 
something that does not abide by the containers of individual persons, a Jamesian “it” that moves 
19     See Douglas Hofstadter’s lecture, “Analogy as the core of cognition” (Stanford Presidential Lecture, 2006) for  
an enjoyable description of how analogizing forms the basic action of thought. Hofstadter is careful to note that  
analogical thinking is not limited to 1:1 ratios but rather is a basic, isomorphic, multi-scalar action of finding 
relationship between things so as to be able to do or move. In another articulation of analogy as the basic action of 
thought, V.S. Ramachandran describes human mind as involved in constant model-making, which he elaborates in 
his book A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness (Pi Press, 2004).
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through  us  when  we  feel  we  think.  But  on  the  second  register,  he  addresses  our  sense  of 
controlling or containing our knowledge by imagining that we can place the thing known as an 
object, metaphorically in front of us. We cannot give a history of mind because no one can “mark 
the steps and boundaries of that transparent essence” (417). We do not see intellect well enough 
to “mark” its movements not only because it is “transparent,” but because it is behind us. It is 
“not like the vision of the eye,” therefore unavailable to our visual sense.  In my second chapter I 
will develop a proposition for what this other kind of vision that arises outside of the eye might 
be. Here, I want to explore what it is not. 
Recall  Emerson’s  statement  in  “Experience,”  that  “nature  hates  calculators,”  and  his 
continual dressing-down of anyone’s expectation of being able fully to possess and control their 
own thought, or lay claim to their own actions. To calculate, in the context of that sentence, is to 
see ahead, to know already what variables are at play and the pathways along which things will 
unfold. Calculation implies a full understanding of the object at issue, the capacity to explain it,  
and to predict its movements. (The word “explanation” itself invokes this visual metaphor: to ex-
plane is to lay the component parts of a thing out alongside each other, to separate in order to see.  
The clarity of seeing the component parts comes at the cost of their working assembly.) But 
insight—the sudden understanding of laws through the faculty of analogy—does not arrive on a 
predicted timetable. It is “spontaneous in every expansion.” Emerson declares the “hardest task 
in the world” is “to think” precisely because of this lack of control. We cannot make the thought 
come; if  it  will  come, it  will  come flitting,  “unannounced” (EL 418).  Education will  not  be 
forced. This is why Emerson must write “Whim” on the lintel when he hears the call of “his 
genius” which might signal nearness to an “excellent region” of thought. “The mind that grows 
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could not predict the times, the means, the mode of that spontaneity. God enters by a private door 
into every individual” (418). Thus our calculated actions are not likely to be imbued with extra-
personal intelligence (as God, as nature, as vast-flowing vigor), but rather to be as limited as our 
persons, and our registers of what we have already learned. Participation in process, in new 
intelligence, comes, for Emerson, when our persons experience the surprise influx of intelligence 
from  without.  “Our  spontaneous  action  is  always  the  best,”  and  that  action  provides  not 
explaining sight, but rather “hints” and “glances.” Spontaneous action is like being picked up by 
a wave. The less fearful and the more receptive we are, the better we will be able to ride it. The  
distance we would require to see the wave would remove us from its flows. In the effort to 
understand it objectively, we would relinquish its benefit. 
It strikes me that Emerson’s description of spontaneity harbors more than just a caution 
against efforts to control thought. If spontaneity is the experience of “God enter[ing] by a private 
door,”  then  this  flitting,  contingent,  and  unpredictable  moment  of  thought  is  the  venue  for 
religious experience. Directed away from what he describes in “The Divinity School Address” as 
“historical Christianity,” Emerson now seems to be pointing to presence as divinity, and thinking 
as the medium of presence: “Our thinking is a pious reception” (EL 419). 
Yet if we believe we are always thinking, Emerson reminds us that we are mostly not. As 
early as Nature he was working this talking point: that it is possible to drain the power from the  
tools of thought (leaving a currency with no value), and that the return of power will take us by 
surprise only if we acknowledge this poverty. The subtle, counter-balancing navigation by which 
our discourse can be “inflamed” and we ourselves can commandeer, if only briefly, the “fire of 
thought,” is the “hardest task in the world.” Emerson cautions that we should not expect to gain 
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much by thinking (at least not according to our own timetables). And yet clearly thinking is 
Emerson’s primary task and primary assignment. 
Just as the illumination of “Experience” is first felt as a nearby space, the experience of 
power—as the capacity to steer our vessels within “that great nature”—is felt as a joining up 
with something that comes through, comes into us. Frequently he describes the delight of this 
sense of simultaneously being dwarfed by the greatness and tenant within its flows of power. In 
optimistic moments he proposes that the “fire of thought” (958) is the means of transforming a 
submission to the reception of those flows into a capacity to act, or what he calls “practical  
power” (492). 
But it is not always a joy. “It is very unhappy, but too late to be helped,” he writes in 
“Experience,” “the discovery we have made, that we exist. This discovery is called The Fall of 
Man” (487).  This  unhappy discovery is  a  fall,  a  fall  out  of  an Eden or  heaven or  perhaps,  
luminous realm of the Real, and into the ongoing, ever-changing oceanic context of life, which 
we  may  only  navigate  by  our  instruments,  which  for  Emerson  means  the  instruments  of 
language. And so although we do experience “more or less luminous image[s],” a penetration 
that allows wise men to “pierce … rotten diction” and “fasten words … to things” (23), we 
cannot  ever  attain  a  position  of  objective  certainty,  we  cannot  rest.  We  will  remain 
“experimenters” (412). We will always “suspect our instruments” (487). This suspicion, I think, 
underlies Emerson’s habit of sending forth a profusion of non-synonymous images when trying 
to get the feeling of any critical abstraction into his essays, along with his observation of nature’s 
abundant reiteration and variation. The condition of our thinking will always be in the midst of 
our “more or less luminous” images.  Caution, then,  and flexibility, are called for in moving 
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forward. Instead of rushing into over-confident “manipular attempts to realize our world” (492), 
epitomized by the many utopian experiments and reform movements of Emerson’s time,  we 
would do best to learn how to be simultaneously receptive to nature’s ingress, and capable of 
participating in its course. “Life is a series of surprises,” he writes, “and would not be worth 
taking or keeping, if it were not” (483). Thus a basic necessity of “man thinking,” which we 
could  rephrase  “man  navigating,”  (recalling  Joan  Richardson's  study  of  Henry  James's 
navigational imagery, discussed in the introduction), is a willingness to improvise: to allow a 
new image to supersede the last, and spontaneously follow its navigational implications.
Where can we find examples of a thinking that does not calculate, that does not expect to 
possess, and yet that persists at its task? A cultivated receptivity that is not simply passive? A 
kind of thinking that acquiesces to a certain poverty? One venue is the two-headed literary form 
that  Emerson himself  uses,  and that Thoreau will  use:  the journal and the essay.  But  I  also 
recognize the kind of thinking Emerson describes in the practice of improvisation, which has 
been an ongoing part of my own engagement in dancing.20 To improvise is to compose—say 
engage “intellect constructive”—in the moment, we might even say “casually.” Etymologically, 
improvisation means “not foreseen.” Emerson’s sense of thought coming through us from behind 
hinges on this sense of seeing as foreseeing or foreshadowing (since certainly one variety of 
reception is visual, and he does not intend us literally to shut our eyes, just as he does not intend 
we should actually go silent when he champions silence over speech). The “private door” by 
20     Improvisation exists across most dance and music forms. I am thinking here particularly of the improvisational 
forms that grew out of Anna Halprin's work and her influence on the Grand Union (a group originally formed to 
perform Yvonne Rainer's Continuous Project Altered Daily, then becoming a collective practicing improvisational 
performance for many years), and out of Contact Improvisation (a form developed by Steve Paxton, a member of the  
Judson Dance Theater and Grand Union). Three contemporary dance figures who exemplify improvisation as a 
receptive, navigational process,  are K.J. Holmes, Deborah Hay, Jennifer Monson. See Melinda Buckwalter's  
Composing While Dancing: An Improvisor's Companion (University of Wisconsin, 2010) for a document of a wide 
array of performance improvisation approaches related to this scene. 
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which God enters a person is known only by God, in this image, and cannot be located by even 
the person in whom the “door” figuratively exists. Because visuality dominates our models of 
thinking, we can describe this not-foreseeing sight as a form of voluntary blindness. The image 
comes forward in these terms in this poem by Emily Dickinson:
From Blank to Blank —
A Threadless Way
I pushed Mechanic feet —
To stop—or perish—or advance —
Alike indifferent —
If end I gained 
It ends beyond
Indefinite disclosed —
I shut my eyes—and groped as well
’Twas lighter—to be Blind— (F 484)
Mechanic feet  move in ways already described; machines are our calculators. The landscape 
accessible  by  these  feet  is  blank  and  “threadless”:  without  what  Emerson  describes  as  the 
“subterranean channels” of power that yield the “sunbright Mecca[s]” of illumination. What end 
I can gain in this advance is not the end that  it arrives at—a vague end, an end in the waves 
( Emerson might call that end “the shores of interminable seas”). And so the best there is, is to go 
blindly: to go without foreseeing. The success that Dickinson describes in this poem is not an 
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attainment, but an experience of getting lighter. We can read that light both as a paradoxical  
illumination having submitted to the darkness of closing the eyes against mechanic foreseeing, as 
well  as a lighter feeling in the body and in the stepping: a physical relief, a greater ease of 
movement. Eyes closed, off the mechanic grid,  Dickinson's poem leaves off by  improvising, 
groping along, finding an unforeseen way. 
The vague beyond where Dickinson's end is gained (if it is gained) helpfully recasts the 
beyond-as-transcendent realm which Kenneth Burke reads in Emerson's Nature in his 1966 essay 
on Emerson's “machinery of transcendence.”21 Burke assigns Emerson a “pontificating” function, 
defining  transcendence  as  a  bridge  built  by  which  one  context  is  read  in  terms of  another, 
manifested most dramatically by Burke through an image from Dante, of the living's love for 
“the farther shore” of death. Dickinson's beyond, in its vagueness, offers no further term in which 
to interpret the present stepping. All it leaves is stepping itself: “Onward and onward!” (EL 486).
“From  Blank  to  Blank—”  resonates  with  Emerson’s  images  because  it  speaks  to 
undergoing a submission to non-control, but leaves off still moving, still on the series of stairs. 
There is neither settlement as success, or settlement as failure. When we find ourselves receiving 
intellect, we will find ourselves unsettled. Emerson says we have a choice: we can not receive.  
“God offers to every mind its choice between truth and repose. Take which you please,— you 
can never have both. Between these, as a pendulum, man oscillates. … He in whom love of truth 
predominates will keep himself aloof from all moorings, and afloat” (EL 426). So to combine the 
two vocabularies, we are instructed to stay afloat by acquiescing to a kind of blindness in our 
walking: a light-footed but never resting wandering, we could say. 
21  “I, Eye, Ay: Emerson’s Early Essay on 'Nature': Thoughts on the Machinery of Transcendence.” The Sewanee  
Review. 74.4 (1966): 875-895
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The charge to stay afloat and the inquiry into how to live in this state is understood by 
Cavell as Emerson's response to skepticism. Cavell describes the problem of skepticism as one of 
the “master tones” of Emerson’s writing. (I take this in a musical sense, as grounding chord 
played throughout what he calls “Emerson's transcendental etudes.”) Looking for the point of 
inflection in the trajectory of Emerson’s thought as it moves away from idealism, Cavell points  
to a departure from the voice of  Nature in the trio of essays “The American Scholar,” “The 
Divinity  School  Address,”  and “Self-Reliance.”  “I  would characterize  the difference,”  writes 
Cavell,  “by saying  that  in  Nature Emerson  is  taking the  issue  of  skepticism as  solvable  or 
controllable, whereas thereafter he takes its unsolvability to be the heart of his thinking” (ETE 
112). Unsolvability is thus part of the movement vocabulary of Cavell’s Emerson. Elsewhere he 
picks up on Emerson’s description of the impossibility of final rest (of ideas, of categories, of 
persons, of objects) within a processual universe as “onwardness.” He cites Emerson’s quotation 
of Galileo's descriptive comment concerning the earth’s movement—pero si muove, and yet it 
moves—as an argument with Kant. In the passage from “Experience,” Emerson writes: “The 
secret of the illusoriness [of life] is in the necessity of a succession of moods or objects. Gladly 
we would anchor, but the anchorage is quicksand. This onward trick of nature is too strong for 
us. Pero si muove” (EL 476). Emerson’s argument here, says Cavell, is with the ground itself of 
Kant’s  distinction  between  subjectivity  and  objectivity,  which  the  “onward  trick  of  nature” 
unmoors. For both the inner (moods) and the outer (objects) are subject to this necessary and 
relentless  succession.  Instead  of  a  distinction  between  the  two,  we  experience  a  both/and 
relationship:  “We are in  a  state of  ‘romance’ with the universe,”  writes Cavell.  “We do not 
possess it, but our life is to return to it, to respond to its contesting for my attention in ever-
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widening circles, ‘onward and onward,’” (ETE 13). “The act of seeing and the thing seen … are 
one,” says Emerson (EL 386). There is not an objective universe in-itself out there; the universe 
is what “answers to our conceptions,” it is the incoming return to our attention (and attention 
itself part of that answering) (ETE 13). Because of nature’s onwardness, if we love truth, we will 
not  allow ourselves to  imagine our conceptions as anchored,  or as assuming a different  and 
longer lasting existence in an immaterial world of forms, as a priori.
What interests me in this is not the difficult and dense navigation of thinking through 
Emerson as responding to Kant, so much as what Cavell draws out of this response as a charge to 
take up the moving assignment he calls the “task of onwardness,” which is what emerges when 
the  binaries  (empiricism/rationalism,  subjective/objective,  private/public)  yield  their  ground. 
Emerson’s “onwardness” is not characterized by speed; it  is more the tempo of a shifting of 
weight  taken  to  remain  standing  on  unsteady  ground.  It  seems  to  call  for  two  kinds  of 
knowledge, which in turn offer  two kinds  of tools for approaching the composition of texts 
which call  to  and are answered by the world.  The first  is  a  perceptual  capacity to  take our 
bearings: where do we find ourselves,  and now where do we find ourselves, and now...  The 
tempo established by his opening image of our climbing a series of stairs suggests that we take 
stock of the world in an unfinished series of still-lives, retrospects, perches. We delight, or relax, 
or feel settled in these pictures. And yet we discover that they are not fixed: pero si muove. I like 
to imagine this discovery is the same one that Emerson is talking about when he describes the 
“very unhappy … discovery we have made, that we exist … called the Fall of Man.” We can 
think of this fall, which is not into sin but away from some kind of unmoving Eden, in other  
terms than into language, though it is that also. This is also a fall into movement. Because of it, 
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we “suspect our instruments,” those instruments we use to take our bearings. Reading “the Fall 
of Man” with the license to discover its counter-intuitive associations, I think of the very basic 
fact  that  we are,  whether  standing,  walking,  or  sitting,  falling bodies,  subject  to  gravity,  as 
Emerson also notes (“The circuit of the waters is mere falling.  The walking of man and all 
animals is a falling forward” (EL 308)). Constantly being moved by forces in the world, we find 
what we call stillness only by virtue of enacting or receiving a counter-pressure. Giving attention 
to the way that walking is falling22 produces an experience in which we can begin to discover the 
invisible, the “infinitesimal attractions” or tiny displacements that we rarely register consciously, 
given the fitness of our anatomies to navigate gravity. Falling and resisting our way through the 
world, we rely on proprioceptive intelligence. Along with a capacity to take our bearings, we 
need  a  way  to  understand  ourselves  moving  through  space.  We  take  pictures  and  moving 
pictures. Yielding the picture to the movement and the movement to the picture, we come up 
with a moving intelligence. 
In an Emersonian mood, which is to say in a mood that craves an experience of extension 
into vastness, the onward confluence of these two forms of mapping—of the space around us,  
taken in snap-shots,  and of ourselves moving through space,  seen as pattern and pathway—
points toward a poetics of cosmic location. This mapping requires two different instruments for 
the  provision  of  intelligence,  in  the  military  sense  of  intelligence  as  actionable,  useful 
information. On the one hand there is the intelligence of looking around, asking “where ... we 
find ourselves,”  with each “passage into [a]  new world,”  whether  a  grand new world of  an 
22     See Erin Manning’s Relationscapes (MIT Press, 2009) for a fractional analysis of walking and falling in the 
vocabulary of process philosophy. Also relevant is Steve Paxton’s “Small Dance,” (discussed by Sally Banes in 
Terpsichore in Sneakers (Wesleyan UP, 1987)) a dance score that begins with giving attention to stillness, which in 
turn discloses the impossibility of actual stillness. Paxton’s score directs the dancer to tune in to the minute 
sensations of movement that are part of our regular equilibrium. Undirected by a conscious intelligence, the small  
dance is an instance of how we can experience the way “it” thinks. 
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illuminated new America, or simply the new world of each successive stair. And then there is the 
receptive intelligence of proprioception that comes from behind: signals of where we are in space 
and what is acting on us as we move through it. 
Can we reframe these senses as prompts toward composition? How do these intelligences 
create instruments with which we can source material, and with which we can build that material  
into sequences? How does an attention to series guard against a settling into concepts? Can we 
tease the sound of these instruments out of literature which seems to engage a poetics of cosmic 
location? Will  the question “where do we find ourselves,” called out and answered within a 
condition of onwardness, yield unity, if only glancingly, with a kind of perfection? 
3. TAKING READINGS, KNOWING OUR POSITION
LOCAL PERFECTIONS, COSMIC LOCATIONS
What,  then,  is  the  perfect  thing  with  which  Emerson  craves  unity,  if  it  cannot  be 
expressed as a permanence or finality? In the same way as the Augustinian concept of god as the 
extent  of  the  world,  Emerson’s  perfect  is  a  completeness  from which  incompleteness is  not 
necessarily excluded. The fold of the particular, the ordinary, the daily, within the expanse, is our 
means of participation, and if we would follow our genius, allowing the most partial, private 
investigations to yield to the most public, we would see that there is no contradiction. Emerson 
goes so far as to suggest an identity between the part and the perfect: “And this deep power in 
which we exist, and whose beatitude is accessible to us, is not only self-sufficing and perfect in  
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every hour, but the act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the  
object, are one,” he writes in “The Over-Soul,” continuing, “We see the world piece by piece, as 
the sun, the moon, the animal, the tree; but the whole, of which these are the shining parts, is the  
soul” (EL 386). As much as he gestures toward totality, however, Emerson’s perfect is not perfect  
in  the  sense of  a  finished whole.  To reconcile  this  sense of  encompassing fullness with his 
equally strong impulse that everything is initial leads to a picture of a universe in process that 
accords with the twentieth-century descriptions of Alfred North Whitehead: an everything that is 
continually added to by the new.
A project  of Emersonian perfection,  then, would be the location of the moving point 
within the moving, evolving whole. Joan Richardson writes that Emerson, in discovering “that it 
is the imperfect that is our paradise … allowed his thinking appetite to nourish him as it needed 
from the squirming facts disturbing sleep and the dream of reason, thus revealing religion to be 
as it was in the beginning, an expression of spiritual location: a vector indicting the latitude, 
longitude, and moment of being on a sphere reeling through the universe, the mind of God” 
(NHP  70).  Richardson’s  Natural  History tracks  the  incursion  of  scientific  information—
particularly the awareness of the wave-nature of light, and the Darwinian information of the 
world’s  unending  process—into  theological  thinking,  and  links  the  resulting  varieties  of 
comprehension to a family of American aesthetic projects, embracing Henry James, Gertrude 
Stein, Wallace Stevens, and Susan Howe, among others, all of whom produce a sense of testing 
location in the affect of their work, variously trying both the avenues and fringes of lived spaces 
for their openings, mapping expansions of individual arenas. How, these artists could be seen as 
asking, do we understand our place in a universe in process? 
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This project of locating oneself comes forward into process art as a pedestrian aesthetic.23 
Although there is a romance to this work, to speak very broadly, it is not the idealism that the 
literary  designation  “romantic”  implies,  but  rather  a  love  of  the  ordinary  that  in  its  recent 
manifestations, for example,  has embraced junk, failure, and accident. Thoreau, working and 
walking quite literally as a surveyor, and claiming a radical equality of all landscapes, makes a 
clear link from Emerson to this aesthetic commitment. The commitment to making sense of (and 
delighting in) one’s relations in space and place (a network emphasis as opposed to a temporal 
emphasis  on  chains  of  cause  and  effect)  as  fundamental  to  our  intellectual  health  becomes 
apparent in many of the genres that emerged in the twentieth century, including in theater, the  
landscape play, which is generally associated with Gertrude Stein as its founding theorist. The 
phrase comes from her essay “Plays” which describes Four Saints as “ma[king] a landscape.”24 
Landscape plays are understood to be concerned with developing a picture of relations, rather 
than following a plotted sequence of revelations. Thornton Wilder’s “Our Town,” one of the 
most-performed plays in American theatrical history (a mainstay of amateur theater as well as a 
recurring great text in professional theater), can be read as a landscape play, and perhaps has the 
advantage  over  his  friend  Gertrude  Stein’s  plays  of  being  significantly  more  legible  and 
accessible, unfolding landscapes not at the level of sentences and paragraphs, but narratively by a 
series of perches and flights throughout a small town. Mostly caught up in household details, the 
first act of the play ends by taking a great sweeping step back, like a cosmos-scaled zoom out: 
23     The word pedestrian comes to me from my dance context. The renewal of dance, both within and following the 
influence of Cunningham and Cage, that is associated with Judson Dance Theater involved the incorporation of 
“pedestrian movement,” the everyday movement of ordinary bodies. As far as I know, the word's aesthetic currency  
comes out of the scene at large. Sally Banes's history of Judson Dance Theater, Democracy's Body (Michigan, 
1993), offers a detailed survey of this interest in ordinary movement and the way the Judson artists took it up.
24     Bonnie Marranca's writing on Stein is an invaluable elaboration of how plays make landscapes. Eleanor Fuchs 
and Una Chaudhuri's edited volume Land/Scape/Theater follows with the identification of a broad array of 
landscape concerns in post-Stein theater.
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REBECCA: I never told you about that letter Jane Crofut got from her minister 
when she was sick. He wrote Jane a letter and on the envelope the address 
was like this. It said: Jane Crofut; The Crofut Farm; Grover’s Corners; Sutton 
County; New Hampshire; United States of America. 
GEORGE: What’s funny about that? 
REBECCA: But listen, it’s not finished: the United States of America; Continent 
of  North  America,  Western  Hemisphere;  the  Earth;  the  Solar  System;  the 
Universe; the Mind of God—that’s what it said on the envelope. 
GEORGE: What do you know!
REBECCA: And the postman brought it just the same.
GEORGE: What do you know!
STAGE MANAGER: That’s  the  end of  the  first  act,  friends.  You can go and 
smoke now, those that smoke. (46)
This cosmic location, which begins in “our town,” a place of deep familiarity, and extends far 
beyond it  into the  most  other,  the most  radically  distant,  is  a  critical  element  of  interest  in  
pedestrian aesthetics. The local becomes a vehicle for discovering radical strangeness, and for an 
encounter  that  necessarily  undoes  some  amount  of  self-knowing  and  self-possession.  The 
seeming paradox within this transit accounts for much of what can strike the reader of Emerson 
as frustrating contradiction, the reader of Thoreau as an almost perverse commitment to punning 
oppositions.  Go ahead and smoke during the intermission;  you will  still  be hurtling through 
space, in the mind of God. 
Wilder’s cosmic zoom-out is effective because the play has, up to this point, been so 
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strictly limited to the minor domestic vicissitudes of the people in this small town. Suddenly in 
this  gesture  the  scale  and  rootedness  of  our  identification  with  the  story’s  characters  is 
transposed. If our habits of reading character arcs and life stories has led us to think that this 
sweet  look  at  our  town  is  heading  toward  a  traditional  dramatic  conclusion—revelation  of 
backstory, navigation of crisis, marriage, or death—suddenly we are forced to view Grover’s 
Corners as a tiny point within the mind of God. And then we are cast out of the invisibleness of 
the darkened space of the audience and told to go smoke, if we do smoke: the play abandons us 
narratively, and then the play abandons our theatrical conventions. When we return to the second 
act,  we make a  fragmented landing just  before the marriage,  and the third act goes  right  to 
Emily’s early death—not the movement of the narrative arc we thought we were on. Not only are 
we suddenly in the land of the dead; the dead don’t really feel all that worried or attached to 
Grover’s Corners anymore. 
This lurching forward in time (and then back, when Emily revisits a living morning) bears 
a resemblance to the surprising leaps within ordinary windows into consciousness that Virginia 
Woolf makes, for instance in her elision of narrative between the first and second parts of To The 
Lighthouse, or in the gentler but just as impersonal generational hopscotch of  The Years. The 
way these two scales yield to  each other produces in each instance a  sense of time that far 
exceeds the usual narrative metrics that correspond to the standard plots, whether of growth, 
marriage, crisis and resolution, or even the multigenerational inclusiveness of the biographical 
move  of  tracing  a  life  from  the  parents’  birth.  We  find  ourselves  narratively  in  places 
“unapproachable by a process of continuity” (ETE 121), to appropriate Cavell’s description of 
Emersonian illumination. Thus denied the predictable track, we are prompted as readers to ask 
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where we find ourselves. Our scale expands to the cosmos in which it happens. Cosmic location 
involves doing something to our sense of time, by flinging the individual life (perceiving the stair  
in which it finds itself) into an impersonal meter, whether that is geologic time (the move that 
Charles Olson makes in his Maximus Poems), or the time metered by clouds passing or planets 
turning. 
Our Town dramatizes the question of cosmic location by yanking the domestic story out 
of its usual measurements. Other landscape works—many of Stein's plays, or such contemporary 
plays as Amber  Reed's  The Grand Kindness, Mac Wellman's  Cellophane, or Kristen Kosmas's 
This From Cloudland—reverse the scale, working in the domestic space but descending into tiny 
units of measure that never reach the scale of marriage plots, coming of age stories, memorials, 
or other person-sized narrative tropes. Instead of dwarfing the individual in cosmic time, these 
landscapes  assert  a  continuity or  identity with  matter.  In one sense this  is  a way of finding 
ourselves less than human, but approached without grasping the container of individual life-span, 
or human-sized plots, these new measurements or findings offer a sense of continuity with the 
vaster world: contact with X.
MAKING CONTACT WITH THE OTHER ME
Within  these  fictions—Our  Town,  To  The  Lighthouse,  The  Years—we  see  narrative 
practices that provoke a sense of vaster location through relationships to historical, generational, 
planetary time. These are tracked in part by the persistence of location—the town, the house—
with  changing inhabitants,  so  that  the  role  of  the  protagonist  yields  to  not  just  a  group of 
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protagonists but to a space in which life passes. That space—in Woolf the houses, in Wilder the 
town—itself undergoes its own process, and in Our Town when Emily is given a chance actually 
to  enact  the  return  to  the  house  as  it  was,  what  occurs  is  not  a  success  but  just  a  harder  
acquiescence to process. 
We could discover an alternate form of cosmic location in participatory practices built 
from the data of dailiness, structured by seeking experimental, participatory relation with the 
expansive world. These daily practices have the potential to discover a local relation with what 
Emerson names “the otherest” (EL 616). As a compositional method, this involves trusting the 
resource of the near and the arbitrary,  or in Emerson’s phrase,  “the familiar,  the low,” (69), 
without  imagining that it  is  compassed by our  understanding. Descriptions of  choreographic 
process abound with this same notion. In A Choreographic Mind, Susan Rethorst describes the 
unmade  dance  as  “that  stranger,”  and  argues  for  compositional  practice  that  proceeds  by 
“interviewing” the body in movement, responding to it,  and vigorously rejecting attempts to 
control or grasp what the dance is by means of theoretical constructs. Jonathan Burrows, in his 
Choreographer’s Handbook counsels, “the idea that you can make what you want is a fantasy. 
You are you, and you can only make what you can make…. The trick is to find out what you can 
make.”  Like  Rethorst,  he  describes  a  responsive  process  engaging  bodily  intelligence  and 
impulse as something broader than self-identified intention: “Choreography is a negotiation with 
the patterns your body is thinking” (69). The body, as a resource of immense variety in excess of  
our conscious concepts (and yet amenable to concepts as goals or organizers of action)—we 
could say “an immense intelligence”—stands here for William James’s “it” of “it thinks,” and for 
what  Emerson  calls  “nature,”  and  elsewhere,  the  “other  me.”  Choreographic  work  has  the 
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potential to soothe the dissonance of this paradox, by discovering a strange intelligence, and the 
patterns of that intelligence in action, within the artist’s own body. Thus body-based work takes a 
commonplace experience of creative process—that the work guides the maker, and importantly, 
surprises the maker—and situates that experience of strangeness in the physical “me”—a degree 
closer to home than the materials of the writer, painter, sculptor, or musician. But as many artist 
statements and process-examinations testify, the presence of this strangeness is not so much an 
experience of alienation as an experience of radical continuity with intelligent patterns existing 
both within and without the individual body, or what I believe Emerson means by “the perfect.”  
Experiencing the “other me” is a project of participatory location, an engagement with 
sensing and proprioception that doesn’t make any claims for completeness and doesn’t rely on 
the claim to objectivity that we grant habitually visual data. Thought objects—call them images, 
concepts, or patterns—do not simply disappear from the picture, leaving an anarchy of sensation. 
Thought  objects  comprise  the  apparatus  that  measures  sensory  experience  and  sifts  it  into 
models, but those objects are not external to the body because they are ways of recognizing and 
organizing bodily impressions. Thus central to the capacity to have this experience of the “other 
me” is the acceptance of mediated experience. An exclusive opposition of subject and object is 
unworkable  here.  Emerson  spends  a  good  deal  of  time  in  “Experience”  accepting  the 
disappointment that knowledge can never transcend the partial, that abstractions (even the most 
time-honored)  are  stochastic  patterns  derived  from accumulations  of  partial  knowledge.  He 
writes of his essay: “I am a fragment, and this is a fragment of me” (EL 491). But though the 
dream of an objective survey is lost, a different kind of survey becomes possible. In the moments 
of intensity—lucidity within that survey—we experience radical continuity. 
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This intuition of radical continuity has been with Emerson since his ecstatic statement in 
Nature:  “I  am  part  or  particle  of  God”  (10).  In  my  reading  of  Emerson,  this  continued 
participatory measure, even in the most ecstatic, me-dissolving leaps, defines the transcendence 
of transcendentalism not as a leap outside the self into a plane of pure romance, but a leap into  
scales of experience that are incommensurate with human containment, and so gestures toward 
the  immensity  of  material  and intelligent  life  while  delighting  in  one’s  own garden plot  of 
material  intelligence.  But  outside  of thought  experiments,  this perfect  otherness is  only ever 
something of partial glimpses, intense seasons, which is why, as I understand it, Cavell describes 
Emerson’s perfectionism as a gesture made at the outset of thinking, and not a literal goal. There 
is no heavenly kingdom, only further steps in the series of stairs. We could think of this gesture 
as being a small shift of weight that de-centers us and moves us from standing into walking. It is  
a sense that there is more. 
UNSETTLEMENT, CIRCULATION, RECEPTIVITY
From  its  earliest  appearance  in  Nature,  Emerson’s  image  of  participation  is  one  of 
circulation.  Concluding the  passage  quoted above,  Richardson cites Emerson’s  insistence on 
mobility: “People wish to be settled; only as far as they are unsettled is there any hope for them” 
(qtd. in NHP 70). In my reading, unsettlement is a mandate not literally to keep moving through 
space or to disrupt one’s home and family,25 but to remain attentive (and so responsive) to the 
25     The question of how the call to unsettlement bears on a committed family life hung heavily on me when I first 
started reading Emerson. In light of that anxiety, Branka Arsić's discussion of Emerson's idea of marriage as a venue 
for focusing attention on transition and change so as to make space for growth within the relationship, is extremely 
helpful. (On Leaving, pp. 219-225.)
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ways in which movement and rest are only relative terms: that circulation, exchange, falling, 
negotiated  equilibriums,  relays,  and empathetic  responses,  are  moving contexts  which  never 
cease. 
Let us revisit Emerson’s statement on unsettlement in “Intellect,” as further explicating 
the dynamic relation between will  and proprioceptive sense:  “He in whom the love of truth 
predominates  will  keep  himself  aloof  from  all  moorings,  and  afloat.  He  will  abstain  from 
dogmatism,  and recognize  all  the  opposite  negations,  between which,  as  walls,  his  being  is 
swung” (EL 426). Intentionality, in the form of a negative capability, first directs him to ungrasp 
the moorings and relinquish further intention, upon which event he proprioceptively discovers 
his being as in a continuous swing. Unsettlement, then, would be a practice of unblocking the 
limitations on one’s capacity to sense motion, which could also describe the strategy of most 
somatic  disciplines,  significantly  Alexander  technique,  which  profoundly  influenced  John 
Dewey, about which I will say more in my next chapter. That we could discover these fluidities  
by experimenting with the resources we think of as ourselves—our physical bodies, our store of 
memories,  concepts,  and  habits—begins  to  explain  why  Cavell  sees  Thoreau’s  Walden,  an 
experiment  in Emersonian domestication,  as a form of leave-taking:  the book called  Walden 
records Thoreau’s eventual readiness and capacity to leave Walden Pond.
For Emerson, the discovery of unending circulation is made by watching the incursions 
that  come  across  the  border  of  one’s  mind.  His  experience  of  “the  otherest”  is  receptive, 
frequently  described  as  an  ingress.  Sometimes  this  ingress  is  described  in  grand  terms,  a 
generalized descent  of  the  “universal  being”  into the  man. Where  Emerson addresses  actual 
process, however, the scale is often much smaller. In “Fate,” he writes, “the great man, that is, 
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the man most imbued with the spirit of the time, is the impressionable man,—of a fibre irritable 
and delicate, like iodine to light. He feels the infinitesimal attraction. His mind is righter than 
others, because he yields to a current so feeble as can be felt only by a needle delicately poised” 
(EL 965). To feel the infinitesimal attractions, one would need to keep pictures and language 
concepts from imposing conclusions, in other words, to practice negative capability: “Happy is 
the hearing man; unhappy the speaking man…. As long as I hear truth … the waters of the great 
deep have ingress and egress to the soul. But if I speak, I define, I confine, and am less” (965).  
Receptive perception would require our humility, then, although that humility in turn allows us to  
participate in the magisterial: “Silence is a solvent that destroys personality, and gives us leave to 
be great and universal” (426).
Emerson is not proposing anything so radical as a vow of silence, however. Silence is one 
side  of  the  “opposite  negations”  in  the  condition  of  polarity.  If  we  would  return  to 
communication, we would need those “more or less luminous” images that rise up in that silent 
attention,  and  become  communicable.  The  Emersonian  hero—the  poet—he  figures  in  these 
Orphic terms, as one who could cross in and out of silence, returning from profound reception to 
speak not with the “rotten diction” of dogmatism or settled concepts, but with words “fastened 
again to visible things.” Again in “Intellect” he writes:
To genius must always go two gifts, the thought and the publication. The first is 
revelation, always a miracle, which no frequency of occurrence or incessant study 
can  ever  familiarize,  but  which  must  always  leave  the  inquirer  stupid  with 
wonder….  But  to  make  it  available,  it  needs  a  vehicle  or  art  by  which  it  is 
conveyed to men. To be communicable, it must become picture or sensible object. 
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We must learn the language of facts. The most wonderful inspirations die with 
their subject, if he has no hand to paint them to the senses. The ray of light passes 
through invisible space, and only when it falls on an object is it seen. (EL 422)
The  artifacts  painted  by  these  hands  are  not  final,  and the  succession  of  Geniuses  (not  the 
household deities but the representative men)—poets and even prophets—are only translators of 
“the language of facts.” “The Bacon, the Spinoza, the Hume, Schelling,  Kant,  or whosoever 
propounds to you a philosophy of the mind, is only a more or less awkward translator of things 
in your consciousness, which you also have your way of seeing, perhaps of denominating…. He 
has not succeeded in rendering back to you your consciousness, he has not succeeded; now let 
another try. If Plato cannot, perhaps Spinoza will” (426). The Bacon, the Spinoza, the Hume, 
have not made their pictures, but registered them. The communicable images too are in a sense 
received,  images that have  risen up by giving  attention to  the  experience  of  that  dissolving 
silence. It is in this sense that the partial makes the perfect accessible. My attention here moves 
toward ways of discovering and articulating those images, communicable parts, or pieces, of an 
experience of participation. 
4. RESTLESS STILLS
“Language itself is never in a state of rest … The very idea of reference is spatial: over here is  
word, over there is thing, at which the word is shooting amiable love-arrows. Getting from the  
beginning to the end of a statement is simple movement; following the connotative byways … is  
complex or compound movement.” 
— Lyn Hejinian, “The Rejection of Closure”
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READING “ROOMS”
Let us return to Cavell’s description of Emerson’s perfectionism as a gesture that occurs 
at  the  beginning of  thinking,  a  launching crucial  to  the  mobility  required for  the  project  of 
“having a self,” which is a “process of moving to, and from, nexts.”  (ETE 169; CHU 12). If the  
perfect is onwardness in general, so too is the condition we find ourselves in, described in its 
most abstract terms. So participating in perfection is bound up with the problem of sensing our 
present condition of movement, in successive moments. Framed one way, we could say we are 
faced with a call to sense the way that “all things swim and glitter.” It is here, in the cultivation 
of ways of sensing, that we can find one of the “meeting place[s],” in Muriel Rukeyser’s phrase, 
of literature and philosophy.
Rukeyser’s The Life of Poetry, published in 1949, offers an impassioned and persuasive 
rationale for the de-marginalization of poetic thinking. Her “meeting place” concerns the way 
that different kinds of thinking combine to help understand and operate in a complex world. She 
warns of the dangers of separating out discrete, technical bodies of thought from each other and, 
like Emerson, sees poetic thinking as a resource for thinking in general, through its analogical, 
pattern-seeking richness that is yet grounded in responding to actual things. Her work contributes 
to  a  discussion  of  the  way  aesthetic  projects  matter  to  our  ways  of  navigating  the  world. 
Following Rukeyser, I want to take up as philosophically useful, works and projects which are 
undeniably experienced in the main as obscure and even unintelligible, and do not strike the 
reader who is not already, we could say, committed to the waves of those projects, as being 
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useful sources or instances of  ethical tuning, a tuning of our thinking instrument that becomes 
ethical insofar as the process demands a sensitivity to relation and an openness to surprise, say to 
be surprised by things, people, or situations we encounter. Stein here represents both a creator of 
textual experiences of fine surprise, as well as a figure who has produced more, through her 
license and encouragement to those who choose to inherit  her,  than her proper compositions 
alone. (In this she is similar in influence to Cage.26) We can read Stein's works as flagships of 
what were very new ways of thinking about aesthetic value and the discovery of meaning, ways 
that have continued to feed and inform many artists's approaches to aesthetic understanding. 
I want to close this chapter by looking at a work of prose poetry that exquisitely discovers 
things swimming and glittering: Stein’s “Rooms” from Tender Buttons (1914). Within the frame 
of a domestic still life, operating below the scale of narrative plot, this piece could be seen as 
performing a number of the projects I have tried to collect in this chapter as Emersonian ways of 
watching  the  world  while  falling  through  and  with  it.  Without  drama  (as  either  crisis  or 
dramatization), she makes the Orphic transit from silence to speech, in the rising up of language 
from a still life of objects she does not properly name. She “tells” objects as unfixed successions 
of surfaces in relation. Through assemblages of counter-habitual language images, as we will see 
in  the  examples  that  follow,  she  manages  to  make subjectivity  and objectivity  yield  to  one 
ongoing series of findings,  unfastening the word from the thing in order to  re-pronounce or 
reattach the word and the thing to each other in a field of language not ruled by 1:1 ratios. Maybe  
it is better to say Stein does not “fasten words to visible things,” but bounces words and things 
off  of each other until  they refract and lose their  distinctness,  like waves striking a surface. 
26     A valuable argument for the ethical nature of both Stein and Cage's thinking is made by Joan Retallack in The 
Poethical Wager.
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Stein's  version  of  Emerson’s  “language  of  facts”—the  rising  up  of  images  that  happens  in 
receptive thinking—is generated by a sustained attention to the familiar, the low, the near at 
hand.  She turns up, in her way of seeing, a sense of restlessness in the materials of domesticity. 
Emerson’s ideas continually open into each other; so too do the surfaces of this poem 
keep following curves into a multiplicity of senses. But here I think it would be useful to take a 
close  focus,  like  the  moments  in  an  old  film  when  the  camera’s  iris  collapses  to  just  one 
remaining circle, which lingers in the frame, and then fades to black. In Emerson’s simple and 
beautiful  formula  of  swimming  and  glittering,  we find  both  movement  pathways  and  small 
illuminations.  The  last  event  of  this  chapter  is  to  ask  how “Rooms”  swims,  how “Rooms” 
glitters. 
HOW TO WRITE A GLITTERING 
Let me propose that what it means to compose a glittering, as a writing assignment, is to 
free up the solid contours of a described surface so that it can receive the play of incoming light,  
and in the ensuing play of reflected light, multiply those contours into a shape-shifting series of 
appearing and disappearing images. Lyn Hejinian, a poet with a gift for discovering how, in a 
Cavellian phrase, poetry’s interests are philosophical, claims for Tender Buttons that it practices 
an avant-garde form of realism, calling it a “phenomenological masterpiece” (The Language of  
Inquiry 97). She cites Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s description of phenomenology as a philosophy 
“which puts essences back into existence, and does not expect to arrive at an understanding of 
man and the world from any starting point other than that of their ‘facticity’ … all its efforts are 
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concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world … It tries to give a 
direct description of our experience as it is” (qtd. in Inquiry 98). In order to approach this “direct 
and primitive contact,”  Stein has  to  impose  a  silence on certain  mediated forms of  contact: 
names. “I had to feel anything and everything that was for me existing so intensely that I could 
put it down in writing as a thing in itself without at all necessarily using its name,” wrote Stein, 
about Tender Buttons, continuing, “The name of a thing might be something in itself if it could 
come to be real enough but just as a name it was not enough something” (qtd. in Inquiry 96). She 
might  be  describing  Edwards’s  “sense  of  the  heart,”  without  which  a  word  is  “not  enough 
something.” Hejinian teases out the way that Stein, instead of understanding the phenomenon of 
the thing in itself to be an object (or we could say an unmoving thing), sees phenomena as  
multiplications of relations: “Seeing through, seeing with, seeing at, seeing in, and seeing beside
—a fully prepositional  situation” (99-100).  To clarify  this “prepositional  situation,”  Hejinian 
invokes William James’s description of the materiality of transitional feeling in our experience 
(“We ought to say a feeling of and … as readily as we say a feeling of blue”). 
But  the  magic  of  Stein’s  prepositional  situation  is  that  she  generates  this  quivering 
transitional field around an object by using object  language—nouns—that suggest to Stein a 
relation to what she is seeing and writing as she is seeing it. Generating liveliness by using words  
to “make what [she] looked at be itself,” Stein describes her excitement that those words “very 
exactly related themselves to that thing the thing at which I was looking, but as often as not had 
as I say nothing whatever to do with what my words would do that described that thing” (qtd. in  
Inquiry 98). In Steven Meyer’s study of Stein’s experimental method, he persuasively marks a 
shift between The Making of Americans and the work that followed next, Tender Buttons, as an 
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abandonment of an inventory-style descriptive project, and a renewal of description through a 
project of portraiture. Stein’s portraiture here is an effort to make the object or person described 
in writing, by allowing the writing to arise while looking. With this in mind we can make a bit  
more sense of Stein’s description of words that make what she looked at be itself. It is the words 
that are relating  themselves to the thing seen, and doing very different things than “what [her] 
words would do that described that thing.” The difference between using existing descriptive 
language and learning to scan her own attention for arising language, is the difference between 
empiricism (we could say, following Emerson, a “paltry empiricism”) and radical empiricism. 
Meyer claims for Stein that she was able to pursue radical empiricism even more radically than 
William James. Furthermore he links the project, or we could say, the way of radical empiricism, 
with Emerson’s formulation, from “Fate,” of taking “irresistible dictation”—the words relating 
themselves to the thing seen as she receives and records.  Tender Buttons becomes Stein’s first 
project where the writing is the medium of this way.
These words, relating themselves to things, are recorded by Stein in a cascade of copulas 
that offer relations and equivalences of varying, we could say, graspability, or solidity. Coming in 
this  cascade  they are  not  presented  as  fixed realities  of  the  object,  but  as  the  shape  of  the 
phenomenon now, and now, and now.  Tender Buttons has been described as “cubist” for this 
reason, but this description is inadequate, for she does not just take in multiple perspectives at  
once. Her shapes shift across many dimensions of relation. Take, for example, “A PAPER,” from 
the first section of Tender Buttons: “A courteous occasion makes a paper show no such occasion 
and this makes readiness and eyesight and likeness and a stool.” If this is a cubist rendering of all 
available  surfaces  simultaneously  visible  to  the  audience,  there  are  many  more  than  three 
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dimensions in which a paper is available. 
 Let me return to the idea that to write a glittering is to bounce light—and so record or 
produce  images—off  a  series  of  surfaces  discovered  against,  above,  or  around  the  settled 
contours of an object,  or perhaps the settled contours of an object’s essence as defined (and 
delimited) by its name. Stein’s prose glitters by allowing the objects of her still lives to shape-
shift:  continuously,  lightly,  and  relentlessly.  And  yet  they  shift,  not  only  through  words  of 
transition or yielding, but through a series of statements that require the reader continually to 
ground and re-ground herself in the picture that is being made. That is to say, Stein works a 
significant amount of time in making statements of being. This creates a weirdly stolid effect, 
even as every statement is restless, followed by a new statement of more or less immediately 
sensible relation. The paper that “shows no such occasion” makes “readiness and eyesight and 
likeness and a stool.” I do not believe there is a secret order behind this series, and I think that 
looking for the secret order is part of what makes Stein so frustrating for most readers. Stein does 
expect a kind of understanding to be possible, but this understanding is not the “getting” of a  
hidden key so much as an ability to enjoy the prose.27 If we think about pleasure from a neuro-
physical point of view, we can describe it as the completion of a circuit. Only by yielding the  
desire for the key can the keyless circuit of, for example, “A PAPER,” be enjoyed. And this 
enjoyment can only occur if a reader is ready to be delighted by words, recognizing that, in 
Emerson’s phrase, “Every word was once a poem. Every new relation is a new world” (EL 454). 
To complete a circuit is to sense an arrival, perhaps into a new world, or just a new light. 
The glittering that goes on as a paper makes a readiness and eyesight and likeness and a  
27     Stein makes this claim in several places. See, for example, Pennsound’s archival clip of an interview she gave 
in 1934, probably at the Algonquin hotel, where she states, “I mean by understanding enjoyment. If you enjoy it, you 
understand it. And lots of people have enjoyed it so lots of people have understood it.”
103
stool may seem inconsequentially random and insignificant, but the mind that can take pleasure 
in “the infinitesimal attractions” of those words,  discover its existence in falling through the 
small  slopes  and  eddies  as  the  sentence  transitions  from  one  to  the  next  and  the  next, 
experiencing the series as a circuit and not a fractured set of unconnected objects, is a mind that 
has silenced calculation, discovered Emerson’s “spirit of infancy” which, we may remember, is 
the capacity to be present to the place where we find ourselves. 
GONE SWIMMING
Tender Buttons is divided into three sections: objects, food, and rooms. As a sequence in 
sensing, these meta-categories move the reader’s idea of her primary sense reception from eye, to  
gut, to movement in space. Whereas the first two sections are composed of many smaller pieces, 
suggesting objects, buttons, we could say, or focal points, “Rooms” is one long block of prose, a 
cascade  of  paragraphs,  producing  a  typographical  implication  of  ongoingness  which,  taken 
together with the plural of the title, and coming after so many objects that belong in a domestic 
setting, sets up a mood of wandering through a house. Because the field of each encountered 
thing contains multiple shifting surfaces—the shape-shifting proliferation of relations that arise 
from seeing the house’s objects (cuts of roast beef, carafes) as glittering refractions of images 
that make the things be themselves—to wander this house is not simply a project of walking 
through it, but of swimming. 
Stein begins “Rooms” with an assignment of displacing: “Act so that there is no use in a 
centre” (63).  What  follows is  threaded with reminders to keep moving:  negation of centers, 
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prompts toward open channels, and the simple, gentle unsettler “more”: “The instance of there 
being more is an instance of more” (63); “This is so nice and sweet and yet there comes the 
change, there comes the time to press more air. This does not mean the same as disappearance” 
(64); “Is there pleasure when there is a passage, there is when every room was open” (65); “Is 
there. That was a question” (67); “It is not very likely that there is a centre, a hill is a hill and no 
hill is contained in a pink tender descender” (68). These could be gathered into a description of 
pulsation (a term Emerson also uses), the small pushes of renewal that keep a circulatory system 
going.  An  “instance  of  more”  will  “press  more  air.”  It  is  not  a  “disappearance”  but  a 
displacement: the pressure keeps the moving system in equilibrium, or health, creating “pleasure 
when there  is  a  passage.”  There seem to  be  few doors  connecting  these  rooms,  or  perhaps 
swinging doors; nothing is contained. 
Following this thread further suggests more of this gentle pulsing into circulation by way 
of swinging from affirmative statements to negation: “Giving it away, not giving it away, is there 
any difference. Giving it away. Not giving it away” (70). The swing does not hang us in place, 
but yields hints of forward movement. We make a decision to take a further step. “Why is the  
name changed. The name is changed because in the little space there is a tree, in some space  
there are no trees, in every space there is a hint of more, all this causes the decision” (72); “A 
change is in a current and there is no habitable exercise” (73); “No change is not needed” (74); 
The twining together of negation with descriptive sentences, as in “no change is not needed,” 
creates its own shadow as its sense is sifted, a domestic condition of polarity, perhaps. No change  
is not needed, so a change is needed, but we understand the need for a change (or onwardness), 
against its counterbalancing “no.” “No change is not needed” could be understood as an analogy 
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for standing still. In order to stand still, we have to push the floor away as a counter to the pull of 
gravity. Even if we don’t engage (either consciously or unconsciously) in pushing the floor away, 
the floor  pushes us away. Hidden in the apparent stillness of the most  ordinary occasion of 
standing are pressures whose navigation we barely register. What this all means is that the home, 
a place of relative stillness, is actually a site of continuous movement: “A window and no willow,  
a wide place stranger, a wideness makes an active center” (77). A room we give attention to, at 
units  of  measure  smaller  than  our  normal  attentions,  becomes  “wide,”  becomes  “stranger,” 
becomes “an active center.” 
Alongside the thread of pulsing, there is also a thread of placing.  In navigating these 
rooms, we come upon solid states. Already in the fourth paragraph, which I reproduce below in 
full, there is a sense of encountering relative stasis, as little eddies or traps in the stream:
To begin the placing there is no wagon. There is no change lighter. It was done. 
And then the spreading, that was not accomplishing that needed standing and yet 
the time was not so difficult as they were not all in place. They had no change.  
They were not respected. They were that, they did it so much in the matter and 
this  showed that  that  settlement  was not  condensed.  It  was  spread there.  Any 
change was in the ends of the centre. A heap was heavy. There was no change. 
(63)
There may be no use in a center, but there are actual experiences of losing the capacity to be 
drawn forward, effecting an anchor, negatively instead of positively inflected. But always Stein 
finds a way to slip out of the resting places. She continues: 
Burnt and behind and lifting a temporary stone and lifting more than a drawer. 
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The instance of there being more is an instance of more. (63)
The heavy heap is a “temporary stone.” Lifting and lifting, there are instances of more. Stein’s 
domestic scene is always renewable by these tugs and lifts, or replacements. And even without 
active lifting, there is the fact of the time always changing:  “The question is this, is it possible to 
suggest more to replace that thing. This question and this perfect denial  does make the time 
change all the time” (65). How does perfect denial make the time change? Perhaps because the 
absence of assertion, silence, is somehow a force of attraction: “A silence is not indicated by any 
motion, less is indicated by a motion, more is not indicated it is enthralled” (67). The difference 
between indication and enthrallment is that to be enthralled is to be drawn forward, drawn to, or 
at least to feel the pull of attention towards something, even if momentarily still, a “temporary 
stone.” The oscillation, or lapping away at these two feelings as one spills into the other creates 
an  estuarial  sensation.  There  is  no  dominant  current;  each  will  yield  to  the  other.  But  the 
counterbalance of forces achieves relative stillness only by continuing to vibrate. 
Stein’s still lives, given attention, always seems to produce, in their glittering, a sense of 
more. Establishing facts serves to establish their ongoingness. In “Rooms” as with her other 
writing, she includes a present-tense evaluation of her project even as she is writing it: “There is 
always that  disposition  and in  a  way there  is  some use  in  not  mentioning changing and in 
establishing the temperature, there is some use in it as establishing all that lives dimmer freer and 
there is  no dinner in the middle of anything. There is  no such thing.” (69) Establishing the 
disposition and temperature, not mentioning changing, still yields movement. There is no dinner, 
or perhaps no middle of anything (“no use in a centre”), because the settling (of anything, it 
seems) conjoins feelings of “dimmer” and “freer,” a dropping into stillness that turns over into a 
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rippling out. 
Stasis, in the form of things not shape-shifting, seems always to be met with regret. Here, 
the regret turns over from a register of missing things (images of relation?), to one of questioned 
things (the names that stay put): 
Why is there no necessary dull stable, why is there a single piece of any color, 
why is there that sensible silence. Why is there the resistance in a mixture, why is 
there no poster, why is there that in the window, why is there no suggester, why is 
there no window, why is there no oyster closer. Why is there a circular diminisher, 
why is there a bather, why is there no scraper, why is there a dinner, why is there a 
bell ringer, why is there a duster, why is there a section of similar resemblance, 
why is there that scissor. 
South, south which is a wind is not a rain, does silence choke speech or does it 
not. (69-70)
As we continue to move, silence doesn’t seem to choke speech because silence gives way to 
“dimmer freer” activity (echoing Dickinson’s finding that it’s “lighter—to be Blind —”). Recall 
what Stein said about the project of Tender Buttons: “I had to feel anything and everything that 
was for me existing so intensely that I could put it down in writing as a thing in itself without at  
all necessarily using its name.” It may seem that the question of whether silence chokes speech is 
not a question, but an “am I right or what?” kind of statement. But if “Rooms” answers that 
question, perhaps it answers no, that silence does not choke speech. The project of feeling things 
“existing so intensely” suggests an attitude of reception: Emerson’s happy “hearing man” instead 
of the unhappy “speaking one.” In order to feel things existing intensely, Stein has to silence the 
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official descriptive vocabularies that belong to them, and allow herself instead to be surprised by 
reception of words that “very exactly related themselves to that thing the thing at which I was 
looking.” 
What  makes  “Rooms”  seem  to  me  a  project  of  swimming  is  not  just  the  simple 
implication of moving through a series of rooms, but the way that the work of description, as 
receptive transcription or “irresistible dictation,” seems to call for a resting into the places where 
energy pools, in order to pick up the onward current—to be intentionally silent in order to hear  
the speech of things. Frequently Stein runs into nouns—a bell ringer, a duster, a scissor. But in 
the larger stream of prose, these don’t block her way. Inverting the sense I took above, we could 
read the silence of the question “does silence choke speech” to be the silence on the part of the  
things described, silent when they don’t suggest words that relate themselves, leaving only the 
name of a thing without its relations that make it exist intensely (duster, scissor). The name alone 
is  without  enough life,  “not  enough something.” For Stein,  names without  relation are what 
Emerson might call a “paper currency” with “no bullion in the vault.” Stein reanimates this paper 
currency by pushing at the noun until it again starts to glitter in relation. This pushing is not 
repetition, but iteration, pulse. The passage continues:
Lying in a conundrum, lying so makes the springs restless, lying so is a reduction, 
not lying is so arrangeable. 
Releasing the oldest auction that is the pleasing some still renewing. 
Giving it away, not giving it away, is there any difference. Giving it away, not 
giving it away. (70)
“Lying in a conundrum” agitates the ground, making its “springs restless.” Restless springs are a 
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form of “still renewing.” “Still renewing” opens onto the counter-flows of giving and not giving. 
Something heavy and relatively still—the lying-down body—is nudged upward and onward. 
“Rooms” creates its navigational feeling in the way all its “temporary stones” have to be lifted, 
the way everything is discovered to be restless. Stein’s domestic plots are partial holdings that, 
given attention, give way to a ceaselessly moving and surprising world of experience. They yield 
pleasure.  
The piece comes to its close—its conclusion in enjoyment, by arriving at an image of 
pleasure: the fountain. The image is not only an emblem of triumphant circulation but part of a 
sexual vocabulary that runs throughout Stein's writing.28 As Hejinian reminds, words of reference 
are spatial, pointing “love-arrows” at their objects. Stein’s scene closes with a kind of perfect 
contact, a scene of domestic and erotic bliss:
The care with which the rain is wrong and the green is wrong and the white is 
wrong, the care with which there is a chair and plenty of breathing. The care with 
which  there  is  incredible  justice  and  likeness,  all  this  makes  a  magnificent 
asparagus, and also a fountain. (78)
The approach to the fountain begins with zig-zags, naming solid objects (the rain, the green, the 
white) turned back on themselves (the green is wrong), with a lyric, even meter (or pulse). She 
renders bodily closeness (a chair and plenty of breathing). She declares the presence, through 
care, of abstractions of union and similitude (there is incredible justice and likeness), and all this
—the pulsing onwardness,  the nearby body,  the  care and the likeness—makes a  fountain  (a 
euphoria, a success). “Rooms” offers restlessness at a local scale by allowing proliferating words 
28     See Ulla Dydo, The Language That Rises for an exploration of the language of sexuality and pleasure in Stein’s 
work.
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to record things existing intensely.  The word  plot referred to a patch of earth before it  ever 
referred to dramatic series. Stein discovers facts swimming and glittering in her local plot, happy,  
it would seem, to have discovered that we exist. 
Stein, in her work and also in her example of how to work, how to see, how to write, can 
be read as a making a daily recovery from the “unhappy … discovery” that we exist unmoored in 
a world of process. Her writing, along with other creative practices to be explored throughout 
this study, suggests that “the recovery of the world,” in Cavell's phrase, which Emerson is always 
seeking, the recovery of a sense of felicity through locating oneself as a moving point in nature's 
field of patterns, might be approached through creative work as a form of structured wandering. 
If there is something terrible in feeling oneself subject to “irresistible dictation,” there is also 
something amorous and erotic about it, something felicitous in the spontaneous images it offers. 
Recalling Emerson's ongoing inquiry into ways of participating in the intelligence of the world at 
large, Stein exemplifies the participatory practice of giving daily attention to the way intelligence 
moves through and delights an individual mind. Reading Stein, if I read alongside her, if I allow 
myself to read from the position of the moving point of her writing hand, I experience transition 
and impermanence as elements of the happy condition of there being more. 
It is in this way that reading Emerson has come to matter to me: that his descriptions of  
nature's process can be reformulated as assignments, as moving assignments, as something to do. 
If, following Cavell, we read Emerson as writing about overcoming loss, overcoming skepticism, 
and that overcoming as having to do with finding “practical power” as a common inheritance 
that all living things can claim and participate in, then it makes sense that a response, as his 
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reader,  is  to  ask how I  might  participate  too in  the practical power that helps me “husband 
moments.” How do I find it in the specific and modest corner of the world where I find myself? 
When might I have felt some alignment with this power in the past and how can that help me 
know how to go on?
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CHAPTER TWO 
IT THINKS, I MOVE: AN EMBODIED APPROACH TO IMPERSONALITY
“Motion is the only real evidence yet discovered that thinking is taking place.”
— Mabel Todd (The Hidden You, 61)
“The philosophy we want is one of fluxions and mobility.”
— EL 696
“I am moved by strange sympathies.” 
— Emerson (Journal, 4:200)
In my first chapter, I tried to compass the ways Emerson speaks for submitting to a non-
controlled process of thinking. This process, not critical but rather ceremonial, seeks “unity,” or 
presence, not as an endpoint, but as a medium through which to get outside the tracts, habits and 
settlements that define ordinary life, to experience and to value the feeling of being unmoored in 
the world. The ways in which this unmooring, as a submission to a present vastness, ushers the 
thinker into currents of strangeness and surprise via things found and observed in the local range 
suggests to me a strong family resemblance between Emerson’s vision of the task of thinking, 
and the projects of performance that I have been involved with. These projects, which I could 
identify as growing out of a dual lineage of the influences of the radically democratic (with 
respect to source material and performance styles) movement practices of Merce Cunningham 
and Judson Dance Theater,  and the  found,  assembled compositional  poetics  of  The Wooster 
Group and other devised theater ensembles, also build toward surprising presence using the near 
at hand and specifically very near resource of physical intelligence as approached by somatic 
research.  This  feeling  of  family  resemblance  animates  my  attraction  to  Emerson,  and 
underwrites,  to  use  a  Cavellian  turn  of  phrase,  my  effort  to  turn  Emerson  readers  and 
performance makers toward each other for a mutual expansion of sense. 
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In this chapter, I will pursue the avenues from unsettlement to practical power that are 
traversed by body-based practices that work through what in Emersonian scholarship is called 
“the impersonal,” most  visibly in the work of Sharon Cameron whose  Impersonality:  Seven 
Essays brought the term forward in Emerson scholarship. My entry into to the discussion in turn 
brings forward  somatics as a resource for making sense of Emerson's impersonal. I will look 
specifically  at  the  somatic  work done in  Ideokinesis  and Body-Mind Centering,  which  here 
represent a broader array of somatic practices. I offer these practices as an alternative context to 
Buddhist thought for thinking through both Emerson’s non-dualism, and his various invocations 
and uses of impersonality, for although impersonality originates as a Buddhist term, the concept 
emerges in other contexts too, and I think there is value in pursuing the sense of Emerson's  
impersonal from culturally closer contexts in order to ask how it might figure into non-Buddhist 
lives. This approach allows for the recognition of a family resemblance across cultural contexts, 
a “criss-crossing” that Cavell notes in the body of any literature that involves both influence, 
direct or invisible, as well as parallel developments of thought. Lawrence Buell contends that 
Emerson did not  derive the concept  of  impersonality from his  eastern readings,  so much as 
recognize his existing affinity with it, an affinity that enriched Emerson’s evolving “materialist 
spirituality.” Buell echoes Emerson’s argument, in “History,” that one reads in order to sound 
affinities across time. 
I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  Buddhist  sources  are  not  important  to  understanding 
Emerson;  they  clearly  are,  and as  Stanley  Cavell  has  shown,  Emerson’s  “eastern  longings” 
significantly mark his intellectual appetites (Pitch x).  But I do not emphasize a quest for an 
original source for these ideas, in part because, as will be elaborated in the work of this chapter, 
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the  impersonal  is  a  name  for  something  that  can  be  discovered  by  giving  attention  to  life 
processes, and is not a concept strictly derived from any particular mind or tradition. Reading 
instead for the resonance between Buddhist thought and Emerson’s writings helps to strengthen 
their  articulation,  and  contributes  to  the  possibility  of  continued  cross-pollination.  Even  in 
attempting an argument about origin and influence, the amount of circulation between Eastern 
and Western thinking reveals a complex interplay. 
Just as Emerson read deeply in Buddhist texts, Emerson was read deeply by the twentieth 
century's most influential international translator and proponent of Zen Buddhism, D.T. Suzuki, 
who described his first experience of reading Emerson as “making acquaintance with myself,” 
and “digging down into the recesses of my own thought.”29 As Palmer Rampell relates, Suzuki's 
account of Zen is rooted in the shin bukkyō reform movement, which Suzuki understood to share 
an affinity with the transcendentalist reformation of Unitarianism in its efforts to modernize an 
understanding of Zen as a global religion compatible with science.30 Suzuki actively sought to 
persuade a Western audience of Buddhism's consonance with American religious thought, and 
grounded his understanding of that consonance in his reading of Emerson, as is shown by his 
1896 essay, written in Japanese and never published in translation, “Zen Theory of Emerson,” 
which stresses the importance of intuitive and private religious experience, the only secondary 
authority  of  texts  which  record  that  experience,  and  the  role  of  meditation  in  intuition's 
capability. He even reads Emerson as describing meditation practices in “Self-Reliance” when he 
writes: “Thus all concentrates; let us not rove; let us sit at home with the cause” (Rampell 630-
33).
29    In his book Zen and Japanese Culture (Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 343-44. 
30    See Palmer Rampell, “Laws That Refuse To Be Stated: The Post-Sectarian Spiritualities of Emerson, Thoreau, 
and D.T. Suzuki,” (New England Quarterly, Vol. 84 No. 4, 2011), which examines untranslated writings of Suzuki to 
advance the scholarship of Suzuki to Emerson's writing beyond the acknowledged but rarely pursued affinity.
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Woven  into  the  history  of  the  Western  art  practices  and  practitioners  that  inform, 
neighbor, or populate somatic work are countless American artists who adopted Zen Buddhism, 
many of whom were introduced to Zen though Suzuki's writing, including John Cage and Merce 
Cunningham whose  profoundly influential  work bases  its  approach to  composition  in  a  Zen 
practice of non-attachment.31 While I acknowledge the rich the flow of ideas between Eastern 
and  Western  traditions,  I  am  less  interested  in  (and  also  less  capable  of)  elaborating  their 
exchange than in adding to the conversation the under-appreciated somatic practices which offer 
their  own array of non-dualistic, impersonal  approaches to physical intelligence and identity. 
These practices are American-grown countercultures to notions of individualism bound up with 
privacy and property, to an immaterial concept of the rational, and to notions of confessional or 
expressive  authorship  that  arise  from  such  contained  ideas  of  the  self.  Developed  in  the 
“intelligence of [this] soil,” these countercultures share Emersonian impulses to build original 
foundations of thought, to both test and found traditions.32 A practice-oriented arena developed 
out  of  not  religious  but  rather  scientific  traditions,  the  field  of  somatics  gives  an  important 
secular, experimental venue in which to consider the impersonal.  
The final passage of “Experience” names as the goal of being the capacity to act, or 
“practical power”:
Never mind the ridicule, never mind the defeat: up again, old heart!—it seems to 
say,—there is victory yet for all justice; and the true romance which the world 
exists to realize, will be the transformation of genius into practical power. ( 492)
31    Cage speaks of Zen and chance operations intermittently throughout his writing. For an economical statement of 
the compositional use of chance operations, see his introduction to Lecture on the Weather, a piece made with 
passages from Thoreau's Walden, collected in Cage's Empty Words. (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 1979). 
32    The line is from Wallace Stevens's “Comedian as the Letter C.” (The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens, New 
York: Vintage, 1990. p.27).
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The quartet of tones here could describe the chord of Emersonian impersonality. Onwardness, 
the getting up again; attraction,  the romance that calls  one forward and creates onwardness; 
genius, the local resource of the low and the natural; and practical power, the intelligence of the 
world as it  works.  It  took me a long time to understand what Emerson meant by “practical  
power,”  in  fact  it  took  until  I  understood  this  power  as  impersonal:  something  possible  to 
experience in the range of the person, but not generated by person or personality. Practical power 
struck me at first as abrasive, part of what sometimes makes Emerson seem a precursor to such 
materialist  positive  thinking schools  as  “the  secret,”  or  that  weird  idea that  Jesus  somehow 
licenses wealth as a sign of his favor. But taken as the greater exposure to and moving with the 
intelligence and force of the world, the range of this power is not restricted to forms we might 
describe as successful. Practical power includes also the passing of one form into another in all 
kinds of transformations or deaths. The compensations these stark passages offer—of unexpected 
growth, of new forms of experience—is the gift of the impersonal to the personal, the embrace of 
“the universe, which holds thee dear” (EL 481). This chapter is dedicated to discovering practical 
power in the disinhibiting of the body’s natural movement patterns through the modalities of 
somatic work and related dance practices that have been intertwined with the development of 
that work. It is my task to show that these explorations of embodied intelligence point toward the 
same non-dualistic  intuitions  that  Emerson recorded in  his  locating  of  impersonal  power  in 
natural, embodied process. 
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1. SOMATIC WORK AS A CONTEXT OF NON-DUALISTIC THINKING
1.1 INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN SOMATICS AND PRAGMATISM
Shared Concerns
Although it may at  first  strain credibility to suggest that the accounts of twenty-first-
century performers on the research fringe of their own field could have something to say to the 
field of Emerson scholarship, I have found in persisting with this study, that the connection is, to 
invoke Emerson’s phrase “better than whim, at last.” Not only are there methodological affinities 
in the experiential accounts of a self-culturing process that reaches for an intuition of and facility 
with the so-called nonhuman processes within the natural resource of a human body and mind, 
but also there is  a little-recognized line of transmission between Emerson and contemporary 
dance and performance bearing directly on valuation of the practice of process, and of what 
constitutes a source of and immersion in intelligence. I am not a historian and it is beyond the 
work of my own study to establish that lineage substantially, but I will attempt a brief family tree 
of this line of transmission, a line on which I also locate myself.
There are many shared concerns between performance research and the philosophical 
work of thinking about thinking within which Emerson can be located. Joan Richardson’s work
—the environment within which my own scholarly work rests—connects Emerson, in the vein of 
an evolving pragmatism, to William James33 along the specific project of giving attention to the 
processes of thinking. James’s psychological investigations, working out sentences and prompts 
from  Emerson  in  experimental  processes,  can  be  considered  as  part  of  the  foundational 
groundwork of neuroscience, a field of inquiry that provides much of the conceptual vocabulary 
for contemporary debates on the nature of mind, across therapeutic, criminal, and philosophical 
33    See Joan Richardson, A Natural History of Pragmatism: The Fact of Feeling from Edwards to Stein. 
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applications.  Indeed,  though  Emerson  did  not  possess  the  scientific  tools  to  undertake  this 
inquiry, he gestures toward what we now call neuroscience in his late unfinished work,  Natural  
History of the Intellect, writing, “I await the insight which our advancing knowledge of material 
laws  shall  furnish”  (NHI  5). Recent discoveries  in  neuroscience  point  toward  movement 
experience as a key element of and context for cognitive understanding of the physical and social 
environment.34 The trend in cognitive science toward theories of “embodied cognition” shakes 
off the comet’s tail of an anthropocentric assumption that human thinking is different in kind 
from all other thinking and instead re-opens a groundwork for thinking about thinking from the 
standpoint of acting (moving) in an environment. Researchers in embodied cognitive science 
propose  different  ways  that  representational  systems  (historically  associated  with  top-down 
immaterial mentality) interact with or are composed of biological systems of perception. These 
models, alongside the valuation of movement as a primary cognitive task, point toward a non-
dualistic condition of body and mind that could lead to a fruitful coordination of neuroscience, 
cognitive science, and somatic research. This coordination, were it to occur, would represent not 
so much something new as a rejoining of several streams of inquiry that were closer to each 
other  in  the  early  twentieth  century,  before  disciplinary  and  professional  dividing  lines  and 
technical sophistication produced for them entirely separate arenas.35 
It is my sense that these three fields to a large degree reproduce the same findings in their 
34    Although the work is still in process, the mirror neuron system appears to identify the neurological apparatus for 
what a person watching sports, or dance, or a fight, intuitively knows: that we experience physical sensation when 
watching movement happen, without being engaged in that movement ourselves. The significance and mechanism 
of the mirror neurons are still being explored, but I think it is fair to draw from even the rough articulations an idea 
that movement perception and movement memory are integral elements of recognizing and making choices in our 
environment. See Christian Keyser's The Empathetic Brain (Social Brain Press, 2011) for an overview of the 
discovery of and initial efforts to understand mirror neurons in terms of empathy and distributed mind. 
35    I have realized in reflecting on my choice to focus on Emerson, which is not a choice I make out of an interest in 
period history but out of a sense of the relevance of his writing to contemporary questions, that the wide-ranging 
generalism (thinking across the newest findings in science, art, politics, etc.) afforded to nineteenth-century thinkers  
appeals to my anti-disciplinary, wide-ranging twenty-first-century artist-scholar energies. 
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different  environments,  with  different  instruments  of  verification  but  similar  depths  of 
conversation and peer review. The step from cognitive science to dance is thus smaller than it 
seems: somatic research has been an integral part of the practice and conceptual vocabulary of 
new  dance  since  the  early  twentieth  century,  and  likewise  dancers  have  played  a  large 
investigative role within the progress of somatic research, especially in the development of the 
work done by early somatic experimenters, including F.M. Alexander, Ida Rolf, Mabel Todd, 
Moshe  Feldenkrais,  Rudolf  Von  Laban,  and  Irmgard  Bartenieff,  a  first  generation  of 
experimenters who largely created their own methods, often in response to the crisis of their own 
injuries.36 Much  of  what  constitutes  a  basic  groundwork  for  contemporary  dance,  both  in 
approaching  the  body  as  a  resource  for  movement,  and  in  sustaining  physical  health  as  a 
performer, comes from somatic practice; it is not a stretch to say that somatic work is, to recall  
Emerson’s  phrase,  a  kind  of  “immense  intelligence”  in  which  contemporary  dance  exists. 
Certainly in my own dance training I encountered somatic work as a fundamental vocabulary and 
orientation  to  physical  intelligence.  Contemporary  dance  thus  shares  some  foundational 
investigations with the fields of neuroscience and cognition, and in recent years has even begun 
to address itself directly to these cognitive questions.37
36    For an overview of the relationship between the somatic first generation “pioneers” and the development of their  
practices into a field of somatic movement, education, and therapy, see Martha Eddy, “A brief history of somatic 
practices and dance: historical development of the field of somatic education and its relationship to dance.” Journal 
of Dance and Somatic Practices Vol. 1 No. 1, 2009.
37    A  case in point is the work of Miguel Gutierrez, who could be seen as a kind of intellectual bellwether for the 
experimental “downtown dance” community. Two of Gutierrez's recent works, Last Meadow (Dance Theater 
Workshop, New York NY, September 2008) and And lose the name of action (Brooklyn Academy of Music, New 
York, NY, December 2012), have foregrounded inquiry into embodied ways of knowing and in particularly 
Emersonian terms, into embodied paths of abandonment of self-conscious thinking to impersonal streams of 
cognition. In an interview for the Walker Arts Center, Gutierrez says: 
My interest with dance has always been, in a way, its instability—the way that it proposes 
an area that is mysterious, not easily understood. These thoughts made their way into Last  
Meadow and I wanted to keep pushing at this interest in this intangible thing with And lose the 
name of action.  
Those thoughts dovetailed with my father’s series of neurological complications over the 
last several years. That led me into learning more about the brain and thinking about how we deal 
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Direct Exchange
Beyond these shared concerns, the field of somatic movement therapy has a historical 
point of intersection with pragmatism, specifically in the progressive intellectual communities of 
New York and Boston in the 1920’s, in which direct conversation, study, and transmission went 
on  between  developers  of  somatic  modalities  and  of  pragmatic  philosophies  of  organism 
exemplified by the work of John Dewey, who studied with Alexander and drew broadly on his 
experience of that work in his thinking as the scene of verification for his ideas about the “unity 
in action” of mind and body, recorded in the three introductions he wrote to Alexander's books, 
as well as in his own writing.38
Alexander  Technique  is  based  in  learning  to  inhibit  strained patterning  (attributed  to 
various socially induced patterns of physical tension or repression) in order to allow the body's 
intelligent patterning to re-emerge. Dewey was initially drawn to Alexander for help overcoming 
a debilitating stammer and what he described in his introduction to Alexander's The Use of the  
Self as his “practical backwardness” (18). Recognizing Alexander's work as deeply grounded in 
scientific method, which Dewey is at pains to praise in his introductions in distinction to the 
over-confident and narrowly-focused techniques of faddish health cures, he continued his studies 
over  a  long  term,  both  with  F.M.  Alexander  and  his  brother  A.R.,  in  his  recognition  that 
Alexander had generated a process by which the objective conditions which underlie habitual 
with construction of personhood in the body. What is considered intelligence? How does the 
subjectivity of the body remain present, when a person’s cognitive or ratiocination capacities 
become diminished? I was spending lots of time in the hospital, and thinking about the way we 
deal with our bodies as these machines, things that get plugged into and cleaned and kind of left 
there. It seemed so counter to my experience of working with the body, which addresses its 
sensitivity and its frailty in a much more holistic way. (“Dance, Sense, and Distrust of the Body”)
38    See Dewey's introductions to Man's Supreme Inheritance (1918 Enlarged Edition), Constructive Conscious 
Control of the Individual (1923), and The Use of the Self (1932), as well as a sustained discussion of Alexander's 
theories in the section “The Barrier of Habit” from Dewey's Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry Holt, 
1922). (Collected in the pamphlet John Dewey and F.M. Alexander, New York: AMSAT)
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action and perception can be investigated, something with implications for the entire spectrum of 
selfhood. “The technique of Mr. Alexander gives to the educator a standard of psycho-physical 
health—in which what we call morality is included,” writes Dewey. “It supplies also the 'means 
whereby'  this  standard  may be  progressively  and  endlessly  achieved,  becoming  a  conscious 
possession of the one educated” (introduction to The Use of the Self 19). Dewey also credits his 
experience of Alexander's work as creating the condition in which his theoretical ideas were 
verified,  thereby opening them beyond theory into the  critical  field of  action in  which “the 
traditional barriers between mind and body break down and dissolve” (“Preoccupation with the 
Disconnected,”  24).  “In the study [of Alexander  Technique],  I  found the things which I had 
'known'—in the sense of theoretical belief—in philosophy and psychology, changed into vital 
experiences which gave a new meaning to knowledge of them” (Use 18). 
Michael  Huxley  has  shown  that  along  with  Alexander,  Mabel  Elsworth  Todd  also 
participated  in  a  community  of  influence  and  exchange  with  Dewey  and  other  pragmatist 
thinkers  and educators.  Starting  from the  better-known relationship  of  Dewey to Alexander, 
Huxley describes an intellectual community engaged in new valuations and reconsiderations of 
physical  intelligence,  investigating  the  physical  basis  of  rational  intelligence  and  abstract 
cognition along multi-disciplinary lines. Huxley’s study concentrates on the usage throughout 
this context of the term “psycho-physical” (a fore-runner of the now-predominant “somatic”) to 
denote intelligent processes that cannot be analyzed with dualist paradigms. 
Todd taught at Columbia and the New School after teaching in private studios, first in 
Boston then New York. It is at Columbia that she met Dewey and James Harvey Robinson, the 
influential history professor and co-founder of the New School, and who studied with both Todd 
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and Alexander. Like many of her peers in the first generation of somatic work, Todd developed 
her work in response to her own debilitating injury (after she was told she would be unable to 
walk), calling on extra-therapeutic resources (in Todd's case her high-school studies of physics) 
to  devise  exercises  that  would  lead  her  back  to  health.  After  her  recovery,  Todd  studied 
movement and voice at Emerson College of Oratory, and opened a studio in Boston where she 
worked with women experiencing physical strain from factory work taken up during the first 
World War.39 When she opened a second studio in New York at the Essex House, she began to 
work with performers and athletes, and through this came to the notice of Jesse Feiring Williams, 
who integrated Todd's findings into his own work laying foundations for a progressive physical 
education  and  “education  through  the  physical”  at  Columbia.  Williams  invited  Todd  to 
Columbia, where she earned a B.S. in 1927, and lectured until 1931. Williams cites both James 
and Dewey in The Principles of Physical Education (1927), and goes forward in 1930 to describe 
“the modern physical education” as “based on the biological unity of body and mind” (qtd. in 
Huxley 12). 
This physical research was not limited, for these intersecting academics, to therapeutic 
applications,  but  was  a  kind  of  laboratory  for  experiencing,  verifying,  and  developing  new 
conceptions and practices of thinking.40 Likewise the philosophers offered means of verifying 
and lending credence to the physical work. Todd calls on James as an authority in her book The 
Thinking Body (1937), and echoes his language in the marvelous and poetically urgent late book, 
The Hidden You: What You Are and What to Do About It  (published posthumously in 1953),  
which she dedicates in the following language:
39    Todd's biography is given in Pamela Matt's A Kinesthetic Legacy, pp. XX-XXX.
40    For a look at the fruitful relationship between pragmatism and somatic orientations in contemporary philosophy, 
see the work of philosopher and Feldenkrais practitioner Richard Shusterman, particularly Thinking Through the 
Body: Essays in Somaesthetics (Cambridge UP, 2012).
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Dedicated to the memory of Dr. James Harvey Robinson—a sincere searcher for 
truth  and  a  devoted  adherent  to  the  philosophy  expressed  in  this  book—in 
appreciation of much good advice and academic aid. 
One of Dr. Robinson's wisest observations was, “Of all human ambitions an open 
mind, eagerly expectant of new discoveries and ready to remould convictions to 
the light of added knowledge and dispelled ignorances and misapprehensions, is 
the noblest, the rarest and the most difficult to achieve.
With this introduction, Todd signals the trans-disciplinary reach of her and her peers' questions 
about the moving health of human bodies. 
Todd's work has had a lasting influence on “new dance” or “postmodern dance,”41 which 
is  generally  associated  with  movement  techniques  not  built  from  idealized  or  expressive 
concerns (as in classical modern dance, although the distinction is not entirely clean), but from 
ongoing inquiry into body mechanics and the ranges of consciousness and articulation that attach 
to explorations of different body systems—nervous, circulatory, lymphatic, skeletal, and so on. 
Todd called her own work “Natural Posture.” Her “natural” was a corrective to the artifice of 
Victorian  ideals  of  posture  that  deleteriously  imposed moral  concepts  of  uprightness  on  the 
otherwise curving and counterbalancing spine, rushed or foreclosed critical developmental stages 
of childhood movement, and exchanged the responsive balancing functions of muscles for fixed 
41    For a discussion of postmodern dance, see Sally Banes, Terpsichore in Sneakers (Wesleyan UP, 1987). Banes 
notes that the explorations of the “postmoderns” in dance are better compared with art historical and literary  
modernism than postmodernism, pointing out that the “postmodern” designation is a response to the generation of 
“moderns” who founded modern dance. The designation “modern dance” sits awkwardly with the types of dance  
about which I am writing, as it can be unclear whether this is a reference to classical modern or the contemporary  
dance which grew out of it. Most people in the practicing dance field forgo identifying as modern dancers, either  
trading “new” or “contemporary” for “modern,” or by forgoing periodic designations for geographical, and going  
with “downtown dance,” which, although it has spread well outside its old location in the lofts of downtown 
Manhattan, can be identified by relation to the downtown dance scene of the 1970's, '80's, and '90's, as well as with 
the hub of Movement Research, an institution that is central to the preservation of the downtown community and its 
ongoing inquiry.
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patterns of holding. In addition to trying to free the body of this holding toward finding natural 
mechanical balance, she was also concerned with developmental stages of movement as critical 
patterns  for bodies to  therapeutically  recuperate.  Todd's  work,  refined and developed by her 
students Barbara Clark and Lulu Sweigard, continues to be known and taught in dance training 
programs as “Ideokinesis,” Sweigard's coinage, meaning movement guided by imagery.42 Todd's 
work also leads to the work of Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen, founder  of Body-Mind Centering 
(BMC), which builds on Ideokinesis,  Laban Movement Analysis, and occupational therapy.43 
BMC is one of the richest empirical fields of contemporary somatic research and has extensive 
crossover  into  the  contemporary  dance  approach  to  movement  training  and  sourcing.  An 
influential  modality  among  other  consonant  approaches  in  current  use  (Laban/Bartenieff 
Fundamentals, Skinner Releasing Technique, Klein Technique, and others) BMC will stand in 
this study as a representative of a broad way of thinking about anatomy and improvisation as a 
resource for movement.
What is particularly interesting in relation to Emerson is the way that somatic practice 
can be seen to be a form of the hybrid sensibility that Joan Richardson names “transcendentalist 
pragmatism.”44 Somatic work is an exemplary form of radical empiricism, one that is in many 
ways  more  radical  than  even  James  seemed  to  envision.  But  for  many  practitioners,  the 
commitment to and use of the work is structured around appetites shared with Emerson that ring 
more in the transcendentalist mood: to experience the natural body outside the limitation of ego 
42    Sweigard's protégé Irene Dowd, a longtime member of the Julliard faculty as well as a master teacher in the  
field at large, is the contemporary exemplar of the application of Ideokinesis to dance training.
43    My description of the streams of thought and therapeutic methods that combine to form a background for BMC 
here is necessarily truncated, but I think it is fair to identify the stream of Todd's thinking as a major approach to 
bodywork incorporated in BMC. 
44    This unpublished formulation comes from the name of her seminar, American Aesthetics: Transcendentalist  
Pragmatism, of which I was a member, at the CUNY Graduate Center in Fall 2009.
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and the imposition of “unnatural” social constraints, and to free a person’s potential to act with 
maximum ease  and  power  by  developing  a  receptiveness  and  responsiveness  to  power  that 
comes from places conceptually located below (if we follow the standard spatial assignation of 
mind to a generalized upwardness in the scale of things) or beyond the individual will.  The 
experience this yields, in its intenser moments, is a kind of lowering and lateral transcendent 
experience within a completely material venue.
As I will show, somatic work, in the same way as Emersonian self-reliance, calls on, 
attends to, and goes so far as to identify with impersonal, material systems that coordinate to 
create a living intelligent body, an individual. Not only does this work support physical health by 
encouraging what Emerson broadly describes as “circulation,” but it also offers experiences of 
participatory clarity in the dynamic, material world. These experiences render an awareness of 
the individual human body as a continuous part of much vaster distributions—of cellular life, of 
warm-blooded animals,  of a  weather-like system of hormonal transmissions,  for example.  In 
these ways I see somatic practice as a contemporary venue of “transcendentalist pragmatism”: a 
conflux  of  radical  empiricism,  action-orientation,  and  an  appetite  for  moving  within  an 
experience of  what Emerson calls “unity,” or radical interconnectedness, or what a dancer might 
call presence. “Call it  life, spirit, electricity, God—what you like!” writes Todd. “There it is, 
facing you” (The Hidden You 15).
1.2 THE TROUBLE WITH TERMS
The problem of what to call things is going to be pervasive in this chapter, since the 
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Western philosophical and critical vocabulary is dualistic in its conceptions. In finding language 
to describe somatic work, one runs almost immediately into the problem of dualism’s mascot, the 
mind-body divide. In her description of Body-Mind Centering, Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen has a 
usefully instrumental definition of mind, not as an immaterial or disembodied faculty, but as a 
guiding, navigating attention understood to be physical in its basis and shared by all the matter of 
the body—not just the grey parts. If we follow Bainbridge Cohen in defining mind as attention,  
and  acknowledge  the  multiple  interacting  registers  of  reflex,  intent,  physical  apparatus  and 
mental representation that comprise attention, the choice to say “body” or “mind” doesn’t have to 
signal  an  essential  exclusion,  but  rather  could  imply  varying  degrees  of  reflection  and 
automatism. 
The term “somatic” contains an implicit argument for conjoining body and mind in our 
understanding.  Although we now understand the  early  twentieth-century  work of  Alexander, 
Todd, and the other early physical intelligence researchers as belonging to the field of somatics,  
the term was coined retrospectively in 1970 by philosopher and somatics practitioner Thomas 
Hanna. The word “soma” is Greek for “the living body.” In Hanna's recuperation he translates it  
as “Me, the bodily being” (Bodies in Revolt, 35), emphasizing in the embodied condition of 
first-person identification the abandonment of any idea of separation between mind and body, 
spirit  and flesh.  He initially  announced this  term not  in  relation to  the  work being done in  
movement studios, but as a fresh description for the experience of being that comes in the wake 
of a persuasive dismantling of dualist thinking brought about across science and philosophy. His 
Bodies In Revolt: A Primer in Somatic Thinking (1970) makes no mention of Alexander or Todd, 
but rather describes as “somatic thinkers” a two stranded set of “somatic scientists”—Darwin, 
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Freud, Piaget, Lorenz, Reich—and “somatic philosophers”—Kant, Kierkegaard, Marx, Cassirer, 
Camus,  Merleau-Ponty,  and Nietzsche,  who is  given pride  of  place  throughout  his  book as 
making  the  primary  expressions  of  the  new  somatic  thinking.  Given  the  degree  to  which 
Nietzsche repeats many of Emerson's expressions, as will be addressed further on, Emerson too 
could be included in this list, as could James and Dewey. What joins Hanna's array of thinkers is 
they way they were able to draw from their observations an image of human being (and living 
being more generally,  for some) as the experience of energies and responses to an evolving 
world, and so to see the categories that earlier religious thought liked to name as immutable 
(soul, truth, order, identity) as intimately linked to both inherited and mutable physical patterning 
interacting with an environment, and the interaction between this patterning and the language 
environment created by the social and cultural world any individual “soma” is born into. What 
makes them “somatic” thinkers in Hanna's description, is the consistency of their situating the 
observer  position  within the  environment  it  studies,  emphasizing  the  variable  experience  of 
response to the world from specific standpoints. 
In the preface to the second edition of Bodies In Revolt published in 1985, Hanna noted 
that  the  intervening  15  years  had  brought  increased  investment  in  investigations  of  “our 
physiological reality,” and that “somatic” thinking had expanded to refer to the particular array 
of practices known as “somatic movement,” “somatic education,” and “the field of 'somatics'”. 
Hanna had, by this time, also become a practitioner of somatic education, developing his own 
methods of movement therapy. In a later definition of “somatics,” he situates it more directly in 
these movement practices, describing it as “a field of study dealing with somatic phenomena: i.e. 
the human being as experienced by himself from the inside” (“What is Somatics?” 343). 
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Somatic work, as a field of moving investigations, is then a radically empirical form of 
research  that  gathers  information  experientially  from  within a  living  body's  life  processes, 
seeking  to  understand  that  information  as  patterning.  These  processes  are  understood  to 
encompass  a  range  of  interacting  intelligences,  only  a  fraction  of  which  are  familiar  to  the 
conscious  mind.  Two  interrelated  approaches  characterize  somatic  methods  of  employing 
conscious  thinking.  Given  the  strangeness—this  interior  unfamiliarity—of  the  body's 
intelligence, somatic techniques tend to have a common method of allowing the body to educate 
(or re-educate) itself, rather than imposing deliberate ideals of form or posture onto the body. 
(This  imposition  was  characteristic  of  the  “physical  culture”  movement  that  preceded  the 
development  of  somatic  work,  and  was  often  explicitly  rejected  in  the  writing  of  the  early 
somatic educators.  In the present day,  many dancers trained in classical technical disciplines 
experience the same opposition when encountering somatic work, having to unlearn muscular 
patterns that have been imposed by long practice.) Some techniques primarily seek to get out of  
the way of the body's intelligence. Alexander Technique, as briefly mentioned, is a technique of 
inhibition of controlling habits (both consciously imposed postural ideas and patterns of tension 
so long reinforced as to have become spastic, that is, continuously engaged and so unconsciously 
continued).  With  the  inhibition of  negative  patterns,  there is  room for  the  body's  intelligent 
patterning to reassert  itself, and the technique pairs inhibition with simple movement tasks that 
act  as  contexts  for  the  better  patterning  to  occur.  Likewise,  the  pedagogical  methodology 
developed by Moshe Feldenkrais in his “Awareness Through Movement” technique explicitly 
forgoes correction (on the part of the teacher) in order to allow each student’s learning to occur 
from within. (The teacher guides the practice of an intricate series of physical tasks, each one 
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repeated in sets with minor variations, and helps instill a rhythm of stopping to “listen” to the 
body's small transformations as it learns to repeat the task with greater efficiency.) 
Other techniques, including the two I  foreground in this chapter,  seek confluences of 
imagery brought in from exterior forms of study with emergent bodily intelligence experienced 
during active movement sessions. BMC practitioners, for example, take a full kinesiology course 
from standard medical education and often use anatomical reference books as teaching tools for 
the  introduction  of  the  particular  organ  or  system  to  be  approached  in  any  given  class; 
Ideokinesis lessons involve studying drawings of greater or lesser abstraction of the lines of force 
and balance in the body.
I  find myself  using the phrase “physical intelligence” to describe the coordination of 
things or persons in action, and using descriptions of “picturing” or “imaging” to point toward 
the reflective elements of that process. However I understand that picturing is not limited to 
reflective applications. I take the view of things articulated in the field of embodied cognition, 
that modeling (that is, representation) is both the basic action of mind, and a dynamic element of 
action,  rather  than  a  function  of  a  segregated  and  immaterial  representational  space  where 
computations are first made and then applied.45 Intelligent action always involves models, only a 
fraction of which are conscious or reflective, and many of which, in the stream of human thought 
and action, arise associatively and not deliberately.46 When I refer to “picturing”, “imaging,” or 
45    See Anthony Chemero’s Radical Embodied Cognitive Science (MIT, 2009) for a useful overview of the 
distinctions between various lines of thought within what is generally described as “embodied cognition.”
46    The degree to which mental representation is accidental and associative is elaborated by Douglas Hofstadter's  
work. His lecture “Analogy as the Core of Cognition” (Stanford 2006) focuses on this associative analogizing 
present in all cognitive activity. Hofstadter emphasizes the idea that analogic thought picks up on elements of 
consonance that do not necessarily follow the proportional consistency of ratios. Indeed he says that the bulk of 
analogy is taken up with strange proportions. The import of this observation is that the elegant pattern awareness 
that we might associate with mathematical analogy is also present in any associative movement of mind. Thus his 
argument that analogy is at the core of cognition. 
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“image work” as the chapter progresses, I mean to indicate an intentional space of doing what 
Todd  describes  as  “entertaining  an  image”  and  what  V.S.  Ramachandran  phrases  “off-line” 
thinking, that is, reflective thinking taking place outside the immediate scene of action to which 
that thinking corresponds. Both describe this capacity to engage in mental work outside the scene  
of action as the particular distinction between humans and nonhumans. (Although by widening 
the aperture on what constitutes a scene of action, this distinction is not necessarily a bright line,  
and anyway who among us can say with certainty that only humans imagine?) Commitment to 
the work of entertaining images is one of the marked affinities between Todd and Emerson, who 
share the experiential  knowledge that holding a thought  can transform the flow of thought's 
patterns—whether those patterns flow through language or movement.47 Think, for example of 
the  way Emerson entertains  the  titular  image of  “Circles,”  which  leads  him into  an  almost 
ecstatic sequence of circular images, resulting in some of the most exciting of his articulations of 
the un-anticipatable channels of thinking. I will focus on the ways that Ideokinetic imaging, by 
asking a person to identify with an image and so invite it to inform the physical present, feeds 
into and transforms the conditions and possibilities of action along the same lines that Emerson’s 
images are meant to travel. 
In advancing into the zone of impersonality, I will wrangle not only with the pair person-
impersonal, but also human-nonhuman. The “nonhuman” (like the related “posthuman”) is one 
of those terms that has taken on senses in contemporary academia that are easily lost when taken 
47    It is clear that Todd read Emerson, as she quotes him at one point in her writing, but how deeply and in what 
circumstance she read him is unknown to me. Although Todd's writing is preserved, there is as yet no biographical 
scholarship about her, except for what appears in Pamela Matt's A Kinesthetic Legacy (1996), which collects the 
work of Todd's protégé Barbara Clark, and includes Clark's oral history narrative of Todd's training and professional  
history, given as background to Clark's career. What I am pursuing here are the echoes between their texts that 
demonstrate a consonant view of human thought and action. A set of comparative selections will follow in a later 
section, to flesh out this affinity. 
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outside of that conversation, since the “human” embedded in the term refers not to the casual 
sense of the word as referring to people, but to a particular anthropocentric, hierarchical subject-
view of the natural world where “man is measure” and the autonomous individual of classical 
liberalism is  the central  unit,  segregated from the rest  of  nature by some critical  difference. 
Thinking about the nonhuman when describing the human body reveals the inadequacy of the 
term,  an  inadequacy  that  I  think  is  shared  by  the  word  “impersonal.”  Where  the  word 
“nonhuman”  surfaces  here,  I  mean  to  engage  a  sense  of  an  alternative  scheme  of  material 
measurement  that  imposes  on  a  person  an  acknowledgement  of  the  many  registers  of  our 
identity, only some of which are coterminous with our skin. When the choreographer Deborah 
Hay defines her body as her 53-trillion-celled “teacher,” for example, she is making a gesture 
toward what someone in the contemporary humanities might call the “nonhuman” (although I 
don’t  think  Hay  would  choose  to  segregate  her  humanity  descriptively  from  her  cellular 
existence). Ultimately for my purposes it is important that the material identifications with things 
not  measured in  precisely human units,  such as the roughly 53-trillion cells  that comprise a 
human body, are not felt to be external to or exclusive of human selves. This necessitates the 
abandonment of strict concepts of containment or interiority in favor of an image of overlapping 
registers, interacting networks, wave fields. But to acknowledge or spend time identifying with 
these  nonhuman  measures  within  our  embodied  experience  does  not  obliterate  the 
meaningfulness of the measure of selfhood, which is both an obvious and critical measure of 
human experience. To deal with Emerson’s impersonal, one has to try to defuse the either/or 
status of the reflexive dualisms that pervade our common language of bodies and selves, and 
accept that we each are composed of simultaneous, incommensurate identities and networks, one 
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of which is “this thought which is called I” (EL 196). 
Entertaining thoughts  not called I and allowing those thoughts to recondition the one 
which is called I is the activity of impersonal image work. Through earnest, gracious hosting, the 
not-I  is  welcomed  to  share  with  the  I,  making transformation  possible.  The discomfort  this 
produces, of being unable to say where exactly I end and something not-I begins, and to assign to 
these  multiple  structures  their  relative  share  of  agency—whether  trying  to  circumscribe  the 
bacteria that flourish in my body and contribute to my optimism, the actions my unencumbered 
skeleton is capable of, or the words with which I compose these thoughts—can be a fruitful 
discomfort, an unsettlement in which I am carried onward. For Emerson, this unsettlement of 
identification,  crucial  to  all  varieties  of  health,  is  the  initiating  thought  of  both  religious 
experience,  and  self-culturing  or  practical  power.  This  critical  initiating  role  for  such 
transformations of identification makes all experiments in such unsettlement interesting to the 
conversation around Emerson.
1.3 SUBSTANCE VERSUS PROCESS
Substance-centered environments
It is hard to avoid dualistic language and its concomitant malformations of the sense of 
non-dualistic  concepts.  In  his  book on Buddhist  philosophy,  which  explains  Buddhism to  a 
Western  audience  in  part  through  the  consonant  texts  of  Western  exponents  of  process 
philosophy, Nolan Pliny Jacobson reminds his Western readers that they have been reared in a 
substance-centered  environment  of  language and concepts,  an  idea that  comes  directly  from 
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William James's chapter “The Stream of Thought.” Many Western Buddhist scholars, Jacobson 
claims, are unable to translate adequately certain Buddhist concepts because of the difficulty of 
fully stepping outside of substance orientation.  Dewey, James,  and Whitehead are frequently 
cited  by  Jacobson  for  their  success  at  getting  beyond  the  subject-object  binary, 
phenomenologically returning essence to being, or ideas to things, a return that we can also find 
in Emerson.48 One signal of this successful exit from binary systems is in the re-evaluation of 
ideas of truth, specifically a rejection of a priori, immutable, universal truth, for an actionable 
truth of a world in flux, economically summarized in James’s argument that “truth happens to an 
idea” (Pragmatism 574). Jacobson cites Dewey’s argument that, with the development of natural 
science  and  its  discoveries,  among  others,  of  geological  time  and  evolutionary  speciation, 
Western philosophy “is forced by its own development to abandon the assumption of fixity and 
to recognize that what for it is actually ‘universal’ is process” (qtd. in Jacobson 1). 
One way in which somatic work is valuable to philosophy is the way that, as a practice of 
re-patterning,  it  offers us ways to rear ourselves all  over  again in a re-calibrated conceptual 
environment  where  models  and  matter  are  felt  to  be  continuous.  This  new  environment, 
structured by receptivity, attention, and patient openness to encounter, as well as an awareness of 
shared forms across natural bodies, could be said to give the Western-reared mind an opportunity 
for a re-education, making somatic practice valuable not just for therapeutic efforts to overcome 
physical discomfort, negative holding, or injury, but as a resource for philosophical thinking. 
Arguably this is precisely the resource that his work with Alexander represented for Dewey. I can 
attest to the intense sense of “cash value,” to invoke James,  that the recurrent association of  
48    Herwig Friedl is exceptionally helpful on this point, demonstrating that Emerson achieves a completeness in this 
return that even Nietzsche does not. See particularly his essay “Fate, power and history in Emerson and Nietzsche”  
(ESQ, Vol. 43 No. 1-4. 1997), explored at length later in this chapter. 
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scenes of somatic exploration and choreographic thinking have given to my own reading process 
as have I worked my way through Emerson over the last six years. These studio verifications,  
which  echo  what  Emerson  describes  in  “The  Over-Soul”  as  the  brief,  intense  seasons  that 
structure our belief, have underwritten my own capacity to read Emerson just as, when I was a 
philosophical and choreographic novice, they underwrote my capacity to read and make use of 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s  A Thousand Plateaus,  which I  count  as one of my first 
choreography teachers.49 It wasn’t until I read Jacobsen’s description of the Western mind as 
reared in an environment of “substance orientation” that I understood how to make the argument 
for studio work, somatic research, and a commitment to creative process as useful to a healthy 
pragmatic thinking in the way those practices re-educate the practitioner's conceptual orientation.
49    I was referred to Deleuze and Guattari's book, in an event of great felicity, by Ted Byfield, the partner of Gwen  
Welliver, whose influence on my own dance thinking and making is hard to overstate and whose example 
contributed to my understanding of translations between text and movement. I began to read it during my third year 
of college, about a year after I had begun to choreograph, and more significantly after encountering as a repertory  
student the work of Doug Varone (in whose company Welliver danced) and Bebe Miller, two enormously important  
choreographers in the dance scene of the 1990's in which I came of age. I count this book as the first time I heard my 
“genius” sing with “alienated majesty” in the pages of something else, to invoke Emerson's phrase. At the same time 
what I recognized in the book was something that I already intuited but couldn't yet articulate or produce. While 
reading, images from Varone and Miller's choreographies would come to mind. Deleuze and Guattari don't address  
dance in their work but they talk endlessly about space, territory, and deterritorialization, all of which I was able to  
grasp in dance images overlaid on an abstract stage space. In turn the book became something like my 
choreographic tutor, and as I developed dances over the next few formative years, I used their vocabulary of spatial  
concepts both as assignments and descriptions. Combining these abstract spatial markings with Welliver's 
articulation of dance vocabulary as a geometrical elaboration of skeletal joint mobility, I was able to develop a 
dance-making practice that was oriented toward patterns that emerged and regulated a space or territory, and  
inflections or redirections which disrupted that spatial logic in favor of a new one. 
Years later when I began to read Emerson, again I found studio images accompanying my reading, this time 
not as prospective choreographies, but of remembered experiences in my later somatic training and engagement with  
improvisation as a teacher. In both cases, the sense of real trust in my physical experience associations underwrote  
the manner and mood in which I brought myself to these books. Most recently, in a year-long practice of Authentic 
Movement (a structured improvisational form in which the mover moves with eyes closed, trying not to compose or 
invent but rather to listen to the body's impulse and allow it to develop, while being witnessed by a partner), 
Emerson came to the studio with me, accompanying my movement experience with his sentences in the same way 
that my movement experiences had previously accompanied my reading. 
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The oscillating process
If  I  make sense  of  Emerson’s  impersonal  by  thinking through somatic  practices  that 
contradict  essentialist  dualism, it  is  important to acknowledge that Emerson, while rendering 
unity as process, also continually employs dualistic images. Indeed, he rarely gets to a sense of 
process  without  first  oscillating  between  the  poles  of  a  binary  opposition.  But  Emerson’s 
oppositions  are  better  understood  as  counterpoints,  the  furthest  reaches  of  a  curving  wave: 
apogee and nadir, each turning toward the other. Sensing process is for Emerson evidence of “a 
love of truth,” and the person who experiences this “true romance” sees binaries as the positive 
and negative charges that keep a current moving. The binaries, for example the opposition of 
person and the impersonal, stand not for locations of being, but for limits on being: 
He in  whom the  love  of  truth predominates  will  keep  himself  aloof  from all 
moorings,  and afloat.  He will  abstain  from dogmatism,  and  recognize  all  the  
opposite negations, between which, as walls, his being is swung. He submits to 
the inconvenience of suspense and imperfect opinion, but he is a candidate for 
truth, as the other is not, and respects the highest law of his being. (emphasis 
added, EL 426) 
It is quite possible to live without this recognition, but to do so is to “shut the door of truth,” to 
close off the avenues for the ingress of power, illumination, or surprise. 
Emerson makes use of dramatic oppositions to act as a kind of propulsion, rappelling the 
reader, as a rock climber, off first one wall and then the next until a sensation of motion, and an 
appetite for continued motion, can be established. These exaggerations he takes to be a necessary 
part  of  the  “electricity”  without  which  “the  air  would  rot.”  He  celebrates  the  “violence  of 
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direction” that exaggerates in the person but contributes to the “sanity” of “circulation” in the 
greater aggregate of society—which is not a quantity but “a wave”: “Society is a wave. The wave 
moves onward, but the water of which it is composed does not” (EL 281). That propulsion away 
from what we know ourselves to be is, in Emerson, a necessary impulse, an expansion of the  
feeling of “I” that constitutes both religious experience and the faith that gives wisdom “to finish 
the moment, to find the journey's end in every step of the road” (479). Cavell describes this 
propulsion away as “aversive thinking,” a basic action in Emerson of turning away from things 
settled or fixed. Emerson spends much of his essays’ animating energy on this aversive direction. 
But it should not be taken as representing for Emerson the direction of truth, but rather one of its 
directions. In getting unmoored, getting on the highway, getting into what Cavell calls Emerson’s 
“process of indirection” (ETE 121), the impulse toward the impersonal is one spatial element in a  
multidirectional circulatory system.
One technique Emerson uses to push his reader toward these impersonal considerations is 
through claims that go against the grain of anthropocentrism. The surprise, audacity, and even 
offense of his sentences act as small shoves. As we will see, he makes surprising claims about 
physical  identity:  that  as  bodies,  human  persons  are  fields  of  electrical  activity,  and  also 
vegetable-related. This very condition, far from a debasement, marks bodies as both permeated 
by and accessible to natural law, which applies at all tiers of organization from the molecular to  
the corporeal to the conceptual. He adds a claim about intelligence that heralds Jamesian chords: 
that intelligence is not a faculty fully possessed by conscious minds, but a vast flow exceeding 
any  individual,  and  that  participation  in  intelligence  is  both  receptive  and  navigational.  To 
combine these claims produces a question about physical intelligence that Emerson does not 
137
directly  contemplate.  Discussions  of  the  body  in  action  are  generally  missing,  although  he 
records  traces  of  his  temperament  and  nervous  system over  the  course  of  his  writings  and 
indicates in a broad way the continual reassertion of muscular life over the intellectual alone. If 
“life is not intellectual or critical but sturdy” (487), if we are to learn “the conduct of life,” we 
must learn how to be sturdy, how we are sturdy. 
Vegetable kinship
The vegetable relation is offered early in Emerson's writing.  In the opening pages of 
Nature (1836), he records a variation of his famous revelation at the Jardin des Plantes, of the 
kinship that crosses not only species but kingdoms: “The greatest delight which the fields and 
woods minister, is the suggestion of an occult relation between man and the vegetable” (EL 11). 
This relation is occult not so much because it is not visible—the commonality of structures is 
plainly observed, as Emerson saw in the Jardin while looking at scorpions—but because it makes 
kinship claims that exceed the human, suggests the fern as a distant cousin. The relation “takes 
me by surprise and yet is not unknown,”—that is, it  is known somewhere in a place I don’t 
usually sound for knowledge. 
Electrical kinship
It  is  important  to  recognize  that  Emerson doesn’t  just  propose  kinship  as  analogy—
although he  does  do  that,  in  the  typological  tradition—but  also  suggests  that  in  our  shared 
material condition there is finally nothing different in kind between humans and any other kinds 
of bodies. This he advances through his continuous use of electrical images, presented both as 
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fact and as figure of law. “An individual body is the momentary arrest or fixation of certain 
atoms, which, after performing compulsory duty to this enchanted statue, are released again to 
flow in the currents of the world,” he writes in his late essay “Natural History of the Intellect,” 
continuing, “An individual mind in like manner is a fixation or momentary eddy in which certain 
services and powers are taken up and minister in petty niches and localities, and then, being 
released, return to the unbounded soul of the world” (NHI 27-8). The electrical  currents and 
magnetic  fields  that  he  learned about  from Michael  Faraday  allowed  Emerson to  grasp  the 
identity of a body with electricity as a primal identity of all matter—to grasp that electricity does 
not just offer a typological lesson, but is the condition from which bodies and minds emerge and 
to which they return. This shared condition is at the basis of all other shared structures. So when 
he writes that “man seems a higher plant” (24), we are charged not just to make use of analogies  
about growth, ripeness, or unfolding progress, but to consider what in us is the same as a plant.  
In other words, plant analogies hold true because we are in part plants, or musk rats, or atoms: 
“What happens here in mankind is matched by what happens out there in the history of grass and 
wheat”; “Musk rat is man fitted to live in a mud bank” (23, 24). And, we might say, a man is a 
musk rat fitted to live in a house.
Emerson’s  clearest  statement  of  our  material  identity  comes  in  his  essay  “Nature,” 
published in the 1844 Second Series. Our identity as matter—the same matter that fits plants and 
musk  rats—means  also,  following  what  Emerson  learned  from  Faraday’s  finding,  in  Mark 
Noble’s paraphrase,  that materiality is  a property of electricity.50 (Emerson rewrites Faraday: 
“The world is mind precipitated, and the volatile essence is forever escaping into the state of free 
50See Mark Noble: “Emerson’s Atom and the Matter of Suffering.” Nineteenth-Century Literature, Vol. 64, No. 1 
(June 2009) pp. 16-47.
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thought.” (EL 555)) It follows that we must recognize our identities, considered both as body and 
mind, as temporary vehicles  of  nature's  power.  This recognition precedes access  to  practical 
power. If we can cease “identifying ourselves with the work” and instead “feel that the soul of 
the workman streams through us,” we can experience the “fathomless powers of gravity and 
chemistry” (EL 554). In this essay Emerson charges the reader to identify with two things: nature 
or life, which “runs through all the surprises and contrasts of the piece,” so that “the history of 
nature is charactered in [man’s] brain,” and rest, or the drag on that flow that produces particular 
channels, “enchanted statue[s],” people that live for the term of “seventy sallads” [sic] before 
being returned to “the divine circulations” (EL 555). 
What this recognition stimulates is a receptivity to the call of all other things as cousins, 
who teach of an occult relation in power: “Man imprisoned, man crystallized, man vegetative,  
speaks to man impersonated. That power … distills its essence into every drop of rain. Every 
moment instructs,  and every object:  for wisdom is infused into every form.” He goes on to 
situate this power within the physical body: “It has been poured into us as blood; it convulsed us 
as pain; it slid into us as pleasure; it enveloped us in dull, melancholy days, or in days of cheerful 
labor” (555). The proposition that we identify with vegetable life or with electrical lines of force, 
and that we allow that  identity  to  flourish,  not  just  as  analogy but  as  embodied reality,  the 
proposition that we identify our intelligence as having something to do with a  natural history 
that flows through the particular precipitate of our brains, is a proposition that we embrace the 
impersonal and nonhuman in order to gain the compensation of getting nearer not to fixity or 
certainty or immortality, but to practical power: a state of health, a capacity to act. 
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2. FINDING NEW CONCEPTUAL ENVIRONMENTS
2.1 PROCESS-ORIENTATION IN BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE
In Buddhism, impersonality, or anatta, is a gesture of erosion: the denial of the fallacy of 
the permanent self. The idea of a permanent self rests on a bifurcating relationship of body and 
soul,  where  whatever  is  permanent  logically  inheres  to  an  immaterial  portion  of  self,  since 
physical  death  and  decomposition  are  undeniable  eventualities.  As  an  alternative  to  this 
substance-and-essence duality, Buddhism offers, in Jacobson’s description, a “view of the self-
surpassing oneness of a world that, in each fleeting moment, with its living moment-to-moment 
manifestation of reality, is forever new. The world is never the same twice; the universe is alive” 
(x). In this view, what is “really real” is not a set of permanently fixed entities, but “the living 
moment.”  Jacobson  describes  Buddhism  as  a  practice  of  return  to  “[v]ivid,  free,  creative, 
responsive,  original  momentary  occasions  of  experience”  from  the  “thing-centered,  being-
oriented  world  in  which  all  of  us  are  reared”  (xi).  In  other  words,  through  teachings  and 
meditative practice, Buddhism seeks to reinstate what Emerson describes as “an original relation 
to the universe” had within the course of the “flitting state” of an individual life. 
For Jacobson, the primary practice of Buddhism is an attention to the passing present, 
what Emerson phrases as “a respect to the present hour” (EL 479). In letting go of the fallacy of 
permanence that “substance-orientation” imposes, and in recognizing that the world is “forever 
new,” a change in orientation occurs, one similar to the epochal change described by Herwig 
Friedl, cited briefly in my first chapter, that with Emerson and Nietzsche there is a shift in the 
way “being addresses thinkers,” as opposed to a mere reconfiguration of thoughts about being. 
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Jacobson  echoes  this  with  his  citation  of  James  Dye’s  assessment  of  process  philosophy’s 
mandate to show “that it is the great alternative to Aristotelian substantialism, not merely by 
presenting itself as a different way to think about the world, but as the way the world seems to 
present itself for thought, and for perception and feeling” (qtd. in Jacobson, xii). The impersonal 
is what “presents itself for thought” in this new orientation. When Emerson describes getting into 
a stream of thought that exceeds the personal, as with his image of being “as men in a balloon,  
[who] do not think so much of the point we have left, or the point we would make, as of the 
liberty and glory of the way” (EL 956), it is receptivity and surprise—we could say “forever 
new[ness]”—that characterize the experience. 
Although reading in and about Eastern texts unquestionably influenced Emerson’s images 
of a universe in process, it  is also his reading in natural science that brought him to such a 
perspective.  Of  the  somatic  reorientation  toward  process  that  Darwin  both  prompts  and 
emblematizes, Hanna writes that the order of the universe mapped in the early work of biological 
classifiers was thrust by the theory of evolution into time, into process. Both Joan Richardson 
and  Laura  Dassow Walls  offer  recent  work  on Emerson’s  reading in  science.  Walls  frames 
Emerson the scientist in terms of what she calls “holistic empiricism” and locates his thinking 
within  natural  theology.  Richardson  focuses  on  the  transformation  of  Emerson’s  original 
ministerial tasks from the office of a minister to a naturalist. Taken together they demonstrate the 
foundational place of science in Emerson’s thought and images. Following Madame de Staël, 
whose work he read early in his intellectual development, Emerson saw no distinction between 
moral laws and scientific ones. A large portion of his writing is devoted to articulating nature as 
the  teacher  of  moral  law.  Barbara  Packer  writes  that  Emerson,  once  moved  to  a  sense  of 
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penetrating  insight  by  learning  about  the  transmission  and  reflection  of  light  particles  in 
Newton’s Optics and developments that followed from Newton’s theories, created the neologism 
“theoptics” as an index-heading for his  journals  under which he collated findings  in  optical 
science as descriptions of moral laws (Fall 75). 
2.2 RETHINKING WHAT IT MEANS TO OWN
If the behavior of light offers a poetic analogy for thinking or participating in divinity that  
seems unobjectionable, the moral conclusion that arises from the discovery that, in Dewey’s later 
words,  “what  …  is  actually  ‘universal’ is  process”—a  denial  of  fixity—generates  some 
dissonance when turned to questions of suffering. Whereas Buddhism enfolds suffering into its 
central  images,  teaching  non-attachment  with  the  compensation  of  wonder,  the  developing 
scientific understanding of continual process offers no such way to deal with the problem of 
suffering within an emotional or moral framework. (Indeed, the scientific approach to suffering 
in  Western  medical  work  is  resolutely  antagonistic,  seeking  to  medicate  emotional  abysses, 
fighting the death process unless a patient actively opts out of medical treatment, segregating and 
sanitizing the processes of birth and death.) So it becomes awkward—for some readers to the 
point of real anger—to encounter Emerson’s accounts of death and loss that are not primarily 
accounts of grief, but of process as a kind of health that entails loss and decay. 
We in the West have, in other words, a different conceptual vocabulary for suffering, and 
for what constitutes a healthy, moral response to death and loss. In this vocabulary, the Buddhist 
view is acceptable if understood pluralistically as something coming from another culture, but 
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suspect if found in our own. Such a response is evident in Sharon Cameron’s rejection, in her 
essay “Representing Grief,” of Emerson’s statements in “Experience,” and her effort to impose 
upon his essay the stages of melancholy and mourning that belong to the Freudian conception of 
the grieving process. For Cameron, Emerson’s essay belies his dissociation and denial, shows 
him failing to acknowledge and “work through” the grief occasioned by the death of Waldo, 
thereby assigning to all experience the character of grief. So Cameron experiences Emerson as 
“brutal”—definitely  not  moral—in  the  long  view  he  takes  in  his  rephrasing  of  the  law of 
conservation of energy: 
Thy sickness, they say, and thy puny habit, require that thou do this or avoid that,  
but know thy life is a flitting state, a tent for a night, and do thou, sick or well, 
finish that stint. Thou art sick, but shalt not be worse, and the universe, which 
holds thee dear, shall be the better. (EL 481)
Emerson’s seeming abandonment to the duty of proper attachments strikes Cameron as callous. 
Likewise Cameron’s assessment of Emerson’s impersonal reads as underlaid by an anger 
provoked by the conceptual dissonance of his process-orientation, this time along the conceptual 
lines of property. In the second of two essays on Emerson within her collection Impersonality, 
Cameron levels a  critique  of Emerson’s impersonal  images  that  hinges on an ethical  charge 
folded into a failure of style. Of the voice of his essays she finds only “vacancy in the place 
where we might expect to find a person” (“The Way of Abandonment,” 19). She ascribes this 
vacancy  to  accumulations  of  clichéd  images,  asymmetrical  identities,  and  sense-defying 
associations. This absent speaker emblematizes for Cameron an abdication of responsibility for 
the essays’ calls to submit to the impersonal, calls that elide difference and trivialize suffering in 
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sight of the magisterial and impersonal unity, the experience of which Emerson so relentlessly 
craves. This elision of difference she ties to the banner charge against old white men, of an over-
reaching possessiveness.  Marshaling  a  phrase  from the  end of  “Character”—that  the  proper 
response to the visitation of the impersonal is “to own it”—she makes a leap from Emerson’s 
articulation of expanded identity  to  charge  him with  a  possessive claim of  “owning what  is 
other,” implicitly predicated on a claim over the subaltern, figured here as the right to speak for 
an other. 
But in plucking the word “own” from the passage, Cameron herself elides the riddling 
way that  the sentence complicates the meaning of the verb.  If  we back up a  page,  we find  
“owning” invoked not as possession but as kinship. Having described a great character, drawn 
along the same lines as other asymptotic figures like his poet, Emerson says that the recognition 
of character is often missed. When at last this character arrives, he says, it is a confusion to “treat 
such a visitant with the jabber and suspicion of the streets,” a confusion wherein “the soul no 
longer knows its own.” But if one person recognizes this visitor, although no one else may, the 
“open[ing] into a flower” of the “holy sentiment” is yet true. The essay then ends: “when that 
love … comes into our streets and houses,—only the pure and aspiring can know its face, and the 
only compliment they can pay it,  is to own it” (EL 508-9). Taken in the context of the full  
passage, the ownership of this compliment does not strike me as our primary sense of ownership, 
as staking a claim of possessive control. The OED gives several variegations of the verb to own, 
including, “to acknowledge as an acquaintance, to recognize as familiar.”  This strikes me as the 
more subtle sense of Emerson’s sentence: if you recognize the appearance of the impersonal in 
the wide character of an uncompromising person, the only response is to accept “that love” as an 
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one’s  own.  To  “own”  love  suggests  an  action  Emerson  earlier  ascribes  to  a  force  of  great 
character: to “blend with” an other, to commit to an outpouring. This imagined blending suggests 
a unity not marked by possession, or grasping, but by being-with, accepting the claim of the 
other upon me. This owning is an intimacy, a romance, something Cavell has described as the 
primary  tone  of  Emerson’s  sense  of  contact  with  the  world:  an  attraction.  This  owning  as 
attraction is not part of coming to a rest (or possession), but of what  draws us on “whenever 
another represents for us our rejected [alienated] self, our beyond” (CHU 58). Thus recognizing 
great character as one’s own would prompt a person out of a rigid sense of property, to accept 
instead a “property in the horizon” (EL 9) of something more, something beyond, a “vagabond 
life” (966) of a kind of voluntary poverty. Emerson suggests in “Character” that one path out of 
“our puny habits” is through this conceptual environment of such reciprocal owning, provoked 
by the charismatic presence of a person of great character.  
Cameron clearly does not read the language of “owning” in this sense. Her suspicion is 
animated by passages in which Emerson levels the stations and lots of social life, and revels in 
sweeps of commonality that unfocus all markers of separation including those separations caused 
by violence and oppression. Although I think Cameron makes an unwarranted leap in describing 
Emerson’s  arrogation  of  the  voice of  philosophy as  “barbarous,”  her  charges do highlight  a 
difficult  tension between a political  commitment  to  social  justice,  and a  religious  or  cosmic 
intuition of the radical continuity of beings. Nonetheless, I find that this, like Emerson’s anti-
associationism, must be taken in context. As Barbara Packer describes, Emerson’s insistence on 
aversion from society grows out of an immediate social context marked by extreme timidity and 
apparently self-policed stifling of non-conforming opinions. Arguing for the equality of contexts 
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just as Thoreau will when he writes, “I walk out into a Nature such as the old prophets and poets, 
Menu, Moses, Homer, Chaucer, walked in”(“Walking,” 339), Emerson’s sweeping of all of life’s 
stations into common divinity is meant to be liberating, not to reinforce the status quo. A key to 
this liberation is that for Emerson no place or position can be settled when engaged earnestly. 
Beyond  these  social  contexts,  Cameron’s  critique  functions  by  removing  Emerson’s 
descriptions of impersonality from of the condition of polarity that envelops and contextualizes 
all of his images, eliding the repetitive bathos of his essays and treating his invocations of the 
impersonal sweep as if they were the only definitions he offers of human being, when they are 
rather, as I read them, descriptions of intense experiences that mark the furthest point of the polar 
swing. “Whilst  it  blooms,” he says,  of the company of the holy sentiment,  “I  will  keep the 
sabbath time and suspend my gloom” (EL 508). Why read in this the total suspension of gloom? 
Sabbath time is only possible in relation to the week of work it punctuates; it is a station in a  
calendar, not a continuous experience. Suspension is an aesthetic gesture. It is also an occurrence 
at  the  point  where  an  inhalation  becomes  an  exhalation.  But  this  pairing  is  absent  from 
Cameron’s critique, I think because she takes him as maintaining the impersonal as the higher 
value,  the  greater  truth,  the  “real.”  But  I  read  Emerson as  acknowledging  the  error  of  this 
youthful  dream of  a  Platonic  realm  of  ideas  in  painting  a  scalable  pyramid  of  experience, 
reinvesting the brief sensation of impersonal expansion in a fabric less hierarchically ordered. 
Perhaps  too,  the  omission  of  polarity  is  a  function  of  Cameron’s  broader  investigation  of 
impersonality, the Emersonian variety occupying only two of seven chapters that are “concerned 
with  the  uncompromising  nature  of  writing  about  the  precariousness  of  personal  identity 
measured at  the moment of its disintegration” (Impersonality  ix).  Impersonal experience—as 
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disintegration of identity—is not “uncompromising” in Emerson’s account, but part of a weather 
system of emergence and retreat that conditions the change in a person over time. In fact the 
polarity he describes continually compromises the completeness of his images of transcendent 
suspension. If the impersonal as a name for the “interminable oceans” that lie beyond all our 
categories is imagined to be uncompromising, the experience of “arrival” at those shores, in the 
way Emerson proposes this experience should fold into our daily life, is something else. There 
are different variants of impersonal experience in Emerson, belonging to both extremities and 
ordinary hours.
If the final disintegration of the self is not an event that ever actually occurs in Emerson’s 
writing, it is true that his essays do contain many visions of a complete success, declarations of 
the overarching unity of being—prophetic “ravishments”—as Cameron points out, drawing the 
language from “The Poet.” But just as Wallace Stevens’s Noble Rider does not remain on his 
chariot circling the sky in Plato’s images, but drops from that exciting figure back to the ground 
of the actual world, so too does Emerson continually find himself back in the personal. Even in 
the  more  idealistic  Nature,  written  when,  according  to  Cavell’s  periodization,  Emerson still 
imagined skepticism was solvable, an oscillation is presented. The sky loses its grandeur in times 
of loss, and the “axis of vision” loses its “coincidence” with the “axis of things” (EL 47). The 
interest of impersonality is not as a truth that negates the existence of personality, but its relation 
to personality as the place where are always finding ourselves. Emersonian impersonality then 
stands for the expanse beyond personality that helps keep personhood mobile, keeps the drag 
from becoming a full stop, as we find ourselves now, and again now, on a further stair. This 
mobility characterizes the conceptual shift of the environment of our thinking in self-reflection 
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and self-direction. Finding that environment has everything to do with experiencing fluidity. 
With  Branka  Arsić,  I  read  Emerson’s  image  of  the  “owning”  of  impersonality  as 
something that does not barbarously grasp what is beyond the self, or brutally dissociate from 
what should be properly owned (in private loss), but as a figure for thought as a kind of phreatic  
event: the upswelling of groundwaters in one's particular plot of land and the acceptance of this  
fluidity  as  one’s  own.  This  can  only  be  felt  if  we  allow  subjective  interiority  to  decouple 
conceptually from property in one’s body, to appreciate that the circumference of the individual 
is a membrane across which the primary direction might in fact be incursion. In  On Leaving 
(Harvard UP, 2010), Arsić writes, “Emerson advances an idea of impersonal thinking and … 
such a thinking constitutes the interiority of the ‘I’ rather than being constituted by it. Because of 
that, the external, the outside, and the communal assume fundamental importance in his image of 
thought” (59). Taken from this direction, to “own” is to recognize this thinking within one’s own 
interiority,  which  is,  I  think,  precisely  the  action  that  Emerson  repeatedly  describes  as  the 
ingress, by secret door or subterranean channel, of the universe into the individual. What is at 
stake in this ingress, according to Arsić, is the navigation of “medial personality,” a personality 
always becoming, subject to transformation. This “medial” situation is not an either/or: 
Emerson is not proposing a radical choice: either persons or the impersonal. Both 
of these concepts understood in their purity are futile and differ from what he is 
saying.  … The  point  is  rather  that  Emerson  is  offering  a  diagnosis  with  the 
precision of a phenomenologist, a diagnosis that, in fact, may affect him too … 
Persons are made of many impersonal influences that transform them, making 
them different persons. (73)
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Diagnosed as a phenomenon, the incursion of impersonal influences into the relative coherence 
of any personal identity, a person is something like a situation of encounter. What is at stake is an 
“ethics  of  reading” the incursions (73),  a  “meeting-place,”  to  invoke Muriel  Rukeyser’s key 
phrase, of the voluntary and the involuntary. An Emersonian practice of thinking selfhood is to 
be configured around a commitment to suffer that meeting, and to accept the transformation it  
implies: a commitment to its waves. In order to suffer that meeting, however, one has to first  
learn to perceive its happening or register its traces. This perception occurs for Emerson in a 
series of image processes: the observation of the image as it rises up, the use of the image as a  
vehicle through which to hold a thought, and the testing and possible transformation of the image 
as it runs a course through a stream of thought. It is this sequence of image work that recurs in 
somatic work, and through this sequence I see a relationship between the two projects, which I 
will now attempt to present. 
3. MY LIFE AS A BODY or I WAS A HOUSE FOUNDED ON THE SEA
3.1 PICTURES OF ME
In  the  re-calibrated  conceptual  environment  that  Emerson  asks  us  to  navigate—an 
environment structured without the dualisms of owner/renter, mind/body, or subject/object—the 
key image is the picture of a self. This picture is never fixed, and its variations are not always 
commensurate. One way to read Emerson’s essays is as a series of ways to picture a self—as 
image work. In the varieties of self-pictures that they give, and the picture of existing in this 
condition of variety, his essays anticipate contemporary conversations in relational philosophy 
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around the un-containedness of subjectivity.51 Much of the recent scholarship in the revival of 
Emerson since  Cavell  has  focused on the  paradoxical  and challenging  sense  of  subjectivity 
offered  in  his  essays,  complicating  the  meaning  of  this  figure  whose  popular  short-hand 
designation remains the champion of individualism. In their introduction to The Other Emerson, 
a volume of essays that in large part stakes itself on this challenge, editors Branka Arsić and Cary 
Wolfe trace the history of scholarship on Emersonian subjectivity as moving from an account of 
stasis  and  completion  (in  Chapman,  Whicher,  and  Paul),  to  transition,  disfiguration,  and 
transformation (in Cavell), to absence, fluctuation, or porousness (in Cameron, Goodman, and 
Arsić). Opening their introduction by citing the sense of vertigo entailed by the opening question 
of “Experience,” they describe the present approaches to Emerson as invested in a drawing out of 
his resistance to what is commonly connoted by individualism.  
The corrective emphasis on openness and the warranted insistence upon acknowledging a 
vagueness at defining limits of selfhood risks the omission of the continuing presence of a self 
and of Emerson’s engagement in suffering openness as a means of experiencing selfhood as “part 
and particle” of nature. In this respect, I appreciate Barbara Packer’s sensitivity to the sequences 
of Emerson’s essays and the way each series forms a kind of song cycle. She takes seriously the 
“series” in the names of the collections, retaining a feeling for the durational aspect of reading. In  
51    I am thinking of thinking of the line of inquiry of Judith Butler, for example in Giving an Account of Oneself  
(Fordham UP, 2005) that develops her investigation of the imposition of norms into the relational nature of 
subjectivity, positing selfhood as comprised of relations rather than a knowable, possessed interiority. But she also 
develops this line of porous non-possession into relationships to the larger world, asking “who am I without you?” 
See “Violence, Mourning, Politics” in Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (Verso, 2006). 
Although I doubt Butler would see herself as in conversation with Emerson, she does seem to be developing a line 
of thought from William James that individual consciousness (and so identity) is part of a transitive and continuous 
field: “What we conceptually identify ourselves with and say we are thinking at any time is the centre; but our full 
self is the whole field, with all those indefinitely radiating subconscious possibilities of increase that we can only 
feel without conceiving, and hardly begin to analyze. The collective and distributive ways of being coexist here, for  
each part functions distinctly, makes connexion with its own peculiar region in the still wider rest of experience” (A 
Pluralistic Universe, 761-2). Emerson’s alterity is significantly more cosmic than social, but each of these thinkers 
offer fertile ground for a consideration of individuality as fundamentally grounded in a state of uncontainment.
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particular, within the  Second Series she notes that the exaltations that open the series in “The 
Poet” are meant to be followed by not only the disappointments of “Experience” but also the 
emergence in that essay of “the middle way” as an approach to living through the both exalting 
and violent exposure to change, a workable project reiterated, as she sees it, in his later essay on 
Montaigne, where he offers the image of a “[house] founded on the sea” as a figure for the self.52 
Approaching  Emerson’s  essays  from the  standpoint  of  creative  education  and  active 
engagement in making things, I find myself following the circuit  past his horizonal vistas of 
openness and exposure back to the coherence of a body or “this thought which is called I” (EL 
196) that is actually doing something. That is, I find myself asking about what Emerson has to 
say about the role of exposed experience in the ongoing experience of embodied personhood, 
specifically of a person who identifies herself through work: through doing or making. Work in 
Emerson becomes a kind of estuarial space, the meeting of the house and the sea, a relatively  
defined  area  in  which  to  mark  both  the  influx  of  external  currents  of  intelligence,  and the 
outflow, or “publication” in the particular products of particular character. In work, a self is built 
and comes to be known: “Do your work and I shall know you” (EL 264).
3.2 BUILDING OPEN HOUSES
While the language of “construction” tends to carry a negative valence in its critical use, 
implicating  the  coercive  power  of  socially  prescribed  constructions  of  both  identity  and 
normative  values,  Emerson’s  tuition  to  the  individual  is  to  engage in  the  construction  of  a 
selfhood checked in confidence by the acknowledgement of limits of control and self-possession, 
52    See her section on Montaigne in Emerson's Fall, beginning on p. 199.
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but  also  appraised  of  the  potential  to  participate  actively  in  what  is  beyond  those  limits. 
Construction, or “building,” as he has it in the proto-Heideggarian language of “Fate,” involves a 
meeting point between two extremes: “The whole world is the flux of matter over the wires of 
thought to the poles or points where it would build” (EL 964-5). Emerson does not describe the 
constructed self prescriptively. Rather he asks his readers to identify with images at the extreme 
ranges of what could be considered a self—the “flux of matter”  and the “wires of thought” 
without specifying the point at  which the building happens. Owning this range—taking it  as 
personally  available—offers  a  security  against  the  deadening  effect  of  conformity  which  is 
figured as an ossified narrowness against nature’s expanse. 
Within that range, which is shared, the individual remains a unique and unpredictable 
note, or chord in an untempered scale.  So while there is something idiosyncratic and always new 
in the realized person, what doesn’t change, for Emerson, is the vast scale of identifications and 
relations that all persons can experience and from which each person’s particularity emerges as a 
point  of  building.  He  protests  social  conformity  for  its  imaginative  limitation  of  this  range 
through conventions, proprieties, cheap addictions, oppressions and enslavements. The scale of 
possible  identifications  that  he  would  have  his  reader  imagine  proceeds  from  the  most 
infinitesimal  and even abased materialities to  identification with God or otherwise described 
unities—weeds to weather, from the steel filing to the principle of magnetism. His essays offer 
an imaginative exposure to these scales, a chance to acknowledge a continuity of which we 
cannot know the extremes. Exhilarated and chastened, the reader is pointed back to her work to 
integrate that exposure. 
Emerson’s  imaginative  exposures,  if  felicitous,  work  dramatically  on  his  reader’s 
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empathy, pulling that reader out of a person-sized, volitional sense of self. Readers discover the 
“occult  relations between man and vegetable,”  relations “ministered” by the woods and also 
ministered by these essays (EL 11); readers also discover “the background of our being … an 
immensity not possessed and that cannot be possessed,” which in its pouring through us, as a 
light, “makes us aware that we are nothing, but the light is all” (386-7). Or, in the memorable 
phrase of “Circles,” the imaginatively exposed reader can think himself into dramatic oscillations  
of scale, alongside Emerson: “I am God in Nature; I am a weed by the wall” (406). Skating  
somewhere in the middle of these two images, falling and recovering,53 the essays offer a reader, 
entertaining radically re-scaled identifications, images of a self as a vessel that can be steered 
through the process of work in ways that keep, as he has it in one figure, one side open, exposed 
(386). So it  is with the image of a house founded on the sea. This guided, even ceremonial 
experience of exposure, is part of the work of these essays—they are Emerson’s effort at sacred 
texts that instruct not by argument but by intense feeling. The intensity is rendered, I think, by 
the expansive charge to  identify with the continuity of matter,  by understanding “the natural 
history” of the thinking self. 
This intense feeling—or romance—is supposed to renew each reader’s commitment to 
(by a sense of belonging) and capacity for (by the discovery of new powers of action) doing her 
work, and the ways in which different kinds of work cultivate different kinds of exposure and 
receptivity is part of the logic of Emerson’s sequence of topics. Proper work is a project that 
Emerson repeatedly,  from “The American  Scholar”  on,  attempts  to  rescue  from pre-existing 
social value judgments. Revisiting the question in “Spiritual Laws,” Emerson proposes that each 
53    I must note here that “falling and recovering” is the basic principle of movement explored by Doris Humphrey, 
one of the founders of American modern dance. The exploration of falling and recovering has been preserved in the  
lineage that extends from Humphrey into Limòn Technique and Varone Technique, both of which were an important  
context of my own dance training. 
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individual offers a unique channel to the flow of universal being, and that one’s work is first 
determined  by  discovering  the  particular  capacities  of  those  channels,  and  then  carried  out 
through obedience to their potentiality. He opposes this obedience to a mere social obedience, or 
conformity, which chooses to perform work that has taken its valuation from a calcified and 
timid society. Rather, a person discovers his proper work by respecting the “identical nature” 
(one of Emerson’s names for the impersonal) that not only flows through his particular channels, 
but which cut those channels in the first place, not out of design but out of the unpredictable 
chance recombinations and attractions that characterize natural process. 
Thus “character” is frequently a verb for Emerson, an action of the digging of channels, 
as well as a name for the power that comes through those channels. (This sense is present in the 
Greek root of the word which means to engrave or cut a mark.) “Virtue is the adherence in action 
to the nature of things,” he writes in a Lucretian echo, continuing, “Let us acquiesce. Let us take 
our bloated nothingness out of the path of the divine circuits. Let us unlearn our wisdom of the  
world” (320). Having unlearned the false wisdom that blocks “the divine circuits,” the person 
achieves a kind of transparency, and learns “to make daylight shine through him, to suffer the 
law to traverse his whole being without obstruction, so that, on what point soever of his doing 
your eye falls, it shall report truly of his character, whether it be his diet, his house, his religious  
forms, his society, his mirth, his opposition” (321). The result of this traversal of light as law 
would  be  not  consolidation  but  better  action,  action  that  proceeds  from  the  “immense 
intelligence” of nature and not the “paltry” one of the willful individual: “The rich mind lies in  
the sun and sleeps, and is Nature. To think is to act” (322). 
This particular sequence—of unblocking habits in order to discover and maintain better 
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circuits, rendering thinking action and action thinking—is also the progression of the somatic 
study advanced by both Todd and Alexander. My own physical training and experiential research 
is grounded in Ideokinesis and BMC, so I will concentrate my reading through that work as I 
explore the relationship between Emerson's images and somatic work.
3.3 MEET MABEL ELSWORTH TODD
Given that Mabel Todd is an unfamiliar figure outside dance and somatic practices, it is 
worth offering some lengthy passages to introduce her here. In addition to a number of articles 
published  in  medical  journals,  Todd  wrote  two  books  addressed  to  a  broader  public:  The 
Thinking Body (Dance Horizons), published in 1937 and offering an overview of her image work 
known as “natural posture,” and The Hidden You: What you are and what to do about it (Dance 
Horizons), written at the end of her career and published posthumously in 1953. As Barbara 
Clark, a protégé of Todd’s who carried her work forward, describes in her narrative history of her 
own studies with Todd, The Hidden You shows Todd’s turn away from a focus on the specifics of 
her lessons, and toward an effort to situate her work within the philosophical concerns of the age. 
This disappointed Clark, who preferred the detail and immediate application of the lessons. But 
Todd’s philosophical prose—broad, demanding, and urgent, making universal claims yet tied to 
beliefs derived from specific physical practice—offers an excellent transition from Emerson’s 
images to the image work of somatics. 
The Hidden You reads like a rewriting of Emerson’s “Fate” in the psycho-physical idiom 
of the early twentieth century. Like Emerson, her central concern is polarity, which she describes 
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as a struggle for balance. Like Emerson, she wants to make her reader aware that health is a 
function of continuous movement, and that rigid holdings are undermined by the restless energy 
of matter under the play of forces that make up the living world: 
Our behavior has been developed through the ages by our incessant movements 
toward survival in our world. This world has been changing and we with it, and 
you and I continue to evolve as we move with these changes. 
Everything moves. Through movement the universe evolved. Through movement 
man evolved. The machinery of motion is life itself. To understand one would be 
to understand the other. Through observation of movement man has discovered 
nature’s laws and has learned to interpret his world. 
Life is a continuous stream of energy, its forces molding and remolding the inner 
mechanisms of man. (15)
The  observation  of  movement  available  to  any  individual  is  aggregated  through  scientific 
community  to  reveal  natural  laws.  Like  Emerson,  Todd  is  comfortable  with  the  continuous 
relation  between  individual  observation,  the  authority  of  science,  and  identity  of  these 
discoveries with a ceaseless movement that in its fulness is what Emerson calls “unity”:
Science has now produced evidence that man is composed of impulses of energy 
seeking balance. 
The one great eternal is motion. Call it  life, spirit,  electricity,  God—what you 
like! There it is, facing you. Untiring, eternal movement—a constant search for 
equilibrium!  There  can  be  no  fixity  in  a  universe  of  such  incessant  motion. 
Movement is persistent, and balances must be struck. (15)
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Images of balancing processes arising from explorations with physical balance (in the body or in 
other built structures) are easily analogized by Todd to psychological patterns, reiterating the 
intuition of continuity between physical and moral law that Emerson shares with Madame de 
Staël.  Writing in the key of the twentieth century,  Todd is  particularly attuned to  strain and 
anxiety:
New balances must be found when a change in velocity or direction of forces 
takes place, either within ourselves or without. One of our greatest needs is to 
understand our own emotional velocities and the changes they bring about in the 
direction of movement. Thus we may learn to inhibit less, to guide more. 
All forces act in opposition to each other to hold the objective universe together. 
When an object seems to be still, its active forces are really in balance. 
[…]
Heraclitus,  as  far  back  as  500  B.C.,  expressed  a  fundamental  truth  in  the 
statement: “Everything moves.” 
You think of this in terms of mechanics and physics and as having no bearing 
upon your individual life. But universal forces operate upon human structures as 
upon inanimate structures. These forces make you a different size morning and 
evening as your living substances seek new balances to meet the strains of the 
day… (16-17)
Like Emerson, Todd takes pattern or law, as evidence of divine intelligence. And so she too 
views science as a tool to experience better the world’s intelligence:
The orderliness of the universe is due to the interplay of forces. … Movement in 
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man is the proof of life. Organized movement is the proof of God’s intelligence in 
evolving orderly behavior in the cosmos, and orderly movement in the highest 
form of life: the human being. 
In the science of motion lies the key to better understanding … Only through 
science can man acquaint himself with cosmic intelligence. (17)
And yet scientific understanding alone is not enough; there is a reciprocal imperative. We need to  
“change our thinking” and to “incorporate into our feelings the findings of modern science!” 
This  incorporation  synthesizes  the  analytical  findings  of  science  “for  the  purpose  of  more 
intelligent living” (19). This requires application at the most basic unit of coordination: the cell.  
“The orchestration of these [cellular] intelligences is the integration of the individual. The salient 
characteristic  of  living  protoplasm  is  constant  cellular  activity,  with  its  ceaseless  chemical 
change” (22). 
Here, Todd can be felt to echo Emerson’s identifications of persons with minute physical 
processes, especially in his continual references to magnetism and to polarity as the universal 
law. But Todd moves their shared cosmic images toward specific practice, because her work is 
actually  directed  toward  cellular  activity,  not  just  cellular  images.  It  will  take  another  two 
generations of somatic practice to generate a technique of cellular integration, in Body-Mind 
Centering.  But  Todd’s  basic  insight—that  there  is  a  feedback  channel  between  larger-scale 
processes  that  we  can  more  easily  perceive,  and  cellular  activity—is  already  intact,  and 
underwrites her choice to use imagery supplemented by touch as the vehicle of her work, which 
seeks to change the tissues of her students’ bodies. 
Todd’s lessons were primarily conducted as what she called “table work.” During table 
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work, the student lies on a table, often on her side, and the teacher combines informational touch 
(assisting  with  the  location of  physical  features)  with  guided imagery  that  the  student  is  to 
embody. Although the student is lying down, the work is being done by her and not to her. The 
touch, not massage but something more like a tactile aid to proprioceptive mapping, is intended 
to help link pictures with flesh, nerves, and bone. This mapping produces pictures. Todd’s insight 
during her own recovery from a paralyzing accident (as a young woman she was in an accident 
and told she would not be able to walk again, but accomplished a full physical return by devising 
her own therapy) was that images, whole pictures, could function as parallels to the coordination 
that  bodies  routinely  employ  in  any  gross  motor  action  or  unconscious  physical  function. 
Noticing that picturing was a constant and unremarkable part  of moving, she sought to take 
control  of  movement  by  beginning  with  healthy  pictures:  “That  we  act  as  a  whole  and  in 
response to our sensations, feelings, thoughts, and memories makes what we  entertain in our 
imagination important.  Do we entertain constructive,  forward-moving pictures  of  action?  … 
Think action, and action will  take place” (24). She knew from her own recovery that it  was 
possible to project oneself, through these entertained images, toward a better-functioning body 
and that the body’s action is thoughtful: “We become what we think about. We are not what we 
think we are, but what we are thinking—what we have thought for so long a time that it has 
entered the unconscious realm of behavior and we are unaware of its existence” (31). The “we” 
that Todd refers to here is not a group of contemporary individuals or readers, but the “we” of an 
accumulated evolutionary history leading to (and beyond) human bodies.
“Power  keeps  quite  another  road  than  the  turnpikes  of  choice  and will,  namely,  the 
subterranean  and  invisible  tunnels  and  channels  of  life,”  wrote  Emerson  (EL  482).  Todd 
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reiterates the thought in relation to the power of the body to move: “What makes you move? The 
desired picture of movement in your imagination … Your intention prepares deep reflexes over 
which you have no direct control, except the intention to set your picture of movement in motion 
… These nerve reflexes … function with an intelligence far more fundamental than any direction 
which you could consciously make to measure a time-space movement” (31). For Todd, it is the 
interference of human will and little-minded propriety that wrenches the harmony between these 
“pictures  of  action”  and  the  vast  reflexive  intelligence  of  a  body  in  motion.  In  particular, 
mistaken imposition of rigid moral codes of behavior inhibit and drain bodily intelligence in 
human  society,  sapping  energy  and  producing  strain.  If  animals  do  not  suffer  this  “false 
education,” however, neither can they use the great instrument of  directed imagery, conscious 
use of the imagination to recondition the body, as both a renewal and a return to human natural 
history as collected in the astonishingly complex organism of the human body. 
By  converting  general  descriptions  to  a  physical  context,  Todd  offers  an  exemplary 
continuation of Emerson’s work into action. She builds insights that resonate with Emerson’s 
own toward projects that he envisions but does not find present at hand. We could even say that 
Todd begins to figure out how to make “manipular attempts to realize the world of thought”—
something Emerson declares he has not seen any gain from—by reconsidering how, literally, to 
engage the hands in relation to the world of thought, by backing off from manipulation and 
instead engaging communicative touch to support the embodiment of natural patterns to achieve 
“natural posture.”
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3.4  SOMATIC IMAGE WORK AS PRAXIS
All somatic work depends heavily upon the use of imagery that arises from the perception 
of body patterns in the work of deep listening (used as a metaphor for all forms of attention) to 
sensory information. Anyone attending to their body will become aware of the constancy of its 
movement across all scales, from cellular “breathing” (their exchanges across membranes) to the 
large muscular coordinations that produce both movement and relative stillness. Todd’s images 
and  those  developed  by  her  inheritors  are  all  images  of  moving  pathways.  Todd’s  focus  is 
primarily mechanical, focusing on the transfer and holding of weight through the skeletal system.  
She emphasizes the degree to which humans share the same responses to gravity as both other 
creatures  and  other  material  structures.  Gravity  is  our  condition  and there  is  only  hope  for 
humans,  she might  say,  if  they can adequately  respond to  and transfer  that  force.  Practical,  
action-oriented, and directed at bodily wellness as an essential resistance to what Thoreau named 
our “quiet desperation” and Todd describes as our “strains,” her work can be seen as taking up 
the same insights that guide Emerson’s natural theology, within the arena of the human body. She  
too seeks to “get our bloated nothingness out of the path of the divine circuits,” imaging that 
circuitry within a map of the body.
This project is not one of simple negation, but rather discovery of, and obedience to, 
powerful connective pathways that are not immediately perceptible. This discovery then leads 
not to nihilism but to creation. As Laura Dassow Walls describes in Emerson's Life in Science:  
The Culture of Truth (Cornell UP, 2003), in the natural theological perspective that Emerson 
shared with Bacon and Coleridge among others, ideas of obedience and freedom were yoked 
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together, a duality characteristic of modernism and central to the hope that man both receives and  
makes  law:  “The  double  metaphor  of  organicism is  … modernism’s  icon,  holding its  deep 
paradoxes in restless suspension. We submit as organs of the transcendent whole; we command 
as agents of transcendence. By folding the two into mutually exclusive sides of a single process, 
we can be said to discover our truths and to make them too, to construct a nature and to submit to 
nature’s transcendence” (123). Walls goes on to identify the instances of felicity in Emerson’s 
“marvelous hybrid” of agency and material obedience as ecstatic, a going out of the self to see 
the  self  (which  is  Emerson’s  description  of  intellect’s  making  an  object  of  itself,  or  the 
impersonal action of thought). 
What makes Emerson’s descriptions of intelligence feel consonant with my experience 
(in a way that natural theology in general does not, with its anthropocentric rationalization of 
technological intelligence as law-making) is the intuition, grown from my own experience of 
somatic work, that if we take up physically the challenge of radical empiricism, we discover that 
obedience and freedom may not in fact be “mutually exclusive sides of a single process.” I don’t  
reject  Walls’s  characterization of Emerson’s science as this kind of  Janus-faced binding,  but 
rather suggest that there is latent in Emerson’s descriptions something that points beyond this 
“polar dualism” to a hybridity not conceptualized as a paradox, but as a both/and condition. 
Although the conceptual vocabulary of natural theology—of divine law patterning all nature— 
pervades Emerson’s work across the span of his life, there coexists in his essays a second sense 
of the relationship between law (that which characters) and matter (that which is charactered) 
which is not so neatly hierarchical. 
These  latencies  percolate  to  the  surface  in  essays  like  “Experience”  and  come  to 
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expression as they feed forward into William James’s work. In our own time, work on cognition 
strengthens  this  non-essentialist,  non-hierarchical  approach  to  hybridity.  For  example,  both 
Daniel Dennett and Douglas Hofstadter have offered descriptions of mind that deal with material 
and  conceptual  aspects  of  thinking  as  a  nested  series  of  networks  that  couple  biological 
determinism (the yes/no switch of syntactical firing) with the capacity to model, abstract, reflect, 
and  choose,  that  is,  to  exercise  what  we classically  call  “free  will.”  Instead  of  considering 
determinism and freedom to  be  mutually  exclusive,  and so  their  coexistence  in  the  brain a 
paradox,  both  describe  networks  of  networks,  effecting  each  other  with  both  upward  and 
downward causality (to and from higher-order patterns or “laws”). Additionally, neither draws a 
bright line between human and nonhuman capacities for the elements that make up our self-
awareness and language capabilities. In this sense they build on what Gregory Bateson set out in 
Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity: that modeling, calculation, and other forms of thinking 
that we have traditionally segregated from intelligence and named “instinct,” can be seen across 
nature.54 
Somatics develops the pairing of obedience and freedom in ways specific to our (human) 
bodily experience and physical intelligence. The body is a source for knowledge of patterns, but 
images can be intentionally applied and embodied to remake or retune these patterns. These 
images  are  not  simply  applied  at  whim,  however,  but  arise  in  the  first  place  through  the 
recognition of material analogy. In the feedback loop of re-education and the increase of strength 
and capacity that occurs in somatic work, there is a reciprocity between virtuality and physicality 
that  becomes  obvious  insofar  as  it  works:  change  happens.  Bodies  undergo  therapeutic 
54    The computational nature of natural process is explored in Leslie Valiant's Probably Approximately Correct:  
Nature's Algorithms for Learning and Prospering in a Complex World. (Basic Books, 2013.)
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renovation, and find new and surprising expressive capacities. 
Critically, this reciprocity is not something that functions only in ecstatic moments of 
clarity; it is something that can be approached, practiced, worked at. Indeed, although there are 
therapeutic  applications  that  might  have  a  physical  goal  in  mind, somatic  work is  generally 
approached as an ongoing, continually renewing practice, a “series of which we do not know the 
extremes.” Emerson’s exhortations sometimes seem far from this dailiness, as he charges his 
reader-respondents  with monumentally abstract tasks.  How, for example,  is  a  reader actually 
supposed to go forward with the project of discovering power in the “sharing of the nature of the 
world,” or get “in sympathy with the course of things,” or “[p]lace [oneself] in the middle of the 
stream  of  power  and  wisdom  which  animates  all  whom  it  floats”  (309)?  But  despite  the 
magnificence  of  these  ambitions,  calls  to  dailiness  and examples  of  practice  structures,  like 
Emerson’s journaling and Thoreau’s walking, are also spread across the essays. Committing to 
some kind of daily practice is the only practical response to his calls. 
Arsić too argues that Emerson is a philosopher of praxis, aligning his “practical power” 
with the kind of praxis called for by Karl Marx, in which the material and ideal combine to 
combat alienation and work becomes “human” again. “When contemplation traverses work,” she 
writes,  “labor  becomes a  sensuous activity that  sublates  the  distinction between subject  and 
object” (Leaving 84). She goes so far as to advance Emerson as an earlier diagnostician of the 
problems modernity presents to human life than those continental figures traditionally assigned 
to the role, such as Marx, Baudelaire (in the narrative advanced by Walter Benjamin), Nietzsche 
and  Kierkegaard.  The  practice  that  Emerson  proposes,  says  Arsić,  is  exactly  the  encounter 
between the material and ideal that Marx describes as a return to sensuous, meaningful labor. 
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Rather  than  reading  it  as  proto-pragmatic,  she  commits  to  transcendence,  here  not  a 
transcendence  into the  ideal  plane,  but  a  transcendence  as  confluence  of  the  subject-object 
division  through  a  “happy  romance”  of  genius  and  power.  “In  a  happy  hour,”  she  writes, 
invoking one of Emerson’s descriptions of felicitous confluence, “the material hand touches the 
immaterial” (84). What characterizes the newness that Emerson’s European readers recognized 
and responded to, she says, is “precisely this idea of attachments to the world through a new 
hand that restores without being appropriative, and of a thought that thinks within rather than 
against things, since that is what overcomes the metaphysical divide between subject and object” 
(85). This description strikingly recalls Hanna’s definition of somatics as the study of the body 
experienced from within its  life  processes.  In  fact  this  restorative  touch and thinking-within 
coincides  with  the  modalities  of  Todd’s  Natural  Posture  and  its  evolution  into  Body-Mind 
Centering,  as  it  combines  touch  and  image  work  to  receive,  redirect,  and  transformatively 
embody the cognitive, objective thinking of analogy, conjoining metaphorical abstraction and 
tactile materiality in a new health. 
4.  IMPERSONALITY, NATURAL HISTORY, EMBODIMENT
4.1. NATURAL HISTORY AS THE IT-SELF
I  want  to  think  of  the  impersonal  not  as  something  outside the  person,  but  as  what 
constitutes the onwardness, the growth, of a person. Approached through the modality of somatic 
work, Emersonian impersonality is found in the process of embodiment. So we could say that the 
embodiment  of  an  idea  or  image identified  within somatic  work is  a  specific  realization  of 
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impersonal power. This realization, like the one described in the end of “Experience,” is a “true 
romance,” a joining and blending through mutual attraction, of personal power (as consciously 
directed thought and action) and natural history (the resource and home of the body). Personal 
and  impersonal  power  here  reveal  themselves  as  forming  a  loop—a  “strange  loop”  in 
Hofstadter’s phrase. Before thinking more thoroughly about the process of embodiment, let me 
expand this figure of the loop. 
In my first chapter, I introduced Herwig Friedl’s exploration of the consonance of ideas 
of power in Emerson and Nietzsche, and his assertion that these two thinkers, beginning with 
Emerson and recognized and developed in Nietzsche’s reading of Emerson, represent a moment 
of epochal shift in the history of philosophy that marks, at least in the West, the beginning (or 
really renewal, if we consider the pre-Socratics) of “process philosophy.” Like Arsić, Friedl sees 
Emerson’s relinquishment of traditional  metaphysics (Arsić encapsulates that  tradition as the 
idea that thought rests) in favor of an always moving way of thinking as the marker of this new 
epoch. In a phrase Friedl brings from Heidegger, this new epoch of thinking is not generated by a 
new idea but  by a  new “dispensation of Being.” Arsić names this new epoch as  modernity. 
Friedl’s somewhat longer view leaves historical diagnoses aside, allowing for a reflection on 
epochs of thinking within ongoing “natural history.” 
These “natural” shifts in thinking come not from personal power or thought, but from 
impersonal  life:  “changes  in  thinking  that  may  constitute  the  beginning  of  an  epoch  occur 
because of the way the world or things reveal themselves and because of the way they are then 
seen before they are being questioned or answered.”  The felicitous vision that Emerson and 
Nietzsche both possess in this telling, is a capacity to see the way the world reveals itself, not 
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with the existing conceptual instruments with which we carry on our questioning and answering, 
but within a vision that would exist more fundamentally than this language. Friedl continues, 
“This kind of ontological change is realized by thinkers as a new and basic  intuition  or  vision 
provoked by Being rather than as fundamental assumptions or ideas simply and unaccountably 
generated and then held  by subjects” (269).  The realization being described here is  what  in 
Nature Emerson describes as the “coincidence” of the “axis of vision” with the “axis of things,” 
a coincidence that teaches “the language of facts” (EL 47). 
Attending to this same shift in thinking as part of a “natural history of pragmatism,” Joan 
Richardson gives particular attention to the function of imagination within this coincidence of 
vision and things, and her work with Emerson’s images helps to deepen the connection between 
Emerson and the image-work engaged in somatic embodiment. She places Emerson in a tradition 
inclusive of both philosopher-theologians like Jonathan Edwards and scientists like Newton and 
Darwin—a tradition of examining the “attention of the mind in thinking,” in Edwards’s phrase, 
and attention to natural process in its working. She emphasizes Emerson’s ongoing project to 
discover what he describes as “the necessary and structural action of the human mind.” Through 
self-scrutiny,  he  finds  that  images  are  not  devised  by  human minds  but  rather  “rise  up,”— 
producing a meeting-place of conscious language and nature through analogic images that seem 
to be sourced from beyond or below the deliberate intellect. In Friedl’s phrase, this rising up is 
“the way the world reveals itself.” In Cameron’s emphasis, this is impersonal intelligence. (To 
sound Todd’s  refrain:  “call  it  what  you like  … there  it  is  facing  you!”)  Like Darwin,  says  
Richardson,  Emerson saw mind not  as  a  metaphysical,  transcendental  power,  but  as  part  of 
natural history. Thus instead of taking up the economic thrust to convert  nature into culture, 
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Emerson tries to “transform, reconvert, culture/language into nature” (NHP 79).
This reconversion is part of the circular loop through “fate,” “power,” and “history,” that 
Friedl singles out in “The American Scholar” as Emerson’s epoch-shifted intuition: “There is 
never a beginning, there is never an end, to the inexplicable continuity of this web of God, but 
always circular power returning to itself” (EL 55). This circular power needs no split between 
subject  and  object.  Friedl  interprets  Emerson’s  circularity:  “Nature  speaks  and  the  thinker 
responds;  Being reveals  itself  as  both nature and mind,  as  and through a world of  possible 
correspondences without  origin or telos, without  center or delimitation” (271).  This intuition 
offers  some  relief  to  the  tedious  “problematization”  of  the  relationship  between  body  and 
language I have often encountered in thinkers who consider the body without actually engaging 
physical practice; being is both nature and mind—not a dualistic schism but, to recall Bateson’s 
phrase, “a necessary unity.” 
We can assign to “person” the role of the collector and user—the entertainer of images—
of the instruments fabricated from the rising up of images, the appearing and revealing of nature. 
We can maintain personal health by keeping in mind Emerson’s caution that we must always 
“suspect  our instruments,”  owing not  to  their  faulty  origin so much as  our  cultural  habit  of 
ossification,  grasping  and  fixing.  Taken  in  the  context  of  this  circular,  looping  image,  the 
unsettlement  produced  by  our  necessary  suspicion,  the  commitment  Cavell  singles  out  as 
“aversion,”  we  are  not  threatened  with  a  devastating  homelessness  when  seeking  out  our 
impersonal, but empowered to experience life as, in Friedl’s phrase, “a persistent, a continuous, a 
steady,  self-grounding of  [being]”  (272).  This  circularity,  a  kind  of  relay  of  personality  and 
impersonality, of vocabulary and nature’s renewing “language of facts,” is the basic movement 
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pattern of Emersonian self-culture—not at all that consolidation of property and identity that 
casual valences of “individualism” now suggest in our impoverished and vitriolic contemporary 
“talking America.” 
Commitment  to  this  circularity  demands a  commitment  to  our  natural  history,  where 
being finds its ground. As Darwin shows, natural history is not a fixed past, but a continually 
evolving present that contains both inherited and modified structures and reflexes that combine 
to  create  our  complex organisms.  So a  commitment  to  this  natural  history  would  also  be  a 
commitment to the unknown future of our own nature. Friedl writes: 
The past of the self, what Emerson calls its ‘condition,’ may be read as fate or it 
may be read as acts, as a series of active participations. This implies, at the same 
time, that the self may be said to incorporate an alien other, an ‘it,’ which she or 
he may accept as a yet-to-be-acknowledged phase of self-hood. Returning into 
‘it’-self, the human being may appropriate the alienated or forgotten other that 
usually shows itself as the natural history of the species. (emphasis added, 275)
This “it-self”  is  the impersonality  each person can acknowledge,  or “own” when it  appears.  
Instead  of  “owning  what  is  other,”  the  direction  of  the  circle—the rising  up  of  nature  into 
patterns  and  the  unsettling  of  provisional  identification—suggests  William James’s  proposal 
when he says that we might say “it thinks” just as we say “it rains,” that we identify our thinking 
not as the created action of “I,” but as that of a vague and unpossessed “it” of which “I” is one of  
innumerable nodes or “hot spot[s]” (Principles 224).
In these terms, we can say that somatic work is a process of finding the “it-self” of the 
practitioner as one of innumerable bodies grown from a participation in elements of life that are 
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both  alien  and  forgotten.  The  realization  of  somatic  work,  which  is  a  therapeutically  or 
expressively transformative embodiment of a pattern, is a realization of this ever-unfolding it-self  
through the grounding of the body—our natural history. 
4.2 A HISTORY OF NATURAL MOVEMENT
Throughout the somatic literature from Todd to Bainbridge Cohen, we meet reference to 
natural processes, and find articulated the goal of recuperating the natural through activating 
developmental and evolutionary patterns. A practitioner of Body Mind Centering, Kate Tarlow 
Morgan offers a history of the idea of “the natural” in somatic work and physical education. The 
educational practices she cites, from Ruth Doing’s Rhythms Program developed in the 1920’s, to 
BMC’s Developmental Movement Patterning, grounded in Irmgard Bartenieff's work and further 
explored by Bainbridge Cohen in the 1970’s, use the term “natural” to describe “what comes 
naturally and without direct instruction … that which we do not have to remember how to do” 
(“History of Rhythms,” 269). Linked to an array of progressive educational practices as broad as 
Dewey’s ideas for democratic education, the Physical Culture movement that equated physical 
and mental wellness, urban architectural reforms requiring more air and light in tenements, the 
loosening of Victorian restrictive clothing, the work of Todd, Alexander, as well as Dalcroze and 
Steiner, and the birth of Modern Dance as it  left the rigid verticality of Ballet  in favor of a 
movement developed from the natural curves of the spine and the body falling and recovering 
within (and not against) the condition of gravity, Morgan describes the lineage that runs between 
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Doing’s Rhythms and BMC as based in an effort  both to remember and embody the natural 
stages of development in childhood movement—learning by doing what is natural. Ruth Doing 
was particularly inspired by Ernst Haeckel’s theory that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” and 
built her rhythms lessons around the idea of evolutionary recapitulation (of the fish stage, the 
bird stage…). Although the specific understanding of that recapitulation has shifted away from 
Haeckel’s genetic suppositions, BMC involves practicing a recapitulative series of evolutionary 
movement organizations from pre-vertebrate movement patterns of vibration, sponging and navel 
radiation, to vertebrate patterns of spinal articulation, homologous movement around the midline,  
homolateral  movement  of  coordinated  body  sides,  and  contralateral  patterns  across  body 
diagonals that underly gross coordinations like walking. These natural movement patterns are 
discovered by allowing bodies to  show themselves learning,  and arise  naturally by allowing 
young bodies to move in an environment without intervention. Much of Bainbridge Cohen’s 
early  work  came  from  working  with  young  bodies  experiencing  a  disruption  of  normal 
development  due  to  illness,  and  she  eventually  came  to  hold  that  missed  embodiments  of 
individual developmental  patterns could underlie adult physical and emotional disabilities, or 
what Todd would call “our strains.” Thus part of the work in BMC is a recuperation of the 
experiential intelligence of the movement patterns developed in the first year of life. Todd too 
was  actively  working  against  developmental  physical  interventions,  specifically  the  social 
imposition of rigid verticality and the suppression of activity and noise in the well-behaved child.  
And as we recall, Todd described her work as “natural posture” before the term “Ideokinesis” 
came to be  identified  with her  particular  method of  approaching the  natural  by entertaining 
images.  But  consistent  across  all  these  methods  is  a  vocabulary  developed  through  the 
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observation of children, animals, and even vegetables, moving.55 
Whereas Doing was structuring a classroom that allowed children to experience a kind of 
movement freedom that would maximize natural movement and ward off repressive “unnatural” 
restraints in the developing intelligence of the child, Body-Mind Centering is often practiced by 
adults engaging in a recuperation of childhood patterns. In this recuperation, BMC recalls what 
Richardson describes as Emerson’s effort to convert culture to nature. Bainbridge Cohen terms 
this conversion or return, “embodiment.”
4.3 THE PROCESS OF EMBODIMENT IN BMC
In Bainbridge Cohen’s descriptive lineage of BMC, which lists  32 different  teachers, 
experiences, or studies that contributed to her particular education, she writes, “Andre Bernard 
and  Barbara  Clark,  in  the  tradition  of  Mabel  Elsworth  Todd,  taught  me  a  system  of 
neuromuscular reeducation. They carefully let me into my skeletal structure and brought forth 
great clarity and a sense of personal knowing with effortlessness and gentleness. From them I 
learned how to embody the Western map of the skeleton through the use of touch and anatomical 
imagery” (Sensing 190). This process of embodiment is extended, in BMC, beyond the skeletal 
system into the entire range of body systems. Bainbridge Cohen describes the work done in 
BMC as a process of embodying different structures in a cyclical sequence of three steps. The 
structures  to  be  embodied  range  across  different  body  systems:  organs,  tissues,  nervous, 
circulatory, lymphatic, and so on, as well as through a set of embryological processes. 
55     Vegetable movement is anything but still, and our “occult relations” seems less distant when their movement 
patterns can be studied in elapsed time. Darwin himself observed plants in “eating” and “waking” processes. A 
recent television documentary “What Plants Talk About” (Nature, April 3, 2013) provides astonishing time-lapse 
footage of plant roots in movement that, viewed in this new time frame, remarkably resemble animals. 
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The process of embodiment, in the terms of our Emersonian discussion, is a recuperation 
of, and resettling in, the body’s natural history. Cohen describes the cycle through three stages, 
invoking in her language a movement from self-awareness to direct experience, a transition I 
understand as a movement through the personal (the I who thinks) into the impersonal (the body 
I am). (William James describes a similar sequence when he says that paying attention to the 
stream of thought, he realizes it consists chiefly in a stream of breath: “The “I think” which Kant 
said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the “I breathe” which actually does accompany 
them” (“Does Consciousness Exist?”  37).) The first stage is visualization, “the process by which 
the brain imagines aspects of the body and, in so doing, informs the body that it  (the body) 
exists.” In visualization, she explains, the practitioner acts as her own guide: “after looking at a 
picture of a particular structure in the body, hold the image in mind as you search to become 
aware of that part of your body (inner kinesthetic vision).” The second stage is somaticization, 
“the process by which the kinesthetic (movement), proprioceptive (position) and tactile (touch) 
sensory systems inform the body that it (the body) exists.” In somaticization, there is not a guide 
directing the action, but instead a “witness, an inner awareness of the process.” In somaticization 
the practitioner becomes aware of what is happening in a part of the body, or initiates movement 
from that  part  of  the  body in order  to  become aware  of  it.  In  the  third stage  of  the  cycle, 
embodiment,  the  awareness  no  longer  rests  in  the  personal  mind,  but  is  released  to  the 
intelligence of the body. Having awoken, or activated a  part  of the body through a directed 
process, stepped away from a controlling role by trading direction for witnessing, embodiment is 
the  stage  where  the  body  resource  in  question  is  recuperated,  and  acts  on  its  own  behalf. 
Bainbridge Cohen writes: 
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Embodiment is the cells’ awareness of themselves.  You let go of your conscious  
mapping. It is a direct experience; there are no intermediary steps or translations. 
There is  no guide,  no witness.  There is  the fully known consciousness  of  the 
experienced moment initiated from the cells themselves. In this instance, the brain 
is the last to know. There is complete knowing. There is peaceful comprehension. 
Out  of  this  embodiment  process  emerges  feeling,  thinking,  witnessing, 
understanding. The source for this process is love. (190)
It  is  striking  to  me  how  much  this  description  of  embodied  knowing  recalls  Emerson’s 
description  of  our  being  as  “resting  in  the  lap  of  an  immense  intelligence.”  The  immense 
intelligence  here  is  not  encountered  as  the  mind of  god or  all  of  nature,  but  as  the  body’s  
astonishing multiplicity of cells that combine into tissues that combine into systems that combine 
to produce, among other things, “feeling, thinking, witnessing, understanding,” —or we could 
say, the things we like to take personally. Drawn onward by love (or Cavell's “attraction”) into 
embodiment  as  practical  power,  the  transforming body of  the BMC practitioner  experiences 
medial selfhood. 
5. EXPERIENCING IMMENSE INTELLIGENCE AS A PHYSICAL HERITAGE
5.1 MORE THAN LANGUAGE
In my first chapter, I discussed the connotations of Emerson’s descriptions of intelligence 
as something we rest in,  arguing that throughout his  sustained call  to skepticism toward our 
instruments of calculation, he records recurring experiences of intelligence as an ingress from 
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below  or  behind  the  eyes,  and  describes  this  intelligence  as  an  experience  of  fulness  and 
belonging, the key to participation in nature. In “Self-Reliance” this intelligence is figured as a 
lap in which we lie, invoking a maternal image that points back to the common origin, prior to  
individuation of  persons or even cells,  that  each body shares with its  parental  and ancestral 
sources. Cavell, in the vein of Heidegger’s claim that “language is the house of being,” takes this 
“intelligence”  to  mean  language  (ETE  140).  But  although  I  find  Cavell’s  etudes  intimately 
compelling, as he works his way through Emerson’s language for its resonances, its charges, and 
its claim on his reader as a kind of inheritance, I find this a too-narrow circumscription of the 
intelligence that I, like Friedl, prefer to think of as our natural history. Language is not the only 
trans-historical inheritance in which our thinking is grounded, and indeed the capabilities that 
make our participation in language possible do not emerge out of air, or out of reason, or out of  
some ineffable thing that separates the human from the rest of nature, but from our bodies and 
our situation in an environment we must navigate in order to sustain ourselves. Studies of infant 
development, for example, show that our earliest capacity to model—to recognize types of things
—arises  in  the mouth,  not  as  speech but  as  tactile  modeling.56 Thus the  body underlies  the 
representative action that is so marvelously held and shared in language, just as language needs 
excitement to be meaningful, moving. This tactile energy that joins with conceptual clarity is 
described by Emerson as “fasten[ing] words to things.” In relation to this, recall Stein's fastening 
of  that  description  to  pleasure,  countering  the  claim  of  someone's  not  having  “gotten”  the 
meaning of her writing by saying, that anything enjoyed has been understood.
Emerson recognizes  that physical  conditions  and forces  form an inescapable layer  of 
56    For an accessible account of early tactile modeling within the developing intelligence in infant minds, see 
What’s Going On In There? How the Brain and Mind Develop in the First Five Years of Life, by Lise Eliot (New 
York: Bantam, 2000).
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human experience, but tends to use those recognitions as metaphors in service of the erosion of 
egotistical holdings. For example in “Nominalist and Realist” he writes:
The magnetism which arranges tribes and races in one polarity, is  alone to be 
respected; the men are steel-filings. Yet we unjustly select a particle and say, ‘O 
steel-filing  number  one!  what  heart-drawings  I  feel  to  thee!… Let  us  go  for 
universals; for the magnetism, not for the needles. Human life and its persons are 
poor empirical pretensions. (EL 577)
And in The Over-Soul: 
Man is a stream whose source is hidden. Our being is descended into us from we 
know not whence.… I am constrained at every moment to acknowledge a higher 
origin for events than the will I call mine. 
As with events, so it is with thoughts. When I watch that flowing river, which, out 
of regions I see not,  pours for a season its streams into me, I see that I am a 
pensioner;  not  a  cause,  but  a  surprised  spectator  of  this  ethereal  water;  that  I 
desire and look up, and put myself in the attitude of reception, but from some 
alien energy the visions come. (EL 385)
But these magnetisms and this fluid nature are not simply metaphors—as Emerson knew from 
his reading in science, they are actual conditions of material bodies, impersonal because they 
form  a  condition  that  exceed  any  particular  “thought  which  is  called  I.”  Taking  seriously 
Emerson’s location of human life as natural and in nature, and the fruits of human artifice as 
natural too, I find a latent claim in Emerson that the “immense intelligence” which constitutes 
being and meaningful belonging extends to all parts of our material intelligence, not just the 
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language parts. 
Practices  like  BMC  represent  a  rare  attempt  to  take  material  intelligence  seriously. 
Consider for example the different assumptions in the therapeutic approaches to depression of 
BMC and neuro-chemical medicine. Identifying an imbalance, BMC seeks to recuperate, through 
stimulation  of  natural  patterning  in  action,  the  functioning  of  the  body  that  promotes  that 
balance. Medicine seeks to inhibit or shut off particular chemical productions, or artificially add 
to them. While there is emergency value in these interventions, these brain drugs strike me as a  
calculator’s  approach to  mental  wellness.  If  nature  really  does  “hate  calculators”  (EL 483), 
wouldn’t wellness more likely be sustained by allowing the body’s intelligence to emerge?
5.2 BODY MINDED 
One emphasis of BMC is the experience of the different “minds” of the different body 
systems.  The  practitioner  takes  a  tour  through  the  “immense  intelligence”  of  the  body,  by 
bringing different  systems,  tissues,  or  movement  patterns  into  focus  through  the  process  of 
visualization,  somaticization,  and embodiment.  In embodiment  the “mind” of each system is 
experienced directly, without intervention from the directing mind that we commonly designate 
as human intelligence. BMC situates human intelligence within an impersonal, extra-“human” 
intelligence, and looks for approaches to the experience of that wider mind. 
It is a principle of BMC that every cell has mind, that cells as they combine into specific  
tissues and then to body systems, have differentiated minds, and thus that one’s own body can be  
approached as a vast, heterogeneous intelligence. (See Fig. 1 for a capsule of the different body 
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systems  identified  in  BMC,  and  the  broad  attributes  of  the  mind  of  those  systems.)  This 
mindedness is not defined by the capacity to reason, but rather by a much broader description of 
thinking: perception, choice, responsiveness, coordination of action. Finding the mind of each 
system is also a way into what Emerson might call a new mood, and these moods are surprising.
Of all the minds sought out, the “baseline” practice of BMC is “cellular consciousness” 
approached through attention to cellular breathing, or exchange across membranes. Bainbridge 
Cohen describes cellular consciousness as a purely present-tense mind in distinction to nervous 
system consciousness, which records and repeats experience and therefore holds what we know 
about  how  to  move  through  the  world.  Coming  into  cellular  consciousness  involves  an 
abandonment of nervous system consciousness. Recalling Emerson’s watery description of man 
as “a source whose stream is  hidden,” Bainbridge Cohen describes cellular consciousness as 
directly linked to our natural history, the evolutionary history of cells, a primary location of the  
“circular power” that is always returning to itself: 
It is the first organic pattern of living cells—the exchange of gasses through the 
ebb  and  flow  of  fluids  passing  through  membranes.  It  is  initially  established 
within the earth’s oceans and continues within each of our cells immersed in the 
internal sea of our bodies. Through cellular breathing, we experience life force.” 
(Sensing 161)
Beginning each session with attention to cellular breathing, the practice of BMC thus moves 
through a gesture of aversion, turning away from the accumulated forms of knowledge in order 
to try to experience the body in the present—a measure of “where … we find ourselves” on a 
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particular day. 
From this  baseline,  a  BMC lesson  might  move  toward  any  of  the  body  systems or 
developmental  patterns,  providing  experience  of  different  moods,  or  different  minds.  These 
different minds are experienced through the cyclical process described above, beginning with 
direct visualization of and touch or sounding into a body area, and moving toward embodiment. 
The  different  moods  manifest  physically  as  moving  temperaments,  and  it  is  through  the 
movement experience that this mind is felt, through physical actions that the “vocabulary” of this 
mind’s potential action (its “language of facts”) is recognized and then recorded in the nervous 
system and memory. In my own studio experience of BMC, where teachers have led lessons of a 
few hours focusing on a single organ, body system, or developmental pattern,  I find myself 
moving very differently than I might characteristically move when I go into the studio. I discover 
“new and excellent region[s]” (EL 484), discover unfamiliar tonalities, or capacities to carry out 
movements  I  wouldn’t  have  thought  myself  capable  of  and  wouldn’t  have  known  how  to 
approach intentionally.57  Not only do I experience an appreciation of the real power of a moving 
57    One of the ways I have understood this experience of finding a strange mood in my body is in the way that 
different body systems carry different varieties of weightedness and see different possible avenues for action and  
relating to space. For example, my dance education tended to stress the muscular-skeletal system, with a priority on 
thinking geometrically about the lines of the skeleton and on understanding muscles primarily for their capacity to 
articulate or stabilize joints (as opposed to, for example, dealing with them as tissue or looking at the muscular 
relationship to the way habitual information is stored (and changed) in the fascia). Focusing on the skeleton suggests 
reliance on particular plumb lines of balance and options for movement, and in addition my particular interest in the 
shoulder girdle led me to experience those options as relating to directional ideas that followed the line or curve of 
the arm's bones, leading to an architecturally light and precise mood that emphasizes the formal scale of a body in a  
particular space and the extension, in a graphical or design sense, of line beyond the range of my own wingspan. As  
a counter-mood to this, I think of a session during my BMC studies, exploring the organ system and in particular 
movement initiated from the heart. In such an exploration, a class usually starts by lying on the floor and directing 
internal attention to the organ, with some information from the teacher about what the organ does in its basic 
function. Next, we would try to stimulate that region through touch or sound vibration, and that might be followed 
into movement patterns that also send vibration, pressure, or weight into that region. One of the ways to activate the 
region of the heart is to take a crawling position and pump minutely up and down, pushing through the palms of the 
hand into the floor or taking small lifts that land the palms onto the floor without any give in the elbows. The 
vibration or shock travels up the arms into the chest. After those preparatory stages, we would follow into movement 
explorations as soon as we felt our attention was fully shifted to the region we were trying to activate (to bring 
forward out of automatic functioning). In those heart explorations I distinctly recall a new overall tonality of my 
180
body, but I also experience my body as something “strange and wholly new” (271), a “house 
founded on the sea” (696). 
That the experience is both strange and natural—a surprise to who I think I am, but also a 
welcome discovery of  what I am—signals its appropriateness as a venue for encountering the 
“circular  power”  that  Emerson  describes:  a  power  that  is  both  always  leaving  and  always 
returning  to  itself.  The  impersonality  recuperated  in  the  practice  of  BMC  is  not  a  giddy 
projection of a massive abstraction, but rather an unsettling of body and person: a loosening and 
widening of personality through the expressive event of movement initiated from the intelligence 
of body tissues that go under-stimulated in our sitting, chattering, screen-obsessed physical lives 
in “this our talking America.” Leading to sensing, feeling, and self-aware expressivity of action, 
the impersonal here is in continual loop with the person—the holding, recording, possessor of a 
coherent accumulation of experience.
dancing, having to do with the both protective and valiant or strong experiences that an activated chest occasions,  
along with a holding of my arms and shoulder girdle which followed lines of protection and support, or formed a 
cage for rolling or pushing, rather than my habitual architectural or linear sense of skeleton. It is very hard to put  
into words the real quality of this difference, but I count these occasions as the venues of the most fascinating and 
surprising experiences I have had, these identifications of an “I who dances” who does not resemble the one I am  
accustomed to. 
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5.3 CONCLUSION
I have tried to speak for somatic physical practice as a resource for understanding what 
Emerson means when he speaks of the impersonal,  and of impersonal power, as well  as for 
actually following Emerson's prompts in thinking about how to live, how to find (and found) 
ourselves. Through somatic work, the identification with the nonhuman becomes a thing I can 
approach, a thing I can practice. The surprises that it offers through my deferral to the body's  
intelligence  keeps  that  approach  away  from  the  dangers  of  calculation,  or  dry  repetition, 
maintaining this daily work as a “process of indirection.” It becomes a method, or a way, of  
addressing myself to the impersonal, and to the “circulation” that Emerson acknowledges both 
sanity and health of the body require. Emerging from these sessions, I may find that something in 
me has been re-charactered, re-patterned. 
To find myself re-patterned is to find I have left my habit. This outcome, this leaving, is 
described  by  both  Cavell  and  Arsić  as  the  meaning  of  Emersonian  self-culturing.  One 
manifestation of that self-culturing is Thoreau's Walden, which Cavell identifies as teaching both 
its author and its reader first to inhabit and then to leave. Somatic practice offers another kind of 
self-culturing, critically one that can be taken up in cities. While there is no city that expels  
nature,58 city life does threaten to emphasize the human (taken in Aristotle's sense of the political  
being)  and  the  technological  at  the  expense  of  nature  (or  life  considered  non-
anthropocentrically),  making  us  amnesiacs  of  our  natural  history.  If,  as  Friedl  reads  with 
Emerson and Nietzsche, being finds its ground through its circular return to natural history, then 
58    See Bruno Latour's We Have Never Been Modern (Boston: Harvard UP, 1993) for an illuminating argument 
against an idea of nature would be opposed to culture, or urbanity, or modernity.
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good health and sanity would require some way of committing to this ongoing return. It has been 
my argument  here  that  the  natural  history  we embody is  a  profound and direct  context  for 
discovering the ways in which we are part of nature—the ways we are both the “me” and the 
“not-me” that Emerson demands we come to know. In my next chapter, I will turn to creative 
performance practices which structure spaces and times of clearing—their own kind of retreat to 
Walden Pond—in which to practice that same commitment. 
Emerson is a profoundly recuperative writer, building reference, citation, and rewriting 
(of his own phrases, of those he has read) into his essays. He understands the way that the figures  
of language, as transmitted and recapitulated across the history of literature and embedded in the 
very words we use to speak and write, form the habits and possibilities of a person's reflective 
thinking, and that this is an evolving process whose fossils are our texts. In the transition from 
this chapter's study of the physical body to the third chapter's consideration of philosophical 
bodies and scenes of creative work, I propose to continue to entertain the idea of philosophy as a  
project of recuperation of an impersonal moving intelligence. 
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CHAPTER THREE
Fragment Assignments: Eight Approaches to the Sound of Philosophy
“How do we understand something? We understand something by approaching it. How do we approach something?  
We  approach  it  from  any  direction.  We  approach  it  using  our  eyes,  our  ears,  our  noses,  our  intellects,  our  
imaginations. We approach it with silence. We approach it with childhood. We use pain or embarrassment. We use  
history. We take a safe route or a dangerous one. We discover our approach and follow it.” 
—Matthew Goulish, 39 Microlectures in proximity of performance 
“To work deliberately in the form of the fragment can be seen as stopping or appearing to stop a work closer, in the  
process, to what Blanchot would call the origin of writing, the centre rather than the sphere. … It can be seen as a  
response to the philosophical problem of seeing the written thing replace the subject of the writing. If we catch only  
a little of our subject, or only badly, clumsily, incoherently, perhaps we have not destroyed it. We have written about  
it, written it and allowed it to live on at the same time, allowed it to live on in our ellipses, our silences.” 
—Lydia Davis, “Form as a Response to Doubt”
Prologue: The shape it takes
“A series of accidents brought you to this book,” writes Matthew Goulish. Here are the 
accidents that brought me to this chapter.
My son Harvey passed a restless night (he is bringing in a molar). As he finally was 
sleeping deeply, just before dawn, I lay in bed thinking about my friend Stefania’s archives-rich 
chapter on Muriel Rukeyser’s Houdini play. I wondered why I had shaped a dissertation that did 
not call for archival research, and then remembered my trip to the Amherst archives, when I was 
five months pregnant, to look at  the fragments of writing Emily Dickinson left on pieces of 
envelope and parcel paper. 
I went to look at the fragments because they sounded interesting. I learned about them 
during Susan Howe’s visit to our seminar a few years before. She passed around photocopies of 
lace work and poems written in the shape of collars on envelope parts. I had made a prospectus 
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for a chapter on Dickinson that revolved around virtual games, imaginative assignments, and the 
incompletion of the fragments seemed potentially suggestive. I knew Amherst had a collection of 
Fluxus boxes that also contain virtual games and imaginative assignments, so I decided to read 
the fragments and the boxes side by side, to see if they spoke to each other. I didn't find anything  
definite to pursue in the linkage, but I left with a file of digital images of a set of fragments I  
thought might make a good score for a dance, if you can imagine a score being generated freely 
from a sentence (like, say, the dances of Deborah Hay, which treat sentences as both assignments 
and conditions). 
My dissertation never made it  to the Dickinson chapter,  as the experience of reading 
Emerson  in  the  months  after  Harvey  was  born  became  so  full  and  rich  that  the  opening 
background chapter on Emerson sprouted from one into two, swerving the original prospect of 
the  project’s  range.  But  this  morning  as  I  lay  next  to  Harvey  and  his  emerging  tooth,  I 
remembered the trip to the archives, and the fragments that suggest the atmosphere of a several-
part dance, and this in turn recalled to mind an essay by Goulish, “A Transparent Lecture,” which 
contemplates Morton Feldman’s musical scores laid out in shapes of Turkish rugs, and has in its 
middle, an “essay in the shape of a bridge collapsing,” which takes as its structural constraints 
(on its numbers of sentences and sections) the measurements of the pieces of Tacoma bridge after 
it collapsed in a wind storm. The example of this essay prompted me to imagine a chapter that 
takes its formal structure from the Dickinson fragments, use them as constraints through which 
to ask this chapter’s questions about what happens when philosophical essays do not take the 
shape of  traditional  arguments,  but  of something else.  Could I  write  an essay on Emerson's 
philosophical commitments in the form of a series of assignments from Emily Dickinson? 
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(Pause to listen to Erik Satie’s Three pieces in the form of a Pear.) 
Emerson himself calls for such behavior on the part of the scholar, asks that we rewrite 
our sacred texts, asks that we give ourselves permission to learn the necessary measure of our 
own “meter-making argument” without awaiting sanction from other sources. Why should I not 
also entertain an original relation to this material? 
In this chapter I have granted myself permission to write by neighboring, instead of by 
advancing an argument. (What does it mean to write by neighboring, by approaching without 
arriving, by persisting nearby? It seems like an architectural prompt.)  What I want to think about 
is: what is the shape of the room that neighbors philosophy? What is the feeling of a house 
whose inhabitants carry philosophical commitments? What is written on the page that lingers 
near a long-carried question or intuition? I want to think in a choreographic mode (that is, in time 
and space) about essays that give themselves permission to come close to a question without 
necessarily facing it, that do not face forward and demonstrate their conclusions. About essays 
that do not always face their audience, but do welcome them into the area of their being. The 
writer and reader do not focus on each other, but take their seat at different positions, addressing 
themselves to the question at hand. (This is the kind of permission that a grounding in modern 
dance offers; where ballet’s rotation was developed so that a dancer might move in all directions 
without  ever  turning  to  face  away  from the  royal  audience,  modern’s  basic  parallel  (in  its 
founding  generation)  and  insistence  that  there  is  no  center  or  front-facing  (in  its  second 
generation) drops the burden of explanation and demonstration, and rethinks audience as a group 
of nearby witnesses of a field of action.) 
I  once  studied  dancing  with  Shelly  Senter,  a  longtime  member  of  Trisha  Brown’s 
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company, who incorporated Alexander Technique into her teaching. We would do these very 
simple exercises, exercises I think of in poetics terms as experimental copulas. One was: walk 
forward across the room and say aloud, I am walking backward. Then, walk backward and say, I  
am walking forward. The statements turns out to be true somehow. What is a facing? Don’t we, 
like mountains, have something we could call faces on all our sides? We must be very generous 
with our attention to feel that the back of the performer is inviting us to neighbor, not closing us 
out. But once we do, we can start reading the performance in radiant dimensions. In physical 
presence, information that comes in otherwise than directly from the front and center is as much 
a part of the transmission as what sits easily in focus. How might this translate to essay form?
This  chapter  entertains  these  questions:  How  might  philosophy  sound?  What  does 
philosophical  thinking feel  like? How far afield might philosophy move? Can we find it  on 
strange pages? Can we find it in strange rooms?
I  spent  a  full  half  of  my  performance  of  Another  Tree  Dance with  my back to  the 
audience. I covered my back in my grandmother’s red and cream reversible silk coat, and we all 
looked out on all sides together through a series of scenes. This is just to say, this chapter will not  
face its question but, with Dickinson’s direction, persist nearby, take seven approaches to its 
neighborhood. 
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Fig. 1.  Emily Dickinson, Fragment 822a
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1.  And the Seasons take their hushed places like figures in a Dream
“sunk in its greenness, breathing its own order…”  —Anne Carson, “In Praise of Sleep”
Dislogic, intuition, revulsion, wonder. What governs the choice of how to order these 
things? Writing on philosophy’s sleep side can be considered a question of arrangement. The 
phrase “sleep side” comes from Anne Carson’s essay “In Praise of Sleep,” and I marshall it here 
in relation to the realm of experience that seems to take place almost wholly beside “the broad 
daylight of our ordinary memory,” which Proust named in contradistinction to the not-so-broad 
light of the  memoire involuntaire  which darts through the worm-hole reticulations of the deep 
registers of memory. This is  a realm with many names. I prefer Carson’s name to most others 
(the uncanny, the unconscious, the irrational, the real, the natural). Mac Wellman also makes 
wonderful names for this other space: the condition of radiants, Hoole’s Hole, Wild Time. The 
freedom to make good names would seem to be a sonic necessity of artist philosophy, and one of 
the disappointments of academic philosophy has got to be the way technical language thwarts the 
shiver and pleasure of naming. 
I adopted Carson’s “sleep side” into my phrase book years before I knew what use I  
would have for it, mostly because she introduces it while recounting a dream that bears a striking 
resemblance  to  a  recurring  dream  that  marks  my  own  childhood,  a  dream  of  entering  my 
grandmother’s  living  room at  night  and finding it  altered,  open to  new dimensions.  Carson 
describes a dream in which she enters into her living room and finds it both identical to her living 
room and strangely changed. The room is green-toned, like the chair from my grandmother’s 
living room that I took after she died, and also like the great green room of Goodnight Moon, a 
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spooky and lovely room, which I revisit many nights now that I have a small son who requires 
accompaniment into sleep. Carson’s dream came when she was three; it is an early memory of 
discovering the strange, and she says she explained it to herself “by saying I had caught the 
living room sleeping. I had entered it  from the sleep side” (20). The existence of the living 
room’s sleep side, she goes on to say, is “supremely consoling,” despite its strangeness and its 
prefiguration for her of the bewilderment within her own house that marks her father’s later 
dementia:  “it  was  and  remains  for  me  a  consolation  to  think  of  it  lying  there,  sunk  in  its 
greenness, breathing its own order, answerable to no one … in a true sense something incognito 
at the heart of our sleeping house” (20). Sleep, she says, is to be praised because it gives us this 
“glimpse of something incognito.”
Throughout his writing Emerson uses language of hints, glimmers, glances, glimpses, and 
like Carson he suggests that the opulence that can be glimpsed is always near at hand, but hidden 
by  our  usual  looking.  (Carson  calls  it  the  living  room's  “propaganda,”  as  if  the  daylight 
appearance  of  the  world  was  purposefully  reductive  and  obscuring  of  its  real  power.)  In 
“Experience” he describes our waking life as a kind of half-sleep, invoking an old parable of 
entry into the world of person as crossing a threshold where we are given a cup of lethe to drink, 
“that we may tell no tales.” Even waking, we remain sleepy, a kind of inverse sleep to the real 
wakefulness of that other side, producing a confusion of light and darkness: “Sleep lingers all our 
lifetime about our eyes, as night hovers all day in the boughs of the fir tree. All things swim and 
glitter” (EL 471). Swimming and glittering is a condition of being half-wrapped in something 
like sleep. (This parable occurs before the essay takes a turn away from the idea of a real world 
of thought rendered in some inaccessible clarity, and, anticipating William James, turns toward 
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surfaces as the only grounds of consciousness.) Some readers (Barbara Packer, for example) take 
a more despairing sense from the line that all things swim and glitter, feeling it marks a condition 
of alienation from a real  and solid world obscured from us by the haze of sleep. I  find the 
description  obvious  and  delightful.  My  pleasure  with  this  condition  of  moving  with  tactile 
information on all sides (swimming has no front facing) and absent clear vision (the things glitter 
and cannot be seen straight), my comfort with the idea of the hovering night in the interior of the 
tree’s spread, I think derives from having what Susan Rethorst calls “a choreographic mind.” A 
choreographic mind is governed by a spatial sense instead of a narrative sense, more particularly 
by a spatial sense experienced as operating not in a pictorial space  in front of one, but in the 
round,  as  what  dancers  call  kinesphere—the area  described by the  reach of  the  body in  all 
directions. Engaging back space, swimming rather than surveying, sounds to me like what we do 
when we think.
This roundness of thought’s kinesphere—the space that radiates out in all directions from 
the metaphorical line of linear narrative—is where theater takes place, according to Wellman, 
whose  “Speculations”  speaks  for  the  process  of  finding  strangeness  and  investigates  the 
experience of the term in an extremely long series of aphoristic statements. The combination of 
strangeness and finitude, joined not by rationalism or narrative presets, but by wild connectors, 
creates what Wellman calls “apparence,” the theatrical event in which something new is realized. 
Getting our thinking into this space where apparence happens is an action with philosophical 
commitments; in its coinage Wellman follows Kant's “apperception” into the theatron as a space 
for showing and so appearing. Preferring mathematical imagery to invoke this space, he calls it, 
using Willard Gibbs’s  term,  “phase  space.”  Phase  space  is  the  representation of  all  possible 
192
manifestations of a system in a multidimensional plot. Graphically it poses a way to imagine 
making theater outside the constraints of the “line” or “arc” of the classical plot.  In Wellman's 
hands, phase space offers not just the fruitfulness of something new, but the vertigo of complete 
disorientation. If “Speculations” demonstrates a particular philosophical commitment, it is to the 
relative value of swimming (plunging) and glittering (appearing) in phase space, as opposed to 
the “already known” “clock time” of “Geezer Theatre” (note the -re ending to signal the Geezer's 
British fetish) with its prefabricated, moralizing circuits. If the linear plot of those circuits is so 
deadening  to  the  possibility  of  getting  into  phase  space  (he  describes  that  getting-out  as  a 
function of “vertical narrative” in contrast to the image of the x-axis timeline), then the question 
of order seems basic to the question of making theater. Given that theater always moves forward 
in  time  (though  the  intense  theatrical  experience  of  time's  measure  can  make  the  forward 
movement yield elasticity), how might the order of events also create an experience of moving 
laterally, vertically, cross-dimensionally? How does something proceed that is “sunk in its own 
greenness, breathing its own order”?
It  is  a  truism  of  creative  work  that  it  is  possible  to  listen  to  the  emergent 
object/play/fiction for its  own direction.  Call  this  task listening for  greenness.  Call  this task 
listening for the movement of the breath. Just as with somatic work's project of listening for the 
intelligence of one's body scripts an approach to re-grounding the self (explored in my discussion  
of Friedl in Chapter 2), composing a thing by listening for its own order structures an approach 
to the  sleep side of its sequence, which might offer our imaginations (not by theories but by 
consoling glimpses) new circuits of understanding the mysteries of cause and effect. Traditional 
plot demands a moment of crisis, but in a theater that does not concede that privileged climax, 
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crisis, or, to use some terms with which Cavell describes Emerson's motions, transfiguration and 
deformation might occur  anywhere within the phase space of a system, and may occur many 
times over. Merce Cunningham says as much: “Now I can't see that crisis any longer means a 
climax, unless we are willing to grant that every breath of wind has a climax (which I am), but  
then that obliterates climax, being a surfeit of such.”59
I translate Dickinson’s “seasons” into theatrical vocabulary as spells, durations, episodes, 
scenes, or events. They take their places (breathing their own order), she tells us, “like figures in 
a dream.” Listen to the image again: and the seasons take their hushed places like figures in a  
dream. It sounds like a description of a dance, or maybe of the beginning of a dance. It even 
reminds  me  of  old  formal  dances,  like  the  anti-masque  ballet  that  would  occur  within  a 
Renaissance Masque, or like the second act of so many story ballets, which traditionally takes 
place on the creatural or spectral side of the story (with the swans, the wilis, 60 the sylphs, the 
shades). Figures in  a  dream tend to  possess  a  compelling  logic of  arrangement  that  is  also 
dissonant with our daylight expectations of narration. (And then X, who was also Y, somehow 
turned into Z… I went into the kitchen which was also my childhood living room and also the 
state of Montana…) A choreographic mode of composition is comfortable in these other tracks, 
connecting its sections by the “subterranean and invisible tunnels and channels” that contrast 
with the orderly turnpikes of village life (EL 482). Maybe because choreography is a temporal 
but generally, since modernism, not a narrative art, choreographers embody a kind of “ear” for 
connection that is guided by a non-explanatory sense. A sense in the round.61
59    Quoted in Roger Copeland, Merce Cunningham: The Modernizing of Modern Dance. 65
60    The underknown Wilis are the phantom women who dance men to death, the spectral posse claiming the heroine 
of the story ballet Giselle. 
61    Obviously it is impossible to generalize on behalf all choreographers, but in my watching and reading I mark a 
consistent engagement of this non-explanatory approach to moving forward in performance's time. To situate my 
reference to this kind of thinking within an array of choreographers whose work I have seen or participated in  
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Choreographic  thinking  offers  a  compositional  approach  to  the  task  Thoreau  called 
speaking a word for nature, speaking a word for what in us has more allegiance to all matter than 
it does to the particularly human or particularly controlling (to explaining), and so speaking a 
word for the human experience of swimming and glittering through the “flitting state” of our 
“brief encampment” in this body. Choreographic composition—of dances, of essays, of stories—
begins  with  a  sensitivity  to  neighboring,  facing,  and  joining.  Choreographic  composition  is 
always prepared to discover something hidden in what it began with, and to follow the path that 
thing points  toward.  Choreographic  composition  is  comfortable  with  weird  joinings  because 
bodies in time and space will always make transition happen (they are always there, moving 
forward in time). Matthew Goulish: “Join the form to the processes of the mind and body. Call  
this join Sense. How then do we inhabit the music?” (“Transparent” 179). 
developing, let me offer the following names as an incomplete but sufficient assignment for further viewing: Susan 
Rethorst, Tere O'Connor, Bebe Miller, Chris Yon, Ivy Baldwin, Ohad Naharin, Pina Bausch, William Forsythe, 
Adrienne Truscott, David Neumann. 
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Fig. 2.  Emily Dickinson, Fragment 254
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2.  Incredible the lodging, but limited the guest
“I wish to speak a word for Nature.” — Thoreau, “Walking”
Emerson describes the human condition in oscillating images. In low spectrums he recalls  
us to our fragmentary being, one among “a million fresh particulars,” admonishing: “You are one 
thing,  but  nature  is  one  thing,  and  another  thing,  in  the  same  moment.”  This  proliferating 
expanse “insults the philosopher,” who generalizes without realizing his own partiality (EL 581). 
Elsewhere he calls from the widest expanse of this range: “I am nothing; I see all” (EL 10). 
These exaggerations record the “pour[ing]”,  “convuls[ing]”, “slid[ing]”, envelop[ing]” influx of 
“[t]hat power…which makes the whole and particle its equal channel” (EL 555). 
Cavell, claiming Emerson as a philosopher, though not of the generalizing kind Emerson 
describes, says we can think of philosophy as a voice. That voice belongs to no one person, but  
speaks  on  behalf  of  the  human,  of  the  living,  speaks  neutrally  to  an  uncertain  future.  Yet 
philosophy is written and spoken by individuals, produced by hands and mouths. What “limited 
guest”  can be authorized to  speak or write  on behalf  of such “incredible lodging[s]” as  the 
condition of life? Cavell suggests the speaker position is taken up in an “arrogation,” a claim of 
the  right  to  speak  on  behalf  of  the  human  compelled  by  the  discovery  of  “philosophical 
commitments” in one’s own life. Proposing philosophy and autobiography as each “a dimension 
of the other,” he cites Emerson’s claim in “The American Scholar” that “the deeper the scholar 
dives into his privatest, secretest presentiment, to his wonder he finds this is the most acceptable, 
most public, and universally true” (Pitch vii). 
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This suggests a difference between generalization and speaking universally, suggests that the 
task of philosophy is not to describe or define being, so much as to speak on behalf  of the  
wonder at discovering an identification with more-than-personal power and life, an identification 
generated in the dive that, as Cavell puts it, “takes an interest in strangeness, beginning … with  
the strangeness of oneself” (xv). This interest could also be called attraction. The discovery of 
this interest,  I  would suggest through Emerson’s terms, is the compensation of patience, and 
particularly for Emerson the compensation of persisting in the process of writing. This power or 
wisdom (which philosophy loves or identifies with) has slid into every form around and through 
which we have passed, but “we did not guess its essence, until after a long time” (EL 555). Is it  
possible  that  the  term of  patience,  in  the  sense  of  its  duration,  is  Emerson’s  clue  to  what 
universality might be — that “universal” refers not to something that is everywhere true, but 
rather, to the condition of ongoingness that may be the only universally common condition? The 
guest’s  limitation  is  not  only  spatial  but  temporal:  “We  are  encamped  in  nature,  not 
domesticated” (552). If we would “speak a word for Nature,” along with Thoreau, we would 
need to speak about the ways we take our time as well as the ways nature takes time with us.
Autobiography with  philosophical  commitments  (philosophy),  sets  out  to  account  for 
experiences  of  wonder  that  exceed  self-possession’s  “privatest”  boundaries,  expanding 
identification to the scale of the incredible lodging, the vast intelligence in whose lap we lie, the 
very long time. Instead of life writing as writing of person, this autobiography is life writing as 
writing  person’s  deliquescence,  person’s  imbrication  in  life  as  in  networks  of  processes  in 
motion, including the slow motion of philosophical conversation; writing motion instead of rest, 
this  produces  what  Cavell  calls  “a  philosophy  of  immigrancy”  (xv).  The  guest  makes  an 
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encampment, a “tent for a night” (EL 481). Pitch your tent, and you may claim the passing right 
to speak on behalf of what pitches. Who is to say what that voice coming out of the tent will 
sound like, especially given the necessary and exhilarating “violence of direction” (549) that 
nature  imparts  to  all  individual  things,  so  characterizing  each  with  particular  excesses  and 
deficiencies? 
There  is  a  relation  between  the  philosophical  dimension  of  autobiography  and  artist 
essays that document first person strangeness, which is how I describe my experience both of 
performing and of making, and something I recognize as being spoken about (and for) in the 
accounts of performance process that interest me most. Just as Cavell found in Emerson and 
Thoreau the repression or hiding of philosophy’s foundation in America, I find philosophy hiding 
in some artist essays, like those of Matthew Goulish or Mac Wellman, that account for creative 
process.  Or,  because  I  do  not  take  Goulish  or  Wellman  to  be  actively  attempting  to  hide 
philosophy, perhaps I could say something like this: the arrogation of the voice of philosophy in 
these  process  essays,  in  speaking  on  behalf  of  process  (which  is  universal),  manifests  as  a 
freedom to wager an idiosyncratic syntax, tempo, sonority, and situation for a voicing of process 
that does not sound philosophical (in a disciplinary sense), but is philosophically committed in 
that the syntax itself structures the dive in which a strange kind of power, a strange kind of 
identity, is found (a dive presumed to echo and relate to the process of generating theater, among 
other things).
Identifying with the incredible lodging sounds glorious, but identifying the universality of 
ongoingness means identifying not only with flowering but also with death. To speak on behalf 
of  theater,  which  “enacts  the  great  vanishing  and  perishing”  (“Speculations” 295),  is 
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philosophical not only because this calls for an account of a strangeness one can get interested in,  
but because it also entails a necessary accounting of failure, fragility, instability, perishing, and 
partiality, for taking an interest in particular and strange things, for arrogating the voices and 
actions  of  these  things,  and  then  abandoning  them when  the  performance  is  over,  or  even 
abandoning them midstream, for some emergent choice, some compelling redirection through the 
dark space of the incredible lodge. 
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Fig. 3.  Emily Dickinson, Fragment 778
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3. To the bugle every color is red
“What  matters?  Shape,  space,  motion,  emotion,  time,  and  rhythm.  Movement  matters.  
Manipulating movement and text matters. What matters is matter, materiality.”  
—Annie-B Parson, from 53rd State Occasional No. 1
If transparency is the perfection to which Emerson gestures at the advent of thinking, the 
“due sphericity” of the spectrum that describes the universal,  color, he suggests, is the daily 
condition of our seeing: “Thus inevitably does the universe wear our color, and every object fall  
successively into the subject itself… As I am, so I see; use what language we will, we can never 
say anything but what we are” (EL 489). Here, our color is a limitation both on what we see and 
can say. But what if we embraced “our color” as the standard bearer of our interest, offering a 
map of attractors? What if we said “our color” is our blazon? In “History,” Emerson describes a 
reader  discovering his  colors  in  the  lives  of  past  heroes,  and suggests  that  a  reading which 
embraces and recognizes affinity will empower a reader to feel a member of a trans-historical 
family, joined not by blood but by homology of appetite. (Here I am thinking of Whitehead’s 
description of thought’s directional tendency as its “appetition.”) Emerson means it to license 
original action without deference to the magnitude invested in the pantheon of past greatness, but 
I also find in the image a promise of reading as a means of finding good company, of discovering 
an alternative family array. Superimposed upon the relations of blood family, this alternative 
family lifts a person out of the precise coordinates and conditions of her birth, and gives a new 
possibility of belonging, one whose reach is always still to be discovered. 
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I had forgotten until  recently that when I applied to graduate school,  I described my 
project as attempting a secret genealogy of my community of artists (maybe I said my posse?). 
But as it has grown, this dissertation has become just that: a series of attempts to account for 
Emerson as a figure who might be seen in relation to the commitments and practices of that 
extended posse, as a thinker who might be “owned” as one of my people. Emerson’s emphasis on 
original  relation,  on not losing the day in  deference to  the past,  encourages  the intuition of 
connection to suffice, but the protocols of scholarship frown upon ahistorical reading. So it has 
been a delight (and relief) to uncover slowly the historical relation which describes the family 
resemblance I have claimed with Emerson since my first reading of “Experience.” 
The first three chapters of this dissertation can be seen as moving from Emerson toward 
the three intellectual communities that intersect in my own work: poetics (Emerson–> James–> 
Stein–>  landscape  plays/poet’s  theater),  movement  (Emerson–>James/Dewey–
>Todd/Alexander–>  somatics/new  dance),  and  theater.  (The  fourth  is  a  document  of  the 
convergence itself.)  It  is  in  theater  that  I  discovered the  most  surprising line of  connection, 
moving  from  Emerson  to  Antonin  Artaud,  and  from  Artaud  to  the  physical,  incantatory, 
movement-and-language-theater of New York’s current downtown scene, born of the 60’s and 
70’s group theaters (for example The Living Theater, The Open Theater, Mabou Mines, The 
Performance Group, and The Wooster Group) and still vitally alive in ensemble and “devised” 
work of the present (for example that of Elevator Repair Service, Big Dance Theater, Nature 
Theater of Oklahoma), as well as writer/director-led companies (Richard Foreman's Ontological-
Hysteric Theater, New York City Players, Young Jean Lee’s Theater Company, Half Straddle), 
and in the new playwriting that also circulates in that world (of Mac Wellman, Sibyl Kempson, 
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Erin Courtney, Kristen Kosmas, sometimes myself).62
Emerson and Artaud are an unlikely pair. When I started searching to find out if they had 
been read together,  I found a lone reference in Cavell,63 spirited through the intermediary of 
Derrida’s writing on Artaud. Cavell describes Emerson's “horror at the willingness of human 
beings to have no voice in their words,” and links this to Derrida's reading of Artaud's writing as  
demonstrating a “sense of suffocation by a plagiarized world” (in Cavell's summary). But this 
link does not move through the manifesto texts that were so influential in theater, although of 
course  it  bears  on  vocalization  as  something  fraught  with  the  possibility  of  phoniness,  an 
inherently theatrical anxiety.64 What delighted me about the connection I had realized was that it 
departed from the philosophical lineage a substantially long time ago, and in fact owes nothing to  
Derrida or Heidegger or process philosophy or pragmatism, and everything to the questions that 
come up in making theater. As far as I can tell,  Emerson has never belonged to a history of 
theater. (I read somewhere that he disdained entertainments.65) He is claimed by poets, and can 
62    The constraints of this chapter prevent me from elaborating on the Artaudian foundation to this work, but my 
claim in brief rests on the widely acknowledged importance of Artaud’s manifestos to the 50’s-80’s set listed (Living 
Theater through Mabou Mines), and the growth of a new approach to performance text out of that generation’s  
particular renewal of theater. For more on Artaud’s relationship to the downtown theater, see PAJ 56, an entire issue  
of Performing Arts Journal devoted to Artaud, and particularly Gautam Dasgupta’s “Remembering Artaud,” which 
forms the introduction to the issue and concisely introduces his introduction to and influence on American theater.
63    Cavell notes but does not elaborate a connection between Emerson's “Fate” and Derrida's reading of Artaud's  
writings in “La Parole Souffle,” and mentions his drawing of the connection in Pitch (163) and in his “cover letter” 
to his essay “Emerson’s Constitutional Amending,” where he indicates his wonder at whether the combination is 
productive or merely shocking. See The Translatability of Cultures: Figurations of the Space Between, edited by 
Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser. (Stanford UP, 1996).
64    See The Anti-Theatrical Prejudice by Jonas Barish (University of California Press, 1985) for a long history of 
this anxiety. 
65    I can't seem to recover the source for this and it's possible that it was drawn from a journal comment made in 
one of his moods that does not believe his other moods. I was trying to find out what kind of music Emerson might 
have listened to, as a possible reference for some songs I was writing. In his journal he wrote that he has a “tin ear”  
for music, and his essays bear musical references almost exclusively to natural sounds as far preferable to composed  
ones. His particular discussion of theater in his essay on Shakespeare is limited to an appreciation of it as a form of 
dramatic literature with different conventions for what we'd now think of as intellectual property, and he lauds 
Shakespeare not as a dramatist but as a poet. Of course the theater that I am speaking of has only partial relationship  
to the American theater of Emerson's day.
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be claimed by association to Thoreau by the Cagean sound/dance/art array (which does intersect 
with and occupy part of New York’s downtown theater scene). But I may be the first to propose 
directly that Emerson wears the colors of our theater.
I was compelled on a hunch to return to Artaud when I decided to write a defense of theater 
for a recent event asking why experimental theater people still  insist  on making shows, and 
oriented  towards  proposals  for  forms  theater  might  take  “after  the  show.”  From  earlier, 
obligatory readings of his Theater of Cruelty manifestos (which along with Brecht’s manifestos 
form  two  poles  of  twentieth-century  theater’s  self-construction),  I  had  taken  away  only  an 
impression of temperament, and because my own work is extremely quiet, delicate, and loving—
not something you’d ever describe as “cruel”—I had casually slotted Artaud away as someone to 
whom I exist in opposition. Artaud is anyway not a figure that people continue to make much 
reference to  in contemporary theater,  and I  think I  shared a general  estimation of Artaud as 
someone in the background of the Dionysian elements of 60's  performance.66 But  in my re-
reading I recognized in Artaud not only the foundational orientations of a theater-making I and 
many  around  me  practice,  encompassing  both  staging  and  playwriting  concerns,  but  also  I 
discovered  what  felt  like  restatements  of  Emerson.  This  makes  plenty  of  sense  considering 
Artaud’s  love  of  Nietzsche,  and Nietzsche’s  love  of  Emerson.  What  happens in  Artaud that 
makes his reiterations so important to me, is the diversion of the stream away from philosophy 
and into theater:  he  poses  material  questions  to  be  materially  answered.  One answer  to  the 
66     Tom Sellar, a critic and the editor of Yale's Theater Magazine, casually dismissed Artaud as a present-tense  
figure in a discussion with Pavol Liska and Kelly Copper of OK Radio. In their conversation, which circled around 
issues of control, madness, and miracle, and the older sense of addressing the divine in theater, they agreed that  
contemporary theater in general had ceased to be about the divine, and become only about the human, an opposition 
that could be described in the difference between Artaud (seeking a sacred) and Brecht (seeking social action). Sellar  
and Liska agreed that “Brecht and Stanislavsky won the war. Artaud got shut out.” The conversation clearly 
demonstrates that Liska (one of the co-directors of Nature Theater of Oklahoma) prefers the Artaudian vision of  
what can happen in performance. 
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question  of  what  happens  when  artists  write  philosophy  is  exactly  this  re-inscription  of 
philosophical commitments within material problems. 
Here is a brief convergence. Like Emerson, Artaud is concerned with “rotten diction” and 
the  necessity  of  developing an original  vocalization  that  allows the  performing artists  to,  in 
Emerson’s words, “pierce this rotten diction and fasten words again to visible things” (EL 23). In 
Artaud: “If confusion is the sign of the times, I see at the root of this confusion a rupture between  
things and words, between things and the ideas and signs that are their representation” (Theater  
and Its Double 7). Like Emerson he disdains the consolidation that happens in self-definition, 
what Barbara Packer summarizes in her descriptions of Emerson’s four-part diagnosis of the fall 
of  man,  as  “reflection.”  In Artaud:  “If  our  life  lacks brimstone,  i.e.,  a  constant  magic,  it  is  
because we choose to observe our acts and lose ourselves in considerations of their imagined 
form instead of being impelled by their force” (8). Like Emerson, Artaud demands that we make 
an “original relation to the universe,” writing: “The library of Alexandria can be burnt down … It  
is right that from time to time cataclysms occur which compel us to return to nature, i.e., to 
rediscover life” (10). Rediscovering life does not mean a life without symbols, but rather a life in 
which symbols and language grow from experience (Emerson: “Cut these words, and they would 
bleed; they are vascular and alive” (EL 700)), where symbols are, like Emerson’s spirit, “matter 
reduced to an extreme thinness” (475) through unsettling alchemical processes that cannot be 
attained in  repose.  This  theater  is  one  of  presentation,  not  representation,  which is  assigned 
instead to the afterlife of theater in the mind of the audience, the extremely thin transmissible  
matter  which  lodges  in  recurring  thoughts  either  of  intense  moments  (images),  or  common 
vessels (words). Artaud prefers a theater which renews the shock by which this recurrence, as 
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mental consolidation,  happens.  Artaud: “like the plague,  [theater]  reforges the chain between 
what  is  and  what  is  not,  between  the  virtuality  of  the  possible  and  what  already  exists  in 
materialized nature. It recovers the notion of symbols and archetypes which act like silent blows, 
rests, leaps of the heart, summons of the lymph, inflammatory images thrust into our abruptly 
wakened heads … for there can be theater only from the moment when the impossible really 
begins and the poetry which occurs on the stage sustains and superheats the realized symbols” 
(Double 27-28).
For Artaud, theater is a venue for identifying with the magic, the violent, the onward, the 
natural, one which he hopes will physically affect the audience with a violence sufficient to be 
the total necessary purge, allowing a pacifism to arise outside the ritual space. This physically 
affective theater demands a total  commitment to the material presence of theater (he calls  it 
“expression  in  space”  (italics  in  original  89)),  rather  than  a  subordination  of  theater  to  its 
representative,  mimetic  function.  Artaud  does  not  exile  language  from  theater,  but  instead 
demands that the words “would bleed,” would be sonorous, effortful and incantatory before they 
would do what  words inevitably  do:  settle,  replay,  represent,  mean.  The combined material, 
which  includes  but  is  not  ruled by text,  creates  “dissociative  and vibratory  action  upon the 
sensibility”  (89).  Artaud  lived  in  emergency  times,  spent  years  institutionalized;  his  writing 
sounds out an urgency that is also there in Emerson, but obscured retrospectively by the cadences 
of period-drama that are so easy to impose on the writing of past centuries. But I hear emergency 
here: “Nothing is secure but life, transition, the energizing spirit … People wish to be settled; 
only as far as they are unsettled is there any hope for them” (EL 413). 
Artaud  stands  as  a  presiding  agitator  over  a  theater  which  acts  as  a  ritual  zone  of 
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unsettlement, of intense and original relationship to symbols, ideas, language refastened to the 
bodies  that  produce  them.  His  agitation  has  played out  in  the  physical,  textual,  and scenic 
language of theater since his manifestos, translated by M.C. Richards at Cage’s suggestion while 
at Black Mountain College, began to circulate among the American avant garde scene, and with 
the Artaudian acting methodologies developed in the influential work of Jerzy Grotowski. An 
inheritance can be seen in  the contemporary  downtown theater  whose events  are  thick with 
language  treated  as  both  signs  and  stuff,  stuff  with  sonority,  tempo,  intensity,  incantatory 
potential, with plays conceived as events happening within the condition of a magic circle that 
makes  whatever  language  is  put  in  it  seem  to  sing  with  “superheat[ed]”  animation.  (I  am 
thinking, for example, of Nature Theater of Oklahoma’s investment of hypertrophic life force in 
every “um” of their transcribed phone conversation scripts, or Sibyl Kempson’s ear for craziness, 
violence, and aspiration in the most mundane of doctor’s office interactions.)
Artaud’s  particular  demands  for  the  overt  extremity  of  the  ritual,  the  “genuine 
enslavement of attention” (92) that conducts the audience “by means of their organisms to an 
apprehension of the subtlest notions” (italics in original 81), do not necessarily carry into the 
theater that inherits him. But the idea of a theater that acts primarily not through representational 
meaning, resident in and controlled by the script, but through vibration does: a theater whose 
insistent  firstness  (in  Peirce’s  sense  of  unmediated  presence)  recuperates  “a  kind  of  unique 
language half-way between gesture and thought” that only starts to accumulate meaning in the 
remainders and returns of the event. The Artaudian inheritance, then, the family colors, have to 
do with a commitment to the way in which this theater’s meaning is not reducible to the verbal, 
but  mixes  text  with  a  spatial,  material  vocabulary,  resisting  language  as  a  subjugating  or 
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controlling medium for saying what happened and what force it held, instead enlisting words as 
one of many instruments of its force. 
Cavell  notes  that  Emerson’s  descriptions  of  growth—of  circles  continually  inscribed 
around  circles—share  the  feature  of  being  “discontinuous,”  leading  him to  ask:  “How does 
Emerson picture us as crossing, or rather leaping, the span from one circumference to another? 
What is the motive, the means of motion, of this movement? How do we go on?” (ETE 18). The 
early twentieth-century theater artists who form the background of my theater—the dadaists, the 
surrealists, Artaud — suggested that this movement was convulsive, surprising, and sometimes 
cruel. Emerson often names a similar quality: the incursion of wisdom which “convuls[es] us as 
pain” (EL 555); nature’s “saltatory and impulsive” methods (483); the “severe music” of being 
(82). 
Artaud  responds  to  the  question  of  how  to  go  on  by  generating  a  ritual  space  of 
convulsion. This convulsion persists in new theater as a kind of fine vibration, a commitment to 
matter, to sound, to movement, to the interruption of naturalistic narrative with strictly theater-
based possibilities. Words in this theater regain their spookiness, tactility, and force, open onto 
occasions of incantation. I am thinking of a passage at the end of John Jesurun’s Philoctetes, an 
agitatingly  low-light,  sometimes  excruciatingly  slow  production  originally  created  for  the 
legendary actor Ron Vawter who performed the piece while dying of AIDS, when Philoctetes 
speaks about stepping out into the day, repeating the word “day” so many times that my body 
actually lightened while listening. I am thinking of a passage at the still point of Mac Wellman’s 
Antigone,  staged with  proliferating  image,  action,  and rhythm by Big  Dance  Theater,  when 
Antigone slips out of a hole in the bottom of the world, and describes the place of her arrival in a 
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passage whose light repetitions make a kind of lapping action, as if she is speaking to us from the 
shores the “interminable oceans” Emerson describes as reaching beyond our word for being: 
And I slipped out the back and I made myself very small and I slipped out the 
back way and when I awoke. I was in a different place, a thin place, as though it 
were the place of a compass focus. And the lines of force radiated out from my 
heart in all directions and I could feel these lines of force as though I were a god 
and not merely a nasty girl, a girl tired of being the wise one. Radiated out from 
my still beating heart. (Difficulty 117) 
In these examples it  is not violence we feel  but an onward impulse,  the movement of what  
Emerson calls power. To yield to that force is what Artaud wanted for theater’s audience. His 
“cruelty” is not violence per se, but the reign of that force, in any of its degrees. “Everything that 
acts is a cruelty,” he writes (85). When I see someone flying my colors, what I see is the flag of  
this  vibratory,  dissociative  composition,  where  text  is  attached  to  actions,  to  material 
manipulations, to moving, singing stuff. This is the flag of the theater makers for whom the  
material is what matters, because only matter can release the energy we need (Emerson calls it 
power) for the leap to the next circumference. 
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Fig. 4.  Emily Dickinson, Fragment 790
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4.  A message from the Meadows
“In any weather, at any hour of the day or night, I have been anxious to improve the nick of time,  
and notch it on my stick too.” — Thoreau, Walden
How does nature think? Emerson’s late unfinished work, The Natural History of the Intellect, 
asks this question. A natural thing, the thinking mind experiences thought as pattern, or analogy 
(NHI 40). As Emerson represents it, analogy is not a template placed on nature from an extra-
natural  rationalism,  but  a  kind  of  message-as-picture  glimpsed  through  an  opening:  Nature 
“speaks no word … only this, she is careful to leave all her doors ajar … If he takes her hint and  
uses her  goods she speaks no word; if  he blunders and starves she says nothing” (28).  The 
message is glimpsed, grasped as a picture or generalization. Nature does not speak words, but the 
impressionable man might, in Thoreau’s arrogation, “speak a word for nature” by speaking with 
words fastened to  the images  glimpsed in  these openings.  Nature thinks when an inhabitant 
walking one of the innumerable paths that “traverse … the gulfs of space in every direction” 
(42), is impressed by a picture, and marks it as significant.
Small Acts of Repair, a book on the performance group Goat Island, composed from several 
company voices and edited by company member Matthew Goulish and scholar Stephen Bottoms,  
asks the reader to think of Goat Island’s performance work as a form of ecology. To introduce 
ecology, Goulish cites Gregory Bateson’s last lecture, “Men are Grass: Metaphor and the World 
of Mental Process.” In this talk, Bateson addresses pattern and mental process as part of the 
biological  realm.  Adding to  biological  pattern,  he introduces  as  a  further  element  of  mental 
212
process, syllogism, given in two examples: 
1.
Socrates is a man. 
All men die. 
Socrates must die. 
2.
Grass dies. 
Men die. 
Men are grass. (qtd in Repair 20)
Bateson describes a criticism wagered of his work: that he had spent his career thinking in the 
syllogistic movements of the latter mode (known in logic as “affirming the consequent”), a mode 
that would be “very well if [he] were a poet, but … is inelegant in a biologist” (20). This second 
mode is discredited in logic, which classifies, orders, categorizes and nests. It is how men think 
(some of the time), says Bateson. But the second mode is how nature thinks, how nature builds.  
The message from the meadows comes in the form of metaphor. So Bateson reiterates Emerson’s 
sense that the poet is scientific, and the scientist poetic: they think through pictures, through 
homology, to account for a vast world superabundant with both homology and difference. 
Goat Island embraces Bateson’s metaphor-generating ecology as an analogy for performance 
composition. The work of performance composition is not a project ordered under one sign (or 
theme, or message), but rather can be understood in the vein of Jacob Uexküll as a condition of 
“multiple closed systems overlaid on the earth” (paraphrase of Uexküll, Repair 8). Within each 
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of these systems, an animal sits at the center, dealing with the significance-bearing world around 
it. Ecological performance repeats this relational model. Performed outside the implied neutral 
point of view and crafted dramaturgical significance of proscenium conditions, the ecological 
performance  carries  (and  solicits)  very  different  significance  from  viewer  to  viewer.  This 
complexity is achieved not only by spatially reorganizing the audience to emphasize proximity 
and remove a single front-facing. The ecosystem is built into the composition as a complex, 
overtly patterned overlay of events and texts, usually taken from a great number of sources and 
performed without deconstructive reference to an original text, rather treating the fragments as 
freestanding elements of a new closed system, as a bird might treat found a plastic ribbon while 
building a nest.  
How, then, does the performance mean, how does it become a significance-bearing world 
surrounding each viewer differently? We could say that the meaning is a picture or message 
rising  up  out  of  a  meadow,  a  word  “fastened  … to  visible  things”  (EL 23).  The responses 
recorded in Small Acts of Repair show significance arising associatively, metaphorically, rather 
than  interpretively,  for  no  theme  sits  at  the  center.  A Goat  Island  piece  is  a  composed 
environment  in  which  each  audience  member  occupies  his  or  her  own  center.  This  isn’t  a 
relaxing place. The work isn’t abstract or without reference to the world. It is violent, rigorous, 
philosophical and calls out to an audience’s ethical sensibility. But it declines to summarize its 
sense, trusting that significance will arise at the meeting point between the viewer’s associative 
resources  and  the  images  and tasks  of  the  piece  itself.  The  piece  does  not  contain  its  own 
message. 
Emerson describes the junction of a particular person with the intelligence of the world, 
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as lying “open on one side to the deeps of spiritual nature” (386). Could we designate these 
performances also as a kind of essay with one side open, incomplete until the essay (the try, the 
wander, the attempt) is taken by the audience (and even then, never finalized)? “The performance 
becomes a kind of  psychic  funhouse mirror in  which the  participant  spectator  is  enabled to 
meditate creatively on deeply felt concerns, experiences, and memories,” writes Bottoms (Repair 
66). Then Goulish: “It is as if we are saying one may wander within the performance as if in a  
sort of neighborhood, through which we suggest a particular route, although you are free to stray 
from that route if you choose. The limits grant permission to stray. The straying is the act of 
creative response” (Repair 66).
Straying, glimpsing a particular door, a picture arises. Significance carries. For Emerson 
this event is saving: “I am bewildered by the immense variety of attractions and cannot take a 
step; but this one thread, fine as gossamer, is yet real; and I hear a whisper, which I dare trust,  
that it is the thread on which the earth and heaven of heavens are strung” (NH 42). Again I am 
reminded of the recurring sense (in Emerson, in Heidegger, in Rukeyser, in places in between 
and beyond) that thinking, building, and thanking, converge. Philosophy is a work of meadow-
building; the philosophical commitment is what seeks and accepts the fine accident of the one 
thread. The voice of philosophy sings the thread. 
 If the message comes in a moment of repose or pause, then when writing philosophy, we 
must  consider  tempo.  The  accident,  peculiarity  and eccentricity  of  the  impression  calls  into 
question the appropriateness of the constraints of tempered scales and measured beats. In the 
Cage-related art movements of the twentieth century that addressed themselves to a recuperation 
of the natural and the ordinary, not as a sublime condition but as a feature of all landscapes 
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including that of the city, the tempered scale is abandoned. Dance of this time shrugged off its 
marriage to music’s tempos, and asked instead, how long does it take an arm to swing? A body to 
fall? (Grass to die?)
Theater as a resource for composing philosophy answers by crafting occasions in which 
messages or images of significance might arise, through the alchemy of watching-as-wandering. 
If a proof is a form of preservation—an amber for the luminous idea—could we still accept as 
philosophy an essay with no proof, an essay which glides past but does not summarize its sense? 
An essay whose ideas might not survive the duration of the reading (or watching), except as a 
mark on our body memory, of an intense season? Does this mark of intensity, this nick of time, 
have something to do with an ability to sustain philosophical commitments? 
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Fig. 5.  Emily Dickinson, Fragment 252
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5.  In this short life that only lasts an hour, how much, how little is within our power
“I shun father and mother and wife and brother, when my genius calls me. I would write on the  
lintels of the door-post, Whim. I hope it is somewhat better than whim at last, but we cannot  
spend the day in explanation.” (EL 262)
In his essay on Art, Emerson describes a democratically accessible creative genius in 
keeping with his rejection of any socially fixed location of intellect. Art can be made by anyone, 
anywhere, so long as the artist is sincere, because art is “the symbol of a thought which pours 
itself indifferently through all” (EL 436). He charges the artist with the task of making artistic 
work “an outlet for his whole energy” that will in turn awaken in its viewer “the same sense of 
universal relations and power which the work evinced in the artist.” The effect of this awakening 
“is  to  make  new artists”  (437).  This  proliferation  of  artists  does  not  adorn  the  world  with 
“dazzle,” but rather makes the world more of a home—a place in which we may be “owned” by 
nature: “I now require this of all pictures, that they domesticate me” (436). 
This idea that art  functions to cheer and encourage, by engaging the viewer not as a 
spectator of greatness but as a fellow artist, animates a vision of artfulness as a practice of “living 
good moments,” which is what Emerson names as the real end of wisdom (and so philosophy) in 
“Experience.” There he uses the language of cultivation, the domestic garden plot: “Since our 
office is with moments, let us husband them” (479). 
What is in our power and what is not? Emerson and Thoreau suggest, both specifically 
attacking the over-valuation of European sites for experience, that what is in our power is to 
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experience the “equal nature,” in Thoreau’s phrase, that exists for any living person as it existed 
for the greats of the past. This articulation resonates with the delight in pedestrian wonder of the 
Cage  array,67 making  art  from  the  found,  the  local,  the  ordinary,  not  because  the  grocer’s 
daughter is better than say, a Madonna, but because the art is made by “find[ing] beauty and 
holiness in new and necessary facts, in the field and road-side, in the shop and mill” (EL 440).  
What is in our power is to learn how to see, to hear, “to find beauty and holiness.” 
Although always leaning toward formulations that remind his readers of the limitations of 
their control over their access to any illuminating felicity, Emerson does suggest that there is 
something we can do to make ourselves receptive to the way of the “indifferent” stream of 
nature’s thinking. But in order to do that, we have to have some way to begin. How does one 
start making something? Even if all nature is equal, offering an equal chance to experience its 
force, we have to have some limitation, some project to pursue, some fact to look at, some place 
to start. 
“That music is simple to make comes from one’s willingness to accept the limitations of 
structure,”  writes  John  Cage  (original  typography  removed,  Silence  111).  Structure  is  a 
“discipline which,  accepted,  in return accepts whatever, even those rare moments of ecstasy, 
which, as sugar loaves train horses, train us to make what we make.” Cage leaves a legacy that  
counters the narrative that art comes from the agonizing discovery of driving impulses, from 
self-expression. For Cage, we develop characters as artists not from the flows of expressivity 
from interior  to  exterior,  but  rather  from “ecstasy”—experiences  we  have  beside  ourselves. 
These experiences character our appetites: create channels (structures) through which ideas “may 
67    As may be becoming clear, this is my shorthand indication for the artists for whom Cage stands as a 
representative beacon of affinity and one who voices an aesthetic ideology. One of Joan Retallack’s essays on Cage,  
“Poethics of a Complex Realism,” beautifully explores this Cagean ideology. (In The Poethical Wager.)
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come along,” which we may then “enjoy” (113). 
Everything depends on creating a structure along which something can pour or flow. 
What is within our power, suggests Cage, is to accept the discipline of structures, which are 
simple to make, and do not require the ego to discover them. The ego in fact gets in the way of  
that discovery, which is why Cage uses “chance methodology” to help him find a starting point 
for  making things,  and gives the name “structure”  to  things which  feel  far  from artistically 
deliberate:
“Structure without life is dead. But Life without structure is un-seen. Pure life 
expresses itself within and through structure. Each moment is absolute, alive and 
significant. Blackbirds rise from a field making a sound de-licious be-yond com-
pare. I heard them because I ac-cepted the limitations of an arts conference in a 
Virginia girls’ finishing school, which limitations allowed me quite by accident to 
hear the blackbirds as they flew up and overhead” (hyphens in original, 113). 
My genius calls when I accept limitations which allow me, by no calculation of my own, to hear  
the sound of life;  genius’s call  sounds like whatever we find “de-licious be-yond com-pare.” 
What is within our power is a willingness to take notice of our delight when by chance the birds 
start up — our willingness to inscribe Whim on the lintel. 
In  the  first  workshop  I  took  with  Mac  Wellman,  he  sent  us  out  to  transcribe  an 
eavesdropped conversation in a coffee shop or bar, explaining, when we all returned with very 
different micro-plays, that eavesdropping would tell us about how own ears worked which in 
turn would tell us how to write. This suggests that playwriting is not a matter of inventing drama, 
but rather of accepting the discipline of one’s ear. 
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Cavell and Arsić’s readings of Emerson examine the conditions of ordinary life for their 
potential  to  yield  to  ethical  being,  or  what  Cavell  calls  Emerson’s  “moral  perfectionism” 
(passim).  Cavell  pursues  ordinary  language;  Arsić  writes  about  the  common experiences  of 
thinking, sleeping, and loving. I find that they produce startling and exciting readings, but when I 
examine my own experiences of conversion, I find that speaking, thinking, loving, and sleeping 
only  yield  those  Emersonian  outcomes  when  a  structure  or  discipline  surrounds  them.  For 
Emerson and Thoreau this structure was journaling. In my own life, this structure has come from 
making things (dances, plays, sounds, books). 
There is an argument that creativity is an act of making something  ex nihilo (see, for 
example, George Steiner’s criticism of invention in favor of creation in  Real Presences, which 
argues that “real” art always has a transcendent provenance). A making that begins with chance, 
with  accident,  responding  to  what  already exists,  sees  creative  production  as  a  way to  live 
responsively, as a variety of ordinary being. From this perspective, it is not within our power to 
create something out of nothing, but it is within our power to accept daily structures that might 
allow us to husband moments. This is an art practice that does not imagine itself as an act of  
creation but rather as a structure whose limitations trace an area within which we can give our 
attention to the incursion of interest,  the surprising resonances, the happy moment.68 It is not 
68     One of my favorite living choreographers is Ohad Naharin, director of the Batsheva Dance Company, and 
creator of “gaga” technique. In a short documentary he describes the studio process as being one of “turning up the  
volume of listening” to the body, and one that yields “many happy moments.” In part because English is not his first 
language, his descriptions are deceptively simple. His dances are wild, violent, intense, beautiful, strange. Happiness 
in his description is the felicity of finding the emergent wild form, the emergent intense moment: “There is 
something about the process of choreography that can take you places that I never could imagine exist. There’s not  
much to discover in the world any more, and here it is. The studio provides me a huge opportunity of discovery. This 
is a place where [the dancers] can really go on a daily basis beyond their familiar limits. In the process I have with  
them, they [are] also great contributors. I think we will create many happy moments. … When I’m talking about 
happy moments, I’m talking about moments of discovery, being really moved watching my dancers. We do it on a 
daily basis, we create 'wow' moments for ourselves. We don’t need to do much because we can turn [up] the volume 
on listening and very delicate stuff can become 'wow.'” 
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everyone’s  dailiness,  but  the  inheritance  of  Cagean chance  methods  and values  in  some art 
practices puts making into the list of ordinary activities, rendering it a form of life. At least in my 
experience, it is while in the process of making things that I am most capable of embracing “the 
process of indirection,” of undergoing its conversions, because it is only while making things 
that I manage to sustain my alertness and receptivity to surprise. 
I don’t mean to celebrate a facile idea of what it means to be in the process of making 
something, or suggest that the democratic possibility of getting into that process means that it 
does not require its own severity and commitment (its discipline). “Learning to Love You More,” 
an iconic participatory art project by Miranda July and Harrell Fletcher in the form of a website  
archive of  responses  to  July and Fletcher’s  artful  living assignments,  generates  some lovely 
things  but  they  fall  largely  into  the  aesthetic  category  of  feel-good.  Severe  music,  I  think, 
requires a longer commitment, and maybe its own form of poverty. The people I am thinking of, 
whose example I find representative, are those I call the lifers. Ordinariness here does not mean 
simply the plain or near, but the things we have, through a commitment, made into the structure 
of our daily life. We must require of our making that it domesticates us. 
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Fig. 6.  Emily Dickinson, Fragment 752
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6. Emerging from an Abyss and entering it again, that is life, is it not?
“the exquisite music of that strange procession” 
—“The Gods Abandon Antony,” C.P. Cavafy
Emerson teaches me to understand domestication as an activity: an ongoing series of 
etudes that tie perception to marking, saying, singing, or building. My house would have a glass 
bottom, green sides, and its roof would be a canopy intermittently cut by light. Emerson calls 
what comes in at all sides, nature, or impersonal. He could also call it abyss. 
In her chapter on thinking as leaving, Arsić quotes a letter from Emerson to Margaret 
Fuller: “Even when we have extricated ourselves [by withdrawing into solitude] from all the 
embarrassments of the social problem it does not please the oracle to emit any light on the mode 
of individual  life.  A thousand negatives  it  utters  clear  & strong on all  sides,  but  the sacred 
affirmative it hides in the deepest abyss.” The abyss here is opposed to the individual life, to 
person, not as a form of darkness but as a light that cannot be gotten. Arsić encapsulates: “The 
affirmative remains abyssal, something like a cave into which we can enter but from which our 
persons will not find an exit” (166). 
A cave is perhaps not the right image, unless we can imagine a cave which continually 
opens chamber onto new chamber, proliferating an ever-increasing outside to the mappable, lit, 
and organized world. This cave is a hole without walls because what it means is exactly the 
opposite of organization, formation, person, limit. Person does not find an escape because the 
“sacred affirmative” takes no shape. Person, for Emerson, is the shape we hold against the abyss; 
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domestication is the process of keeping that shape pliable, viable. 
Yet  imaginatively  scouting  that  abyss,  diving  temporarily  into  it,  is  necessary  to 
Emerson’s domestication in nature, domestication writ large as a way of identifying with nature, 
to own and be owned by it. Because movement, and not rest, is the identity of the world, a life  
not  alienated  (by  the  “quiet  desperation”  of  settlement)  is  always  undergoing  transition. 
Recovery of the world, understood as a sense of belonging to it, calls for an acquiescence to 
continual  loss, and the virtual,  imaginative  experience of abyss can make sense of and lend 
aesthetic commitment to that acquiescence. 
Despair  belongs to  the  static;  it  is  not  the  character  of  this  deep.  Affirmation  is  the 
compensation of the abyss,  but  it  does not  affirm persons.  Taken on the largest  scale  of  an 
individual  life,  measured  not  in  days  but  as  a  long  interval  between  birth  and  death—the 
emergence into and out of person—Emerson commits to relinquishing person. Arsić writes that 
he  commits  to  this  quite  literally,  as  an  advocate  of  the  Rural  Cemetery  Movement  which 
encouraged the elemental return of a corpse to nature, and saw error in the sealing up of person 
within the marble walls of tombs.69 Decomposition becomes affirmative when a body, losing the 
organization of a person, continues into more life in new forms, as part of the soil. The landscape 
of the cemetery, the trees and grasses that grow out of that compost, becomes a living monument 
free from the “unhandsome” error of grasping at permanence. The affirmative is always moving. 
Arsić argues that Emerson’s primary tuition is to aestheticize ordinary domestic life in 
order to gain an impersonal, objective perspective on its beauty, and a disciplined, committed 
way of seeing its shifts. Cavell reads in Emerson’s ordinary language an unsettling of words, so 
69    See Section 2 of her chapter, “The Art of Staying,” for her full discussion of Emerson’s involvement with the 
movement and his thinking about burial.
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as to return periodically to his readers’ attentions the conditions of the conditions under which we 
speak and understand each other. I have wondered if Emerson doesn’t also give assignments for 
virtual exercises outside of ordinary experience, etudes for intense seasons that would mark us 
like Molly Bloom, with a sacred “yes.” What if we took his descriptions of felicitous experience 
as images we are tasked to entertain: the ravishing virtuality of becoming a transparent eyeball, 
the maternal comforts of lying in the lap of a great nature, the strange non-possessiveness of 
lying with one side open to the deeps of nature. 
I  have  experienced certain  writers  as  making compositions  like  literary  bathyspheres 
within which I can entertain the image of a virtual dive into the affirmative abyss. Writing these 
dives, they return with sentences clutched in hand that signal their safe passage back from the 
unforming, deforming opening. These sentences are declarative arrogations; if we take them we 
must take them as true. Sometimes they are amulets. (Susan Howe:  “Negligence of passivity  
Love  is  the  interdiction  of  a  history.”)  Sometimes  they  are  curses.  (Hugo Ball:  “Man is  a  
chimera, a miracle, a divine approximation, full of malice, and deceit.”) These sentences hold 
together as tiny crystalline events, escaped from the waves of barely organized and nearly lost  
experience. In the tautness of their wagers they suggest an effort to take and hold shape against 
the darkness of the abyss. Speaking these sentences, saying them as if we were performing their 
script in order to experience their fruits (more as one might speak a scripted prayer than as one 
would “play a part” in a drama), I think we can license ourselves to  entertain their images,  
virtually follow their dives, and experience them as events of our temporary person. This is what 
the bathysphere is: a vessel-as-body into which we can climb. 
Why name the sentences events? In “Fate” Emerson writes: 
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The secret of the world is, the tie between person and event. Person makes event, 
and event person. … He thinks his fate alien, because the copula is hidden. But the 
soul contains the event that shall befall it, for the event is only the actualization of 
its thoughts; and what we pray to ourselves for is always granted. The event is the 
print of your form. It fits you like your skin. What each does is proper to him. … 
Thus events grow on the same stem with persons; are sub-persons. (EL 962-3) 
Take the sentence you can grasp onto as “print of your [temporary, entertained] form.” Take its 
voice as your own, not  for all  time,  but  for the duration of this  intense etude,  this spiritual 
exercise. When I license myself to be the voice who declares that love is the interdiction of a 
history, or that man is a divine approximation, I am licensing myself to put some amount of my 
being into that picture, that event, by invoking the philosophical commitment of the original 
writer to address her own experience insofar as it bears on the neutral, the possible, the human. 
(Recall  Cavell's  “arrogation”  as  finding  the  voice  that  speaks  on  behalf  of  these  things.) 
Philosophy could be a script of amulets, curses, hidden copulas.70 
To climb into a literary bathysphere is to make a virtual excursion in which we imagine 
diving into something that exceeds our person. On the dark sea bottom its language draws a 
circle to define a territory within which the glance of the affirmative may leave its impression. In 
the  shape  of  that  circle  we  can  retain  some  sense  of  person  against  the  vastation  of  the 
impersonal. The impression prints something we might hold onto as we return to the surface (the  
amulet, the curse). The action of drawing the circle is Orphic. A circle is drawn at the precise 
moment when Orpheus, turning, sees Eurydice. Her disappearance glances, marks. Does death, 
like nature, leave open some doors through which we project our philosophical selves? If we 
70    As it does in texts of fragment, aphorism, or koan. 
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could entertain this idea, then we could say the Orphic is our best shot at experiencing the fiction 
of an afterlife. What does it mean that this is also a story of where music comes from? Is Cavell  
talking about a kind of afterlife when he describes the operatic aria as a gesture of being pressed 
between the world we do live in, and an intervening realm of significance?71 Is significance here 
the capacity of an event to persist beyond the disintegration of person? If the Dutch interior (of 
Vermeer,  for  example)  represents  Emerson’s  call  to  find  beauty  and  significance  in  daily 
domestic space (as Arsić suggests), could the gesture of singing stand for that same finding in the 
longer term of our domestication within the “incredible lodge,” in our passing through the shape 
of a person between birth and death? 
We leave behind our amulets, our sentences, our sub-persons, our “fragments of me,” as 
records of that domestication and that passing. We leave them behind but will they be heard? 
Susan Howe digs around in the relative abyss of the almost-disappeared traces of voices fallen 
outside institutional memory. She says archives are the only chance we have to communicate 
with the dead. Transcribing marginal marks into a whispering chora, she takes us on dives and 
returns to the surface with strange copulas. Arrogation of silence (its yes) through poetry. “A 
poem can prevent onrushing light going out. Narrow path in the teeth of proof. Fire of words will 
try us … If history is a record of survivors, Poetry shelters other voices” (Birth-Mark 47). 
Euphotic,  dysphotic,  and  aphotic respectively name the different  stratas  of  the  ocean 
based on the reach of sunlight, which pierces the euphotic, becomes dim in the dysphotic, and 
does not penetrate the aphotic at all.  Poetry (Howe’s) is the submersible that goes below the 
euphotic region of the history’s ocean. Archived material,  not found on finding aids but still 
findable,  lets  her into the twilight or  dysphotic.  (Howe calls  this place the margin.) Into the 
71      See A Pitch of Philosophy pp. 141-4
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aphotic only imagination can take any of us. Howe quotes Emily Dickinson’s letter to her sister-
in-law Susan Gilbert Dickinson: “Moving on in the Dark like Loaded Boats at Night, though 
there is no Course, there is Boundlessness—“ (L 871 qtd. 46). Elsewhere Dickinson writes of  
another path without course, “a threadless way”: “I shut my eyes—and groped as well/ ’Twas 
lighter—to be  Blind—” (F  484).  Howe  claims  Dickinson’s  poems and  Melville’s  stories  as 
threads or courses  in  these dark spaces.  “Their  writing vaults  the streams. They lead me in 
nomad  spaces.  They  sieve  cipherings,  hesitations,  watchings,  survival  of  sound-meaning 
associations: they hound and cry, track and call. So much strangeness from God. What is saved 
to  be  said”  (51).  Her  early  Americans  speak  from a  newly  revealed  and  unlined  soil,  that 
condition of wilderness that makes the myth condition of our early nation. “Silence becomes a 
Self.  Open  your  mouth”  (50).  Melville  says  Hawthorne’s  open  mouth  speaks  a  “mystical 
blackness” (“Hawthorne and his Mosses”). Howe says her writing is “haunted and inspired” by 
“the buried ones” (45).
“Emerging from the abyss and entering it again, that is life, is it not?” Dickinson's is not a  
bright stay outside the abyss. She uses poetry to watch herself hover, inclosed in person, above 
that deep. Her poems draw faces over that depth. Like Artaud’s masks, Dickinson’s figures are 
animate because of what hides behind them: face over a vertiginous darkness, footfall peeling 
back from the  ecstatic  dark  of  “degreeless  noon” (F 259).  As a  poet  she watches  the  deep 
constantly, just as she would have watched all those burials from her childhood window.72 Her 
poems, in their constant interrogation of death, could be taken as practice runs for that eventual  
passage, entertained images of vastation, dissolution exercises. A poem is an opportunity to court 
that passage into the undone, to seduce it into opening on domestic space. “Emerging from the 
72     The home where she lived between the ages of 10 and 25 overlooked one of Amherst's cemeteries. 
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abyss and entering it again, that is life, is it not?” (she writes). “Entering the abyss and emerging 
from it again, that is poetry, is it not?” (she could have written). What does she come back with if 
not the motto of the abyssal affirmative? “’Twas lighter to be blind.” 
 The telling is whispered during the return trip. What survives the telling? So often the 
aesthetic experience of diving leaves a mark of intense experience without leaving an image in 
mind to be explained or related. The sense dissipates the same way as a dream. This is often my 
experience of Howe’s writing. I have a feeling that this is also the experience of my shows. 
Maybe of this section too. I am sometimes told by editors and critics that my writing (of plays, of  
prose) is lovely as it goes along but does not “add up.” But I don't write to reach conclusions; I 
write tracks, dives, trips. The writing takes and then yields its shape. I am sensitive to the minute 
topography of the exit moment. Instead of adding up, I end by handing the experience over. The 
show ends in a transfer. I let you out of the bathysphere. Mostly it is a project of diving. I hope  
some day I will return with an amulet. Do you recall a circle was drawn, a space emerged? And 
did you feel its leaving? Wasn’t it singing when it left?
230
Fig. 7.  Emily Dickinson, Fragment 865
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7.  Not to send errands by John Alden is one of the instructions of history
Dickinson read Longfellow’s long poem, “The Courtship of Miles Standish,” in which 
John Alden runs Standish’s errand to offer marriage to the maiden Priscilla. The errand fails. 
Alden returns to report to Standish, who has not imagined the errand’s failure. In its immediate 
context, the lesson is prefigured by Standish’s military motto: don’t have other people do your 
own work.  Other  questions  hang  over  the  errand.  It  has  its  own success,  just  not  the  one 
predicted by Standish. Whose errand is it? A deeper cause shape-shifts in Alden’s shape-shifting 
rationale. The poem ends happily in marriage (of Alden and Priscilla), forgiveness (by Standish), 
and the implied sanction of God, but this seems purely a fabrication of genre, a naive optimism 
written onto however much is true in this pilgrim history. Stories “based on” true stories, like 
Longfellow’s, are stories rewritten to fit generic conventions. Augmenting and rerouting the real, 
they do a kind of plastic surgery.
Joan Retallack cautions against such generic constraint, arguing instead that the failed or 
unpredictable errand is the type of complex reality. Borrowing a word from Epicurus, she calls 
her counter a “poetics of swerve” (The Poethical Wager 1), which, she says, is a tool for making 
“complex realist” meaning. Far from a history plotted in advance, composed of errands whose 
outcomes can be predicted (fetch the milk, pick up the laundry, take your brother to school), 
Retallack’s  swerve  poetics  is  a  navigational  tool  meant  to  enable  one  to  remain  alert  and 
responsive in an unpredictable and complex present, creating “some kind of dynamic equilibrium 
between intention and receptivity, community and alterity” (3). Following D.W. Winnicott, she 
says that meaning, the kind that makes life worth living, is only made in that dynamic space,  
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actively generated in an encounter with the real, complex, unpredictable world. Emerson wrote 
something similar: “We live amid surfaces, and the true art of live is to skate well on them” (EL 
478).  And  elsewhere:  “Nature  hates  calculators”  (483).  In  the  “new  yet  unapproachable 
America,” they fly the colors of the curve and not the line. 
What would an errand whose outcome is unknown look like? How is it initiated? How 
much of it can be anticipated? “Errand into the wilderness,” is Perry Miller’s name, borrowed 
from a sermon, for the project of the Puritan colonies understood as what, for better or worse, 
founds this nation, or at least acts as its emblem of foundation. That errand had a script and an 
aspiration,  but  continued into a future that fell far  from the script,  allowing every following 
American to ask, “where do we find ourselves?” Not in a city on a hill, it turns out. “It is is very 
unhappy, but too late to be helped, the discovery we have made, that we exist,” writes Emerson a 
few centuries  after  the  real  John Alden  married  Priscilla.  “Ever  afterwards,  we  suspect  our 
instruments” (EL 487). Other people have called this existence a kind of happiness. Retallack 
quotes Lyn Hejinian: “Is happiness the name for our (involuntary) complicity with chance?” (qtd. 
in  Wager 19).  Chance  equals  existence  according  to  Lucretius  in  De  Rerum  Natura (also 
incorporated by Retallack) because in a purely determined world, the first things would never 
swerve and nothing would have happened: “For if they were not apt to incline, all would fall  
downwards like raindrops through the profound void, no collision would take place and no blow 
would be caused amongst the first-beginnings: thus nature would never have produced anything” 
(qtd. in Wager 2).
The  sense  that  this  uncertain  violence  (Lucretius  calls  it  a  blow stemming from the 
inclination to incline “at times quite uncertain and in uncertain places”) is a kind of security is 
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one of the refrains of  Another Tree Dance.  It is a low refrain and I’m not sure how well it is 
heard, but to my mind it is something like the finding of the show. It is dramatized in the show's 
images  as  sliding briskly  down a  curving tunnel,  an event  in  the  recurring  dream from my 
childhood  from  which  I  recognized  Carson's  “sleep  side.”  In  the  dream,  I  come  into  my 
grandmother’s living room at night and on the wall where the couch should be, there are three 
mouths of three tunnels—three holes with three lights above them, and in the dream I have to 
choose and enter one. Often in the dream's recurrences I am pressed to choose quickly, being 
pursued, but sometimes I wander into the room at leisure. Every time the dream recurs, I choose 
a tunnel and crawl in and slide swiftly down and away on a dropping curving pathway. Only that 
much ever  repeats.  That  falling recurs  throughout  the  Another  Tree Dance  in  tunneling  and 
sliding images. I name it security because it is a means to unpredictable transition, to happy, 
involuntary complicity with chance: “There is a security in these special channels. Fantastic  
bridges. Tubes in space. Vegetable interstellar reticulation.”
The  security  carried  by  this  gliding  image  has  something  to  do  with  Emerson’s 
description  of  life  as  “a  flitting  state,  a  tent  for  a  night”  when  he  advises  something  like 
considering sickness or health  as equally palliative to  the universe (EL  481).  I  think of this 
bracing statement as explained somewhat by this exhilarating description from “Circles”: “the 
past is always swallowed and forgotten; the coming only is sacred. Nothing is secure but life,  
transition, the energizing spirit” (413). The failure of the errand is the oncoming of something 
living.  Life  is  a  failed calculation,  a  “series of surprises,  and would not  be worth taking or 
keeping if it were not” (483). It is in this failure to consist without swerving that we are secure in 
the embrace of ongoing life. 
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Retallack suggests that the essay form makes a space for embracing disorientation and 
strangeness, which would make essaying a receptive errand into the strange. Instead of argument,  
the essay is an “urgent and aesthetically aware thought experiment” built of a mix of “logics, 
dislogics, intuition, revulsion, wonder” (4). I think it is fair to say that Another Tree Dance is a 
performance essay built of the logics, dislogics, intuitions, revulsions, and wonder of entertaining 
Emerson's images. Putting it in these terms makes me see its proportions in distinction to the 
essays (of Cavell and Arsić) and the seminar (Joan’s) that taught me so much about Emerson and 
that fortified the allegiance that has sustained me through the weird, hard process of dissertating. 
Those essays are primarily  readings, as the first two chapters of this dissertation are, making 
meaning  by  seeking  out  the  text's  logic understood  as  an  internal  consistency  of  imagery, 
vocabulary, and value set. In bolstering and enhancing these images, words, and values, Emerson 
actually comes to mean more—the readings are a productive collaboration. By contrast, Another  
Tree Dance  makes its  meaning for the most  part  by seeking out  Retallack's last  four terms: 
dislogic, intuition, revulsion, wonder. There is some logic in the script, but it is clustered in the 
show’s prelude, which explains the context and orientation of my reading, and in the card deck 
given out as the show's epilogue, which offers descriptions of the attributes of different working 
intelligences described in Emerson's essays. What comes between the prelude and epilogue is 
what  I  have  come  to  understand,  following  Carson,  as  my  dissertation’s  “sleep  side,”  or, 
following Emerson, as its “occult relation.” That is the freedom that making an essay in the form 
of something else (a room, a building, a script, a dance) offers: to pursue the errand of essaying 
through the “more than rational” dimensions (Stevens), not just to think about and speak for the 
merits of the object of one’s attention (attraction, law), but to swim (and glitter) through it. 
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Fig. 8.  Emily Dickinson, Fragment 754
236
8.  I sometimes almost feared language was done between us – too dear, except for breath – 
then words flowed softly in like a shining scene, the lode of which the miner dreams
Before this  chapter ends,  I  want to glance backwards at  the inheritance  I  claimed of 
Artaud's theater of “vibration” operating in “a kind of unique language half-way between gesture 
and thought.” This theater “decontrols” language (the word is from Morton Feldman and refers 
to his notation) in order to recuperate both the energy of the environment in which it is spoken, 
and the vibratory presence of words at the moment they form their circuits of sense.  The art 
historian  Richard  Kostelanetz  called  the  1960's  variants  of  this  work  “the  theatre  of  mixed 
means,” whose combining he differentiates from the traditional mixing of theatrical elements (in 
opera or musical theater, for example) as not being controlled primarily by language, and further 
by being decontrolled in general. He takes Allan Kaprow's Happenings as the template of the 
mixed means event, noting that Happenings are characterized by indeterminacy, insofar as each 
participant follows a score but has not rehearsed and set either the way that score is manifested, 
or the way it comes into combination with those of the other participants. 
The information about ranges of theatrical experience generated by these events flowed 
into the performance work that followed in their wake. The indeterminacy between elements of 
the larger event did not necessarily remain unrehearsed, becoming instead part of the exploratory 
development phase in many cases. But the aesthetic openness to and value of surprising intervals 
between elements was sustained. If we take Kostelanetz's description in its exactitude, it signals 
an interest not in multiple means of performing, but in the event of their mixing. His language is  
plain, reflective of the tone of the artists he writes about, who talked about ordinary bodies, un-
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artists, and be-ins. But this mixing is not divorced from the more intense Artaudian mood, which 
names the blending and generation of new relationships alchemical.73 As a writer who came of 
age after that scene, after the idea of the playwright as the controlling creator had passed, I am 
sensitive to language as a theatrical element activated by its blending with a scene. (Again to 
refer back to Artaud, he insists on the primacy of the mise-en-scene in the theatrical event over 
the traditional centrality of the dramatic text.) I want to take this last glance at the way the sense-
making power of language mixes in that scene. 
Over the course of this chapter, I have listened for:
— a voice speaking as it returns from a dive into dimness confusion or vastness;
— a voice telling in a structure that couldn't predict its route in advance;
— a single voice singing on behalf of many voices from within an incredible expanse;
— a voice that attends to its own sonority;
— a voice that sounds from a specific and different position in relation to each hearer;
— a voice that takes the freedom to begin speaking from any place at all;
— a voice that operates on the sleep side of logical description.
One way of thinking about this set of voices is as designations of different spaces or rooms 
where language can be entertained. I see these spaces as hovering bands of frequency, wave-
lengths that require the audience to act as a fine a receiver, discovering the place on their own 
dial where the sound cuts through the noise. A theater with philosophical commitments to the 
process of thinking attempts to get its frequency there, half-way between gesture and thought. 
73     See the chapter “Theater and Alchemy” in Theater and Its Double. It is worth remembering that the first 
happening is generally acknowledged to be John Cage's Theater Piece No. 1 (Black Mountain Piece), which was 
devised at Black Mountain College in the summer of 1952, influenced by the M.C. Richard's readings of Artaud's 
Theater and Its Double, which she was in the process of translating at that time.  The term “happening” comes from 
Kaprow, and so is a retrospective designation for this event. 
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This is not a project of “fasten[ing] words to things,” as Emerson describes for the poet. 
This is a project of registering the emergent appearance of circuits of sense, circuits of meaning, 
in the moments before the relationship becomes so compelling as to deserve the word “fasten.” (I 
think this describes Wellman's insistence on the moment of “apparence”74 as where and when 
theater happens.)  Here we are in a room where we might almost fear that language is  done 
between us, in the room's filling up with non-language elements, non-sensical language, or the 
absence  of  controlling  sense  described  in  their  relation.  At  the  moment  we  approach  the 
possibility that no sense will arise (besides the elemental continuity of one thing happening after 
another), that we will remain lost, the words flood softly in, seaming the space in a silver circuit
—a feeling of some kind of completion, some drawing of a circumference around our present 
experience. I know that this circuit of sense needn't be done in words—that there is a language of 
spatial pattern, for example, that also registers with the same clarifying flood of sense. But I am 
particularly interested here to think about what happens when it is through the sense of words 
that these circuits appear in the room of performance, not from above, as explanation or narrative 
trope, but out of vagueness,  becoming discernible in a space “half-way between gesture and 
thought.” Think of sense as a circuit, or as a seam suddenly flooded with silver, “the lode of 
which  the  miner  dreams.”  Imagining  sense  as  this  suddenly  defined  form  reminds  me  of 
Emerson's description in “The Transcendentalist” of  the way “I—this thought which is called I,
—is  the  mould  into  which  the  world  is  poured  like  melted  wax”  (EL  196).  Like 
transcendentalism, theater as an exercise in awaiting the inflooding circuit is a reconditioning 
thought  experiment  meant  to  excite  the  experimenter  into  experiencing  the  illuminating 
74    “Apparence,” as noted in an earlier section, is Wellman's coinage in “Speculations,” signaling the convergence  
of “apperception,” the process of making sense, and “appearance.”
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alignment of the “axis of vision” with the “axis of things,” the pouring of the world into the 
mould (47). Recall Cage's words: “Structure without life is dead. But Life without structure is 
un-seen. Pure life expresses itself within and through structure.”
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CHAPTER FOUR
Another Tree Dance: an essay in the form of a room
“My book should smell of pines and resound with the hum of insects.”  (EL 267)
The summer before I began doctoral study, I read the chapter on Jonathan Edwards in 
Joan Richardson's  A Natural History of Pragmatism. I grasped little of the book then, but the 
word “room” and the phrase “the room of the idea” landed and stayed. Theater is a room that 
contains its participants, and within which three things happen: a form is wagered and followed 
(call it fiction, or choreography), attention is directed in more than usual quantities, and things 
happening are at the same time seen and felt. Its success depends on a willing submission to the 
event’s  duration,  a  commitment  to  patience  with its  unfolding:  a  commitment  to  inhabit  the 
room. What would it mean to inhabit not a drama, but the the wagers that belong to an essay’s  
form? In the form of a room, an essay asks about the physical experience of thinking alongside 
another: about nervous response, about the bodied mapping of witnessed movement. In the form 
of  a  room,  an  essay proceeds by  furnishing,  circulating,  by  turning on the  music.  Jonathan 
Edwards  describes  a  furnished  room  of  elemental  relations  as  “the  room  of  the  idea,”  a 
conceptual chamber of meditation upon a word or an image, a chamber in which an idea is 
staged, making a space in which to persist until the idea strikes the physical, nervous, hormonal, 
conceptual,  and  for  him  religious  “sense  of  the  heart,”  which  is  full-bodied  understanding. 
Theater as room recreates these conditions, in company. In chambers, in camera, light and sound 
and image and the feeling of near bodies strike sensitive matter. The room is for the developing 
emergence of understanding. It thrives on the audience's willingness to persist in the dimness, so 
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as not to ruin the exposure.  The print  that comes of it  is  not part  of the room. The print  is  
transmissible, equipped to survive in time, whereas what happens in the room always lasts for a 
while and then recedes. To enter this kind of theater, we gather, close the door and occupy the 
room together.
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PROCESS NARRATIVE OF ANOTHER TREE DANCE
CREATING IN CONVERSATION
Another Tree Dance is a seventy minute solo show that I performed in October 2013. It 
was originally imagined as a publication of this dissertation in the medium of performance. It 
was to happen after the dissertation itself was done, and to function as a productive pressure on 
the timeline of writing. I envisioned it as a lyric lecture-demonstration threaded with dances. In 
part, I made it because I wanted to re-orient myself as I approached the close of my doctoral 
studies and looked for a place to work. I felt clearly that I would return to working and teaching 
in the performance community, and so it made sense to me that the only way this dissertation 
process would feel complete was if I were able to communicate it to that community. But I also 
decided to make Another Tree Dance because every stage of my graduate work has been sifted 
into  and  through  creative  work,  either  written  or  performed.  I  experience  that  passage  and 
repurposing  as  an  “irresistible  dictation,”  the  obedience  to  the  impulses  of  my  thought, 
experienced both as a dictation and as the way I come to know myself, that Emerson names in 
“Fate” (EL 943).75
I booked the show at The Chocolate Factory Theater a year and a half in advance of the 
performance  date,  thinking I  would  first  complete  the  dissertation  and  then translate  it  into 
performance. Writing was slower than I had anticipated, however, so the process of building the 
75     He continues: “By obeying each thought frankly, or by harping, if you will, pounding on each string, we learn 
at last its power. By the same obedience to other thoughts, we learn theirs, and then comes some reasonable hope of  
harmonizing them. We are sure, though we know not how, necessity does comport with liberty, the individual with 
the world, my polarity with the spirit of the times. The riddle of the age has for each a private solution.” (EL 943)
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show ended up happening alongside that of writing the dissertation, interrupting it, informing it, 
and eventually being at  absorbed into it.  In relation to the timeline of the chapters,  I  began 
scripting it as I was almost finished with my first chapter and had written a portion of the second. 
The performance was built while writing the second chapter. (I tend to make theater by first 
creating  a  series  of  texts  that  do  not  necessarily  lend themselves  to  performance,  and  then 
attempt to build a performance structure around and through them, so the composition of the text 
and the composition of the show are actually separate in both process and product, unlike a 
traditional  play  which  specifies  its  own  performance  structure,  even  if  there  is  room  for 
directorial  interpretation.)  The  third  chapter  was  conceived  and  written  after  the  show was 
complete. Under the influence of my return to theater, I turned that chapter toward seeking out 
Emersonian affinities for my approach to theater generally, as well as theatrical  affinities with an 
Emersonian commitment to philosophy. In the end, Another Tree Dance was not only a way of 
communicating some of this thinking to my performance community, but also a way for me to 
understand my dissertation's questions from oblique angles, to explore my private relationship to 
Emerson's thinking outside the context of scholarship, and allow that in turn explicitly to inform 
my scholarly writing.
From the outset it was clear that the show had to be a solo performance, not only because 
dissertating is such an isolating experience, but also because the imaginative space I find when 
making theater and performance, as strand of my life, feels to me like “the solitude to which 
every man is always returning” that Emerson describes in the last passage of “Experience.” I 
would perform alone. But performance thrives in its collaborative habits, and I did not want to go 
through the process of devising the performance in complete solitude for fear of being unable to 
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get perspective on my task,76 so I asked my friend and long-time collaborator Sara Smith to work 
with  me. We described the piece as  having been created  “in conversation” with each other. 
Conversation became the medium for ideas and images to surface—conversations first  about 
what seemed to animate or propel the questions I was asking in the dissertation and the ways I 
was responding to Emerson, and then conversations about the ways I had already been sensitive 
to  some of  those  same animations  in  my past  work.  This meant  that  the  show took a very 
different shape than it might have had I devised it alone, or devised it as a “translation” of my 
chapters. Through conversation, Sara and I generated assignments. I would then work by myself 
to  answer  the  assignments,  which  would  be  followed  by  more  conversations  about  those 
“answers”  in  terms  of  how they would  become elements  of  the  performance,  which  had to 
operate on its own terms and not only as a shadow or response to the dissertation. 
THE GRID AND THE GALLERY 
Because we lived in different states, Sara and I generated the framework and staged the 
piece in three short residencies – four days in May, a week in July, and the two weeks leading up 
to the performance in early October. During the first residency, Sara came to California, and we 
spent four days talking about the dissertation, which at  that point was focused on Emerson's 
descriptions of intelligence and the different ways to participate in the intelligence of the world, 
or nature. We began by homing in on images or sentences (both from Emerson and from the 
years of seminar reading) that I felt particularly attracted to: “All things swim and glitter”; the 
76     To be both creator and performer means that I would literally never get this perspective, being unable to watch 
myself perform, unlike, say, a process of writing, where I can become the reader after I have been the writer. 
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“occult relation” between man and vegetable; “All I know is reception”; the “solitude to which 
every man is always returning”; the idea of illumination as an “excellent region”; the idea of 
aversiveness as turning away, as well as an idea of turning away that associates with the idea of 
onwardness  or  following  uncalculated  openings;  the  recognition  of  compensations;  the 
conjoining of “dimmer” and “freer”; the “sleep side”; images involving waves; the image of 
Thoreau dropping a sounding line in Walden Pond.
We were looking for ways to think about this inventory of images theatrically, ways to 
participate in and work from their intelligence without having to situate them in Emersonian 
contexts, which would lose too much time in explanation. We taped together nine sheets of graph 
paper into a large rectangle and drew a grid, with columns to list theatrical images, Emersonian 
references, theatrical modalities (dance, song, text, projection), and any old work of mine that 
seemed relevant (see Appendix 2 for an image of the grid score). One of the first images that  
suggested itself was the figure of the radiographer (all I know is reception). The radiographer 
suggested companion figures: the sonographer who sounds the depths, the topiarist who knows 
the occult relations between man and vegetable, the projectionist who entertains (with) luminous 
images,  the  turning  man  who  turns  away,  the  collector  who  understands  the  infinitesimal 
attractions of ordinary things. They were figures defined by occupations but suggestive not of 
characters but of the occult emblems of a tarot deck. This quasi-tarot type of figure made sense 
as a way of imaging Emerson's linking of fate with work, through the “irresistible dictations” 
that are received individually according to the peculiar channels of each person's thought, and the  
linking of “doing your work” with finding and opening those channels. The convergence of the 
suggestion (in  Nature) that there are “occult relations” to be discovered between a person and 
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other nonhuman things, and the mode of study as doing a reading also underwrote the pleasure 
we took in the tarot echoes of this emerging gallery of figures. We knew fairly soon that the 
figures would be somehow a key to the generative process of the show. 
Other images in this early score came from different sources. We were trying to generate 
tasks without worrying about the eventual narrowing down, and pursued any ideas that seemed 
to have theatrical relations to the dissertation's field of inquiry. Eventually some of these sections 
were  conceived  of  as  non-figurative  elements  in  the  gallery  of  figures,  which  became  our 
controlling structural device. These non-figurative cards included The Sleep Side, The Dimmer 
Freer, The Tree Dance, and Another Tree Dance. We experimented with movement tasks focused 
on moving continuously by turning over bones in socket joints (with “turning/following” as a 
translation of  Cavell's  aversiveness  and onwardness,  giving  the  gooey,  lovely  feeling  of  the 
movement the nickname “an excellent region” which is one of Emerson's names for delighted 
thought); included ideas for short audio pieces (we thought we might have an interview with my 
father  explaining  amplitude  and  frequency,  as  his  work  as  an  engineer  included  radio  and 
satellite communications); thought about video and lantern projections (there was an idea to use 
revolving lantern templates as a kind of shadow play, building on ways we both had worked in 
the past); imagined slide shows (of my grandparents' slides, of Emerson's text, both of which 
were retained in the final version of the piece); assigned musical airs as forms of solitude (using 
a small Casio keyboard I had used in past shows). Finally we went through my archive of old 
work in text, movement, sound, video and animation, looking for ways I might already have 
been working with images resonating in our inventory, knowing that those Emersonian images 
registered with me in part because I was already interested in them (I recognized them in their 
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“alienated majesty” as my own.) We gathered a set of songs, videos, and images that seemed to 
already articulate the Emersonian interests. We named these resonating pieces the “prehensions,” 
using  Alfred  North Whitehead's  term for  the  imaginative,  aesthetic,  subjective grasping that 
prefigures and underlies objective understanding. The “prehensions” offered us an archeological 
map to the show, as a kind of buried foundation below the zodiac we were creating with our new 
gallery of emblematic figures.  These were all recorded on the grid score. Each sentence from the 
inventory  was  thus  associated  with  theatrical  imagery,  possibly  with  old  work,  and  given a 
tentative  assignment  (write  a  prose  paragraph;  compose  a  musical  interlude;  make a  dance; 
create a projection or animation).
After  Sara  left  California  at  the  end  of  this  first  residency,  I  began working  on  the 
sections we had designated as prose. I started with The Topiarist, as the passage from Nature 
gave concrete images I could use as a starting point—the delight “ministered” by the woods in 
recognizing the relation between man and vegetable, and the waving of the vegetables to the 
man. Here is what I wrote:
(Voice in the almost-dark; on mic;  minimal underscoring, minimal gesture.  
Perhaps play with lantern templates and fern/curve designs that accumulate to  
create a human form from plant?)
I am out walking. I see a fern no higher than my shin. A curve unfolds a further  
curve. A wave. The fern waves at me. I wave back at it. We sing: cousin, fern.  
cousin, plant. cousin, branch. I am I because the abominable branch knows me. 
We record our kinship by the intervals in our music. The bowls are struck. The 
plants begin. There is no impossible place; they will go waving. I remember I 
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was stuck in the hot grey concrete expanse of freeway, trying to exit. Where the 
road  divided  there  were  birds,  in  a  small  piece  of  shade,  a  greener  grey,  a 
minutely more green grey: birds, two grey birds, and a white bird. Three of them 
in a small bit of shade made by a white concrete divider on the bright grey road.  
There is a rule of islands: where bird, then plant. A small island is fertilized. Soil 
in a concrete crack in the small amount of shade on the exit portion of freeway. 
There was another time when nature meant the woods, but who can afford that 
now when half of all humans live in the city? And of plants and birds too. They 
wave to us and we wave to them. From near places. From tiny patches. Cousin? 
Yes. Cousin? Yes. Cousin? I see you. 
We choose The Topiarist. With his tool, a shears, he has teased a rabbit from a 
block. In the gardens of the municipal park he has taken his shears and cut now 
this way and now that until this mass of plant reveals its human form. For our 
rabbit of the concrete and our human of the shrubbery, we choose the topiarist, 
who coaxes one out  of  another.  Coaxes the sound of a  door opening out  of 
silence. On the closed white blinds, while I was writing, I could see the shifting 
shadows of the trees outside waving in the way they do, nodding up on their 
long stems, nodding over the sidewalk and over the cars, and over the fearsome 
and unholy neighborhood cats. There they are up there waving while the boy is 
sleeping and the dog is waiting and they will still be waving when you come 
home.
This was an improvisation, but it gave me a form to follow: a narrative or descriptive paragraph 
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followed by a kind of nomination (we choose the ____, who ____ ). It was enough to to begin 
moving through an otherwise vague series. That exact structure of passage and nomination didn't 
survive the editing process, as its tempo didn't work in performance. Instead, the prose passages 
were edited and set into the script by themselves, and the nominations were clustered first in the 
“History of Reading” section that acts as an introduction and orientation to the show, and then 
repeated with elaboration in the captions of the card deck handed out to the audience as they 
exited (See Appendix 1).  
COMPOSING THE PERFORMANCE
The second residency took place at Mount Tremper Arts, and culminated in a work-in-
progress showing. During that week-long residency we took each section and tried to stage it 
separately. I brought with me about 14 boxes of slides that I had gathered from my grandparents 
on both sides, as well as slide casing and transparency paper to print and construct our own text 
slides.  In  addition  to  me  and  Sara,  our  set  designer  Luke  Hegel-Cantarella  and  my  fellow 
seminarian Stefania Heim joined us, enlarging the conversation. By the time we arrived at Mount 
Tremper, I had written the entire draft of the script, made a good deal of sound for underscoring,  
and composed a few songs. I hadn't choreographed any dances, and was thinking about trying to 
draw instead on the improvisation practice I had sustained in the year leading up to the residency,  
challenging myself to leave portions of the performance truly unknown in advance.  
A week is not long enough to stage a performance, even a draft of it, and in adding the 
short-term  memory  demands  of  that  rush  to  the  ongoing  state  of  sleep  deprivation  new 
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motherhood had brought me, the in-progress showing was very shaky. (I call it the fawn-legs 
variation.) However it did give us a chance to experience the text off the page, and to get an 
initial reading on the very quiet mood of the piece. Certain sections—The Collector, The Pilot, 
The Sonographer—worked well, even in our very simple staging. (As we had so many sections 
to attempt, we left each one in an elementary state, concentrating our studio time on building 
movement material, and much of our other time in making slides.) One of the more successful 
things that happened during that residency was the illustration of each of the figures. Sara drew 
each image, and Luke digitally colored them so that they held together as a series. We had them 
converted into slides and projected them alongside the titles to each section. We built two short 
dances and left one as an open improvisation. My text for The Turning Man was energetically 
dull  and unstageable,  but  it  had  written into  it  a  slide  show of  pure  color  slides  (made by  
inserting colored lighting gel into empty slide cases). We tossed the text but kept the slide show, 
accompanied by music we had used to experiment with the “following” movement score during 
our first residency. 
The performance we gave at Mt Tremper was structurally identical to the script: a long 
series of discrete sections titled with their figure. Although there was something interesting in  
their accumulation, the shape of the event as a whole was obscure in the extreme, too obscure 
even for experimental dance audiences who are probably the most negatively capable people I've 
ever encountered. Under the pressures and problems of memory, and the generally awful feeling 
of performing something I was not fully prepared to show (even as “in-progress”), I had a hard 
time getting the sense of the material that the experience of performing usually brings, which 
meant that the impressions of my collaborators in thinking about the shape of the whole event 
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became critical. They felt a few things: that the sense was too distant from the surface, and that 
some kind of legible entry into the series of scenes was needed, that the projection of each card 
as  a  title  to  the  section  was  more  confusing  than  helpful,  and  that  the  piece  needed  more 
theatrical energy – there was too much unbroken text and it needed non-verbal counterpoints to 
make  the  language  hover  or  vibrate.  What  worked  were  the  visually  or  sonorously  strong 
sections: a 2-channel slide show of images from my grandparents' vacation slides combined into 
new pairs with shared structural elements (three figures in the foreground, a body of water, aerial 
view of ruins; a vaulting structure) which accompanied The Collector and made it into a kind of 
art-talk (see figures 10-15 of Appendix 3 for some of these paired images); The Sonographer text 
embedded in recorded audio played in the almost-dark with only the light of four signal lanterns 
and my occasional live singing; The Pilot text simultaneously projected as a slide show, and read 
aloud on microphone; the choreographed movement material that moved quickly through spatial 
maps; the sung refrain and audio recording (text field recorded after dinner one night with Sara,  
Stefania, and Luke's wife Christine) of The Dimmer Freer text. 
The final stage of working involved rethinking the order and continuity of events, and 
seeking out  places  to  add energy where it  was  too quiet.  I  wrote  a  prologue (A History  of 
Reading) to orient the audience before the show's descent into the less legible space of its series 
of figures, and turned the figure images into a card deck backed by Emersonian descriptions of 
each  figure's  intelligence.  This  deck  was  still  projected  during  the  show,  but  now  as  a 
concentrated  slide  show,  with  the  group  introduced  all  together  during  the  prologue,  then 
remaining unnamed until  copies  of  the  card  deck were  handed out  at  the  end of  the  show, 
forming its epilogue as well as imposing a frame on the audience's memory of what happened. I 
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put a 5-minute pause in the middle (something I needed for myself as a performer, but also a 
useful  mental  space  for  the  audience),  and structured  the  piece  into two acts  with  common 
sequences:  a direct address, a slide show with music, a podium lecture,  a dance, an abyssal 
experience (I will say more about this), and a resurfacing song. 
RECUPERATION, VASTATION, TRANCE
Perspective on what exactly  I  am up to in the process of making something is  often 
retrospective, but there are three things I became aware of while making and performing the 
piece that seem important to note here. The first is that I began to understand the project as a  
process of recuperation (instead of say, translation, communication, experiment, meditation), a 
word that came to me initially from Cavell's description of Emerson as being involved in the loss 
and recovery of the world but took on new meaning as I worked through my second chapter. The 
real  illumination  of  that  chapter,  in  my estimation,  was  taking the  Cavellian  interest  in  the 
recuperation of the world and Friedl's reading of Emerson's  “circular power always returning to 
itself” as specifying the ground of being as a continuous recuperation of one's natural history, and 
linking them with the somatic studio process recuperative of physical health and intelligence. 
Developing the show, I came to recognize my creative history  also formed a kind of natural 
history: of my own intellect, my experience of thinking and imagining. Not only did this prompt 
(or authorize) the inclusion in the text of images from old work (as with The Sonographer, which 
begins as a storyboard of several scenes from disparate plays of mine, or The Sleep Side, which 
passes through a long inventory of characters from my plays and writings), but also it led me to  
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compose the show's dances from ones I had made in the past, or impressions of the dances of my 
close collaborators in the formative years of my choreographic investigations, the years when I 
made my first tree dance, an adaptation of Hugo Ball's Tenderenda lodged in a fairy tale set in a 
living (dancing) forest (and in which my character turned into a Silver Linden). One of old those 
dances had been performed in front of one of my grandfather's vacation slides, which was the  
initial link to all the stuff of my grandparents (slides, a coat, music) that was folded into the 
piece. 
I didn't approach this incorporation as a quotation of or commentary on past work so 
much as a gathering of text and movement images that gave evidence of ways of thinking, which 
I could join with new images animated over the course of six years spent reading. In other words,  
the old images didn't dominate or act as a key so much as provide a ground from which to find 
the  figures  and  channels  down which  my imagination  presently  runs,  channels  which  were 
figured as the several landscapes and journeys of the show. The Collector quotes an aphorism 
from Spinoza's  Ethics that  I  like  so  much that  I  embroidered  it  on  a  flag  for  the  museum 
installation component of Montgomery Park, or Opulence (made in response to reading William 
James's The Varieties of Religious Experience): “The more an image is joined with other images, 
the more often it flourishes.” I took this to heart. 
These images flourished in the form of the three first-person storyboards which feel to me 
like the heart of the text: The Sonographer, which describes a descent into water (committing to 
the waves); The Pilot, which describes a cross-continental aerial excursion (committing to the 
winds); and The Sleep Side, which slides along the surfaces of a recurring dream (with only 
waking  commitments).  In  the  Sonographer  and The Pilot,  the  storyboards  end  in  a  kind  of 
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deliquescence or atomization of the first person. In this way the storyboard structure proceeds as 
a kind of virtual reality game, playing with the project of entertaining images of “vastation.” The 
Sleep Side, linked to the real details of my life (my work, my nightmares, my son), ends by 
delivering its first person voice back to the limited ground of the actual world but without any 
kind of resolution. It joins with the sections that follow it—a slide show of Emerson's sentences 
of patient skepticism, and The Dimmer Freer song of return and attraction—to find the return to 
wakefulness (to the world) as a willingness to simply go on. 
These  images  were  both  old  and  new  to  me.  I  have  been  making  work  about 
deliquescence (or in Emerson's phrase, “the evanescence and lubricity of all objects”) since I 
started writing, and in fact I think that the best dances I made in the time before I began writing 
also experimented with the emergence and passing away of form. I think my choreographic mind 
found its home in writing because the narrative and imagistic features of our common language 
allowed me to approach that idea more concretely than I had in my more spatially abstract dance-
making (although today I can imagine returning to dance as the medium of this same project). 
This new work, however, folded fluid images into its syntax, so that they did not occupy the 
work as its ending (metaphorical fade to black), but rather as a constant mode of movement (its 
onwardness). I think that has to do with the way my thinking has grown, through my reading of 
Emerson, to hold my attention on the dual cast of vastation and recuperation over the mood of 
daily living, as if they formed a kind of two-voiced music, trading off in the sense of which one 
might be the melody and which the harmony. 
Approaching the performance, I was thinking a lot about how to get at a presence and 
stage space that would allow the group experience (a surface tension at the meeting of me as 
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performer, the form of the piece, and the audience) to take an abyssal plunge, to lose the world. 
In each of the show's two acts, an abyssal dive comes at  the classical  pressure point of the  
penultimate scene (visualize a story's arc). In each act making a dive was a question not strictly 
of textual images (although the text has its own descents in these sections), but of staging, of 
room tone.  The  Sonographer  went  to  near-darkness,  was  heard  in  voiceover  except  for  my 
intermittent singing in a thin high voice, coming from my body lying on the ground, out of range 
of what slivers of light there were, facing back. The Sleep Side was also heard in voiceover, also 
faced back, and also allowed the light (a shifting landscape of deep color designed brilliantly by 
Kathy Couch) to override my body, while I took a ten-minute cross directly upstage, following 
minute  attentions  to  interior  shifts  in  my posture  and stepping.  Each of  these  descents  was 
followed by a song. In the first act, I sang: all the incommunicable things come crowding/all the  
indecipherable things comes rising/go around the world. In the second act: more is not indicated 
it is enthralled / return to me. Two dives, two recoveries. 
It was not until opening night that I realized how much this performance of diving and 
recovery  took  place  in  a  kind  of  trance  state.  After  the  directness  and  good  humor  of  the 
prologue, my performance task was to sustain a simplicity and focus to render the text and the 
dances.  Only  through  the  intensely  quiet  physical  experience  of  holding  that  focus  for  an 
audience – being, in body, the only thread through an obscure series of images  – did I come to 
think of the piece as taking place almost entirely on its own sleep side. Only then did I realize 
that I had used the process to impersonally dive into my own sleep side, as if I could write a 
natural history of my own intellect, to make another tree dance. That is the task I think Emerson 
assigned to me. 
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PERFORMANCE OUTLINE OF ANOTHER TREE DANCE 
Underlined items can be found in full on the following pages. Because the texts and dance scores  
form their own series independent of the choices we made for this performance, I have decided 
to present them here separately, as discrete elements of a possible event. The outline below is 
what we made for my recent performance. If I was to work on the show again, I might arrive at  
an entirely different solution. 
ACT ONE
Enter.
Task:  Entertain images of audience members as cousins of ferns,  branches,  other nonhuman 
things. 
Song: Reading Song.
Slide Show: Meyers and Keithley Vacation Slides, followed by titles for a Vacation Slide Show.
Text: History of Reading.
Dance: Cartographer Dance; Radiographer Coda.
Transition: Play Henry Mancini's “Experiments in Terror.” Reset furniture. 
Text with Slide Show: The Collector with 2-channel slide show of Poinsard Vacation Slides. 
Transition: Slide set from opening lines of Sonographer text. To near-darkness with only signal 
lanterns.
Text: The Sonographer, voiceover with live singing interspersed. 
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Song: Incommunicable Things.
PAUSE (with running audio collage, 5 minutes.)
ACT TWO
Enter. 
Text: The Topiarist.
Task:  Entertain  images  of  audience  members  turning  into  ferns,  branches,  other  nonhuman 
things. 
Slide Show: “Sincerely” by The Moonglows plays. Project pure color slides.
Text: The Pilot (text simultaneously read aloud and projected).
Dance: Another Tree Dance.
Text: The Sleep Side, voiceover with movement score. 
Slide Show: Sentences (Emerson).
Song: The Dimmer Freer, with simultaneous voiceover, slide projections, and live singing. 
End. 
Object: Distribute Card Deck to audience as they exit. 
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TEXTS
A HISTORY OF READING (PROLOGUE)
THE TOPIARIST
THE COLLECTOR
THE SONOGRAPHER (FIRST STORYBOARD)
THE PILOT (SECOND STORYBOARD)
THE SLEEP SIDE
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A HISTORY OF READING
I have been reading for six years. 
I have been reading the same few books for six years.
The same few parts of the same few books. 
Even the same few sentences of the same few parts of the same few books. 
I collected these sentences.
I think I have always read this way. 
I have always read this way because some sentences possess a kind of continuous suggestion.
There are many reasons to read. 
One is to find out what to do. 
How to live, what to do. 
Before I started reading, I only knew my totems: 
the mole, who patiently goes on
the tree, who even more patiently goes on. 
But when my friend came to talk to me about what I had been reading, 
we discovered a circuit of figures, 
figures we recognized as our own.
A gallery, a deck.
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Do your work and I shall know you,
Said Ralph Waldo Emerson.
Every occupation possesses a particular intelligence. 
Each kind of work a different response to the question,
how to live, what to do?
What you are and what to do about it?
I drew a hand, I chose a deck. 
I do choose. 
I choose The Topiarist, who coaxes one out of another. Who knows the occult relation between 
man and vegetable;  I choose The Projectionist, who hovers a line across space, a concentration; 
I  choose  The Collector,  who is  satisfied  with  accidental  and partial  gains.  Who knows the 
plenitude of the ordinary, the sufficiency of the day. Who gathers and reuses and relinquishes 
too;  I choose  The Sonographer, who signals the depths, who transmits noise and reads in its 
return the distances of distances; I choose The Surveyor, who measures in hands and feet, who 
knows the rules for the restoration of lost and obliterated corners; I choose The Radiographer, 
who receives the incoming and unknown, who knows the spooky, active far places;  I choose 
The Pilot,  who knows invisible channels,  knows a violence we can travel by; I  choose  The 
Turning Man, who takes the way of abandonment; I choose The Sleep Side, for I do not possess 
myself;  I  choose  The Dimmer Freer,  for tiny attractions  quietly  moving; I  choose  The Tree 
Dance, for patience; I choose Another Tree Dance, because it chooses me.
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I choose to read about dispossession
I choose to read about onwardness
I choose to read about opulence
I choose to read about vagueness
I choose to read about radiant atmospheres
I choose to read about how sentences carry
I choose to read about excellent regions
I choose to read about the rosy-fingered dawn, the porcelain-fingered dawn
I choose to read what points along the way
I choose to read what makes me see your face
I choose to read what delights
what abandons
what disappears
I choose to read about holes
abysses
waves
I choose to read about lasting
about sounding
about swimming and glittering
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I choose to read what evanescences, what deliquesces
I choose to recall
to collect
to publish
I choose to sing
to forget 
I choose patience
recuperation
tumbling
I choose vastation
I choose reticulation 
I know that friendship is freer
I know our compensations
I know the light it throws
I know our early history  
I know its general failure
I remember the old things
I remember the old faces
I remember the old dances
I remember the early sense of this same thought
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This same thought always returning to itself
Again
Returning wholly strange and new
Again
Q: How does a spider attach a thread across a wide space?
A: A spider hangs her thread by launching – 
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THE TOPIARIST
I am out walking. I see a fern no higher than my shin. A curve unfolds a further curve. A wave. 
The fern waves at me. I wave back at it. We sing: cousin, fern. cousin, plant. cousin, branch. I 
am I because the abominable branch knows me. We record our kinship by the intervals in our 
music. The bowls are struck, and we begin. There is no impossible place. 
I remember I was stuck on the hot grey concrete expanse of freeway, trying to exit. Where the 
road divided there were birds, in a small piece of shade, a greener grey, a minutely more green 
grey: birds, two grey birds, and a white bird. Three of them in a small bit of shade made by a 
white concrete divider on the bright grey road. 
There is a rule of islands: where bird, then plant. A small island is fertilized. Soil in a concrete  
crack in the small amount of shade on the exit portion of freeway. There was another time when 
nature meant the woods, but who can afford that now when half of all humans live in the city? 
And of plants and birds too. They wave to us and we wave to them. From near places. From tiny 
patches. Cousin? Yes. Cousin? Yes. Cousin? I see you. 
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THE COLLECTOR
There are other rooms, ample times, and other sentences. I had to fund what was becoming 
ubiquitous and what was good to look at. Accidentally I wrote x instead of c, or c instead of x.  
Anxiety became “anciety” became by addition “ancienty”; I wonder what it means. The sounds 
of voices are preserved in what we now substitute for letters, so that's something. And although 
in some moods we demand that there be  no reflection, I do collect. Is recombination and the 
sounding of background reverberation in new and subtile intervals something different  from 
holding and grasping and knowing? We have sorted the pieces into new relationships. I like to 
rest in the feeling. In this way the past throws its light on my face and sings. I felt that it was 
slow. This was a sentence. I felt that it was slow. 
After all the promises we made her, we have failed the dog. She is there on the carpet, along with 
the local weather, the weekend-long party in the downstairs apartment, the sound of bicycles 
working a rail, and the opening and closing of the seven garages across the street. I place one 
here, one here, and one here. For my future, I have chosen a glass room to write in. I enter the  
room with a heap of miscellany and begin to assemble it into new arrangements. This tiny work 
in the face of the news and the violence – it is a kind of security. And everyday I walk out into 
the day, which is a shape thrown across the accretion of so many days. And in this way the day 
throws its light on my face. “The more an image is joined with other images, the more often it 
flourishes.” 
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Listen. The pattern of the ceiling fan. The offshore wind that leans the trees by the electric plant. 
The coffee machine gathering its pressure. The dog's eye is open but she lies completely still, 
while I lie here trying make pictures for my most fragile abstractions, to land them in pictures.  
Like the speed of swimming sea lions at the aquarium or the far off car race that has fly-droned 
all weekend through the open windows of middle spring. The quiet is full of movement.
I propose we sing all the new words in the green light of the living room I've been dreaming of 
since I was a child. The interruptions collect as we sing. There is a hill I cannot place, but I know 
it  grows buttercups  and we roll  down it.  Like  logs  attempting  the  feeling  of  abundance.  “I  
visualize my way back to treehood,” says the log. 
There is a security in these special channels. Other worlds, fantastic bridges, tubes in space, 
vegetable  interstellar  reticulations.  In  a  green  room  I  see  a  yellow  a  blue  and  a  red  light  
positioned above three tunnels and it is my choice to make. Choose a slide. I do choose. The 
dream repeats. 
I choose the yellow light and the yellow light chooses the collector. I take old things and speed 
them up,  propel  them gently forward.  Despite  the violence,  despite  the fear  and the  hate,  I 
continue to chant, ancienty. Ancienty is a tilted chimney in the grey mist of this morning's sky. 
Ancienty is the ticking of the kitchen timer. Radicalization now. Radicalization forever. Still we 
have food and beds and furniture. Still we have the words we hold in common. And our dogs. 
And the surfaces we cannot keep clear. And for that I apologize. 
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THE SONOGRAPHER (FIRST STORYBOARD)
One. I had myself placed into a bathysphere. 
Two. I was lowered into the waves. 
Three. The chains were released. I floated. 
Four. I felt I was committed to the waves. 
Five. There is light in the water, fishes. 
Six. I descend through a canopy of jellyfish. 
Seven. There are caves in the sea floor. 
Eight. I swivel the beams onto the walls of the cave.
Nine. My vessel lands, the light cuts out, and I am in darkness.
Ten. There are faintly glowing seams of something. 
go floating
go lowering
go leaning
Eleven. I crawl out of my bathysphere. 
Twelve. There is a ladder going upwards. 
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Thirteen. I climb until I don't where I am. Total darkness. 
Fourteen. I am washed ashore. 
go floating
go lowering
go leaning
Fifteen. I travel overland to a cave mouth. 
Sixteen. I enter into a series of caves.
Seventeen. I find an underground lake. 
Eighteen. There is a further chamber filled with moles. 
Nineteen. A further chamber of mice, howling. 
Twenty. Beyond that a great indistinctness, a sense of disappearance. 
Twenty-one. I walk very far. 
go glowing
go seeming
go glowering
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Twenty-two. I am still out walking. 
Twenty-three. I am abroad in the land. 
Twenty-four. I pass a man on horseback with scraps of paper pinned to his clothing. 
go finding
go following
go following
Twenty-five. I cover my mouth. I remember him. 
Twenty-six. I have light coming out of my own eyes. 
Twenty-seven. I go on by floating. 
Twenty-eight. I am in an oceanic condition. 
Twenty-nine. I gather scraps to me as I float. 
Thirty. I join them together. 
Thirty-one. I attach them to the currents. Like the air man at the car wash. 
Thirty-two. I have made a kind of house. 
Thirty-three. I slip inside the house. The house remakes itself.  
Thirty-four. The house is I and I am floating on a kind of ocean. 
Thirty-five. On a kind of sea. 
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Thirty-six. I am a house founded on the sea. 
Thirty-seven. We are houses founded on the sea. 
Sing.
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THE PILOT (SECOND STORYBOARD)
One. I have myself placed into a basket. 
Two. I light the gas fire under the canopy of balloon. 
Three. The basket is rising. 
Four. I throw down the ropes. 
Five. I am committed to the winds. 
Six. There I am, an eye cast across the land. 
Seven. I see trees spread out like fingers, trees in the shape of veins. 
Eight. I see trees in thicket. 
Nine. I come to the place I live. 
Ten. I see myself below. I am floating over my own self below. 
Eleven. I am in both places. 
Twelve. For the picture to work. 
Thirteen. I join a balloon gang and hover menacingly above the freeway. 
Fourteen. My balloon shadows three birds sheltering in the shade of an exit ramp. 
Fifteen. Cars quivering and inching. Balloons leaning out of banners. 
Sixteen. I slough out of my advertising and spill onward.
Seventeen. Lights of a small city and the sea beyond it.
Eighteen. I cannot tell if I'm moving up or down. 
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Nineteen. I float many days.
Twenty. I come to the mouth of a river. 
Twenty-one. There is my dog swimming in the safe water behind the sand bar.
Twenty-two. I put some amount of my being into this picture. 
Twenty-three. I put some amount of this picture into my being. 
Twenty-four. I continue north, hovering low. 
Twenty-five. I find the abundant valley. 
Twenty-six. There is a massive concrete chimney where a school of swallows circles at dusk. 
Twenty-seven. I join the bird-watchers.  
Twenty-eight. I join the birds. In the darkness of this chimney. 
Twenty-nine. We cover trees whose names I do not know. 
Thirty. We cross factories on the land that glow all night. 
Thirty-one. Orange dots and lines in clouds of quiet smoke. 
Thirty-two. Ground-lit tethered blimps wave from car lots. From mattress stores. 
Thirty-three. There they are, nodding at me.
Thirty-four. My basket carries me. 
Thirty-five. This sentence also carries me.
Thirty-six. This picture carries me. 
Thirty-seven. In the air I escape the freeway.
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Thirty-eight. In the air the grounding lines appear. 
Thirty-nine. I pull the staves from my basket. 
Forty. Seeing the sky from the sky. Seeing as the sky.
Forty-one. There are hovering flows. There is accidency, and life.
Forty-two. I plunge into trees cupping the fringes of subdivisions. 
Forty-three. I plunge into houses blinking with screen glow. 
Forty-four. I scatter and violate.  
Forty-five. In a thin, high voice. 
Forty-six. Without looking. 
Forty-seven. [this page intentionally left blank]  
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THE SLEEP SIDE
I am in a house. I have been to this house many times.
I alone awake. I go down several stairs. There are more stairs below me. 
I enter into wide green room. A great green room. It is empty. 
It is empty but on the wall there are three holes. Three mouths of three tunnels. 
Above the three holes are three lights. A red a yellow and a blue light in the green room. 
It is not painted green but it feels green. 
This is the color of the middle night. The color of something unaccompanied. A room rooming to  
itself. 
I must choose a tunnel. 
What recurs is feeling of crossing a swiftly dropping curve as I lose or almost lose control. 
I almost lose control but never fly off. 
I reveal myself as a moving line but at the point of inflection I do not fly off into the tangent, the 
ray, the vector.  Precise words of the geometer.  
I continue. I continue on a curving path. Gripping the far side of the curve. Barely bound, in a  
narrow security.  
Imagine a freeway overpass, imagine speeding. 
I choose the yellow light. I take the dropping way. I do not remember how but – 
I am in a balloon. I am coasting above the city. It is a green and pink city. It is a grey and blue 
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city. 
Red lights on a distant hotel. Lights buzz on as the dusk comes up. 
Red light casts itself into the grey and blue dusk above the hotel bar.
It is the wrong city. This is the wrong house. Restart. 
I am coasting now above a forest. Hand on basket. 
The river that leaves the city is behind me and I am coasting above the trees. 
The balloon grazes the top of the trees. It trawls. That's what I wrote many years ago. It trawls. 
I should be breaking the canopy but the balloon seems to pass through it. 
A kind of misalignment. A material impossibility. 
I am coasting onwards. Into the flickering light that breaks the gloom. 
So many of us. We are many. 
We are in balloons each alone in our baskets but all together breaking the light, scraping the 
canopy
which moves aside in fragments and spills light, this canopy. 
Light onto the forest floor. 
Bloom, angle, facing. It's all there. And underfoot, softness. 
There is a woman walking on the soft floor. 
Pause. 
There is an old but not too old woman and a dog. 
Leave them. 
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I am walking. I cover my eyes. I cover my mouth. There is no man on horseback. There is no 
rabbit. 
Pause. 
In the silence of this house, now. In this silence. A silence you might feel spreading across your 
back. Might be feeling something. Might be feeling something you can't name. What will not fit  
a mouth. What does not fit my mouth. 
In the balloon again, passing over myself still  walking down there on the forest floor in the 
silence of this house intermittently cut by light. 
If you leave the things you have always imagined, if you abandon them and you launch yourself 
onward,
who is to say you will not find imaginings of an older time,
a kind of pleistocene ahead of you. A green place. A soft place. 
Another green world. An earlier, ancienty world. 
What would it mean to possess this world? 
What would it mean to possess this room? 
To be dispossessed by this room? 
As if it was no longer your own, but was the moon's room?
With what would you sense your loss? With what instrument would you know? What exact 
identification is to be made?
A tiny misalignment. 
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The gas flame flickers and cuts out. 
Total darkness. The howling of mice again. 
It turns out the images will not evacuate, but recur, recur in proliferating returns. 
In nonrational variations. 
The mice keep howling. 
A quarter in a palm. 
A very thin tree in a very high place surrounded by other very thin trees.
There are no spires of form. 
There is no right direction.
There  are  no  balloons  breaking the  canopy and spilling  light  onto  the  older  ladies  of  your 
imagination. 
There are no water moccasins skirting water slides in the Kodak light of Georgia.
And in the total darkness, which also is not there,
there are no humiliated men. 
There is no Charles from Oklahoma, Tulsa, and points west. 
No sleeping man has been chosen. 
Wake up. 
In a story you wrote once, morning kept happening. 
Morning, then fires, and then dances. 
An awakening, a door, and a globe. 
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A pigeon, a defeat, a processional, a disappearance.
A defeat, a chamber, a declamation, an apology, the howling of mice, an unmarked passing. A 
song. 
Another song. A heap. Heapism.
A creature revolution. A building. A building on fire. Another song. 
Wake up. 
Take the dog out. 
Your feet and hands. 
My feet and hands. 
For my future I have chosen to go ballooning. 
I will float out over the forest
and over the concrete expanses
and above a field of port o' potties 
and over the port where cranes unload schools 
of new cars without plates awaiting transporters to carry them to lots
marked by tethered balloons nodding over freeways
advertising availability
advertising discounts and calling you to them,
and I will float across the dumps
and the landfills
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over the landscape of this city 
where there are still so many hand painted signs and stores in shacks in the corners of parking 
lots selling food tires haircuts,
this city of parking lots. 
And I will continue over mountains and rest in the cross-continental wind until I am arrived at a 
new ocean;
above the land the pattern of farms
above the land the radiant blue channels of water
above the land the slow transition from west to not west
there is no more west
above the land the shape of a storm like a hat
bullying a car moving steadily across high plains
and above the land the same signs, the same impoverished choices:
what's for dinner? 
what's for lunch? 
If he will not wake up now, do I wake him up? 
What are the figures that will recur 
not every time
but many times
when he sleeps? 
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Will his mind also take dropping curving pathways
sudden near losses of control that never deliver the total loss
that never careen off the overpass
that never derail
that never collide,
that never consummate
the always approaching, never arriving, collision.  
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DANCES
THE CARTOGRAPHER
THE RADIOGRAPHER CODA
ANOTHER TREE DANCE
MOVEMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SLEEP SIDE
Note:  I  have  written  these  dance  notations  in  the  second person,  as  instructions  for 
dancing addressed to the performer. Just as you can read this script imagining yourself as its 
speaker, please allow yourself, dear reader, to imagine doing these actions as you read. That is,  
read these as instructions for a dance yet to be made, not a notation of a dance that was done. 
These dances to be made would follow the architectural/spatial/image score laid out in these 
instructions, but they could manifest in very different movement from my original versions, and 
could satisfy the requirements of the score with varying degrees of compositional complexity. 
Where the choreography involves the recuperation of specific movement sequences from old 
dances, I have tried to describe the tone or type of movement in relation to historical types of 
dancing, and to suggest the kind of places the movement could be sourced  in order to continue 
the choreographic project of recuperation (as against invention).
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THE CARTOGRAPHER DANCE / THE RADIOGRAPHER CODA
This dance comes immediately after the History of Reading, which ends: 
Q: How does a spider attach a thread across a wide space?
A: A spider hangs her thread by launching – 
This  question  is  an  invitation  for  the  audience  to  follow  you  into  the  interior  of  this 
performance's imaginary architectures. In THE CARTOGRAPHER DANCE, you map the key 
imaginative spaces, and allow yourself to experience the feeling of inhabiting those rooms. The 
movement for this dance comes from non-dance tasks: pace out a room, indicate the height of a 
piece of furniture, draw the shape of the window, stand in the shape of a lampshade, trace the 
curve of a tunnel. But you should not appear to be simply playing charades in the dance as you 
perform it. This pedestrian, task-derived source material should be put through choreographic 
filters, its elements then partially elided and reworked so that the action leaves pantomiming and 
becomes dancing (a vague threshold). As examples of “choreographic filters,” think of looking 
for physical interest that can be amplified (a bending over can become a falling over), for ways 
to condense details into layered actions involving many parts of the body at once (the feet trace 
one object while the upper body circles around another), or ways details could be smoothed into 
less definite sequences (corners become curves).  Free yourself  from the original scale of the 
room, and try condensing it into a tiny space, or alternately expanding it to the entire dancing 
space. Let the dance, and not the source tasks, tell you when you need to play this compression 
and expanse against each other. One of the results of this way of working is that as you dance,  
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you  will  feel  yourself  always  inhabiting  an  imagined  environment,  meaning  that  your 
performance is not animated by the internal impulse or expression, but by the situation of finding 
yourself somewhere. Your task is to render to the audience the feeling and interest of being in 
that space, even if you do not need to render the details of the space itself. The audience should 
feel that you are surrounded. 
The spaces to be mapped are:
1. a childhood living room or a living room in a house you visited often as a child, some 
place both familiar and also strange or intimidating;
2. a  floor-plan  for  an adventure game you played as  a  child,  where certain  spots  bring 
reward, and certain spots are perilous;
3. an imagined series of hallways filled with artifacts from your life 
4. an abstract space—imagine it in terms of drawn animations of numbers, letters, or lines—
in which you can perform a full-body semaphore of a secret code or secret name. 
Your first task is to map out the childhood living room. Think of marking its significant objects, 
its ingress and egress, its windows, its light. Project a dream or nightmare into its space, and 
trace the pathways of the action. The second task is to create a repeating pattern that can be 
performed in an accumulation series (1, 1-2, 1-2-3, 1-2-3-4, etc.) that creates a safe pathway 
through the adventure floor plan. You should have a specific way of advancing from point to 
point, and physical events that happen on particular landings. In this section, increase the amount 
of ground you cover, allowing yourself to be propelled through the pattern with some force. The 
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third task is to perform a charades-like inventory of the artifacts from your life, and then to make 
walking or stepping patterns through the hallways. These could be reminiscent of folk dance 
stepping patterns that might be done in circle dances, or they could be very simple walks. Allow 
yourself to take the last leg of the pattern very slowly, advancing along a line that crosses the 
entire depth of the space. Allow yourself to lie down at the end of this pattern. Then get up and 
do the semaphore of your secret code as clearly and elegantly as you are able. At the end of the  
dance, you transition into the RADIOGRAPHER CODA (explained below).
The sound should be a collage, with series of different rhythmic spaces and room tones. Think 
about frequency, and in particular about using thin frequencies which carry over distance. At one 
point in the sound piece, just before the semaphore task, sample a piece of instrumental music 
with a great deal of sentimental value and a particular connection to your childhood (perhaps a 
recording of something you played yourself, if you played an instrument as a child). 
The  end  of  the  audio  is  20  seconds  of  elaborately  pitch-shifted  morse  code  (THE 
RADIOGRAPHER CODA).  The pitch  shifting allows the morse  code to  take on a  melodic 
function. Allow the code-signaling to tease out a physical transition to something you associate 
with reception: a dial, a figure indicating that she is listening, an ear trumpet, a satellite dish, for 
example. Take the posture or shape of this thing, and hold it. 
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ANOTHER TREE DANCE
This is a very simple dance to be made from movement that is entirely familiar to you. The 
meaning of its name is that it should be a type of dancing that you have done before, many times 
over. If you have done no dancing, then this should be built of a sequence of actions and gestures 
that you make in the course of your daily life. Despite their familiarity, allow yourself to perform 
each action as a way of taking a measure of your body and age in the moment you are now 
performing.  Allow  yourself  to  be  gently  surprised  by  the  mass  of  your  body.  If  the 
CARTOGRAPHER DANCE has as its project an effort to render a superimposed spatial map, 
and so participates, we could say, in a fictional project, this TREE DANCE has an opposite task: 
to engage in nothing except the feeling of being patient in the present moment of your body 
moving simply through a sequence of familiar actions. Use this dance to secretly declare your 
affinity and commonality with all other bodies occupying space, especially with those of plants. 
Whatever the original tone or tempo of the movement, in this iteration you should proceed by 
doing  one  movement  task  and then  the  next,  without  rush  or  much of  an  effort  at  making 
transition, beyond the simple transitional actions of shifting your weight as needed. For the first 
two-thirds of the dance, perform something like an inventory of discrete events. Perform this 
inventory in close proximity to the audience, directly on the center line, so as to strip this section 
of  spatial  interest  and  allow  it  to  concentrate  on  your  body.  The  final  third  of  the  dance 
transitions to feeling yourself a body moving through space, and should do this by recuperating 
movement from a folk dance you have done, or if you have done no folk dancing, a folk dance 
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you have seen. Instead of doing a sequence, however, just choose one or two actions at at time, 
actions that have a little padding or swooping or turning in them, and repeat these at length along 
simple, large pathways in space: first making a track around the circumference of the room, then 
drawing its radius, and then moving directly  from the back to the front of the room, directly 
down the center line until you have returned yourself to close proximity to the audience. End by 
taking four or five discreet postures. The final one should have you standing facing upstage, with 
your hands out and fingers of each hand curved into a little ball, almost as if you are standing in 
the shape of a tree as it might be drawn or painted by a child. 
The end of the dance brings up many lanterns like many stars in the sky. 
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MOVEMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SLEEP SIDE
Your movement in this section is extremely slow. In fact you should be so seamless in the way 
you unfold its changes that the audience will be unable to recall their sequence. Accomplish this 
not only by moving slowly, but by allowing yourself to experience continual small intervals of 
rest. It is the subtle information you acquire in the state of rest that will prompt you into your 
next action. The movement, while perhaps occupying a limited range,  should not be set  but 
remain improvised within its very strict  parameters.  As a theatrical  event,  the  SLEEP SIDE 
should feel pictorial, not choreographic.  In order to allow the audience to foreground the text 
(heard in voiceover) as the spine of the section, you should do very little moving for the first 45 
seconds or so, maybe little more than shifting your weight. This section should be performed in a 
coat that lends a geometrically compelling shape, leaving visible only your wrists, hands, ankles,  
feet, neck, and head.  
The spatial path of your action is tightly constrained: a slow cross upstage along a narrow route,  
facing back. You are not allowed to face forward, but you might occasionally look to the side. 
Pay minute attention to the shifts of weight in walking, and sometimes transfer weight forward 
and back before taking a further step. Articulate your feet beyond what is required by normal 
pedestrian stepping. Find all the bones and the surfaces they form. In your upper body, pay 
attention to what is already opening and turning and allow that opening and turning to happen. 
Try to find other faces in your body. What is the face of the palm? What is the face of the knee? 
The kidney? The serratus anterior? The omental bursa? The sacrum? These places may be very 
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internal, but remember that what is visible, what renders the shift, will be your hands and the 
carriage of your arms and neck, so take the time to let internal sensation travel all the way to the 
fingers and up to your skull. Occasionally step forward and break the spell of whatever you are 
attending to. Allow a new sensation to take your attention. 
As  you  engage in  THE SLEEP SIDE's  subtle  physical  investigations,  try  to  make yourself 
available  to  association of  other fleeting  images  not  rendered by you but  by the  undirected 
impulses of your body. That is, if you happen to find yourself doing something that suggests an 
image (a palm tree, a flamingo, a gothic window, a dinosaur bone), allow yourself to mark the 
association by becoming a little more like that image. It is important, however, that you don't try 
to choose any images in advance, and if none come, don't push for them. 
This section should be elaborately lit with a large number of dramatically different light cues, all 
with intensely saturated color and overtly geometric cuts of the light frames.  Take plenty of 
pauses, and never allow the movement to be sequenced faster than the lights. That is, the lights  
should, along with the voiceover and underscoring of the SLEEP SIDE text, lead the tempo of 
this section. Even though you are moving, remember that this is not a dance. What accretes in the  
body over the ten minutes of this section is rather a sense of somnambulation, of a mobility 
initiated by a non-willful intelligence guided by the shifting landscape of the narration.
Return to the simple walk whenever you are lost or thinking. It must take you the entire narration 
(about ten minutes) to move all the way upstage. 
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SONGS
READING SONG
INCOMMUNICABLE THINGS (THE TURNING MAN)
THE DIMMER FREER
Note:  Each of these songs is intended to be sung over clapping rhythms. They need not be 
vigorous, but they could be.
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READING SONG
I have been reading
I have been reading
reading
reading
I saw your face there
I saw your face there
face on the page
I was reading
I wrote your name there
I wrote your name there
your name
in the margin
always returning 
always returning
to this room
our compensations
our compensations
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THE TURNING MAN 
All the incommunicable things come crowding
All the incommunicable things come crowding
Go around the world 
Go around the world 
All the indecipherable things come rising
All the indecipherable things come rising
Go around the world 
Go around the world
  
What goes softening
What comes piling 
What goes scattering
What comes gathering 
You will find it
Rectifying
You will find it 
Terrorizing
All come crowding
All come crowding
All come crowding
All come crowding
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THE DIMMER FREER
“there is a chair and plenty of breathing”
Return to me
“Giving it away, not giving it away.”
Return to me
“The instance of there being more is an instance of more.”
Return to me
“there is some use in not mentioning changing”
Return to me
“and in establishing all that lives”
Return to me
“dimmer freer”
Return to me
“dimmer” “freer”
Return to me
“and there is no dinner in the middle of anything”
Return to me
“There is no such thing”
Return to me
“A silence is not indicated by any motion”
Return to me
“more is not indicated it is enthralled”
“more is not indicated it is enthralled”
Return to me
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SLIDE SHOWS
titles for a VACATION SLIDE SHOW
SENTENCES (EMERSON)
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titles for a VACATION SLIDE SHOW
THE SLEEP SIDE 
DIMMER FREER 
ELECTRIC LIGHT
THE TURNING MAN 
SINCERELY 
A TREE DANCE 
THE HEAP
A HEAP OF WHAT'S MINE
THE LEMON YELLOW HEAVENS
AT AN AUTOMAT
SCAFFOLD FLOATS
THE GLOBE
I WAS IN YORK
RENOUNCE ALL CREATURES
THE HOLE IN THE WORLD 
THE BLACK FOREST 
WOOKEY HOLE
THE FIFTY-THIRD STATE OF THE UNION 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE DAY 
COUSIN FERN
  
LATERAL PLENITUDE
PEDESTRIAN WONDER
PAR LES ASTRES
A BATHYSPHERE
I'M A PLANT
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ON THE APRICOT
SWIMMING AND GLITTERING
STUDY OF NOTHING 
GLAZ-G0-PASO
LUZERNE
ORANGE AND SAD ORANGE 
RHYMES WITH GLUM
AOIRT
 
A GREEN AND PINK CITY 
COSMOPLANE WALL 
GOLDFINCH WALL 
A HOUSE ON FIRE 
I WILL SHINE
MILITANT B. RABBIT
 
VAGUENESS 
DIM O
MORE IMPORTANT MAIL
ALL COME CROWDING
VERDANCY
SUPERABUNDANCE
DELIQUESCENCE
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SENTENCES (EMERSON)
Where do we find ourselves? In a series of which we do not know the extremes, and believe that  
it has none. 
All things swim and glitter. 
Life is a series of surprises, and would not be worth taking or keeping, if it were not.
Nature hates calculators; her methods are saltatory and impulsive.
He thinks his fate alien because the copula is hidden.
Intellectual tasting of life will not supersede muscular activity. 
We thrive by casualties. Our chief experiences have been casual. 
Our moods do not believe each other. 
Temperament puts all divinity to rout. 
We live amid surfaces, and the true art of life is to skate well on them. 
Everything good is on the highway. The middle region of our being is the temperate zone. 
The secret of the world is, the tie between person and event. Person makes event, and event 
person. 
Thus events grow on the same stem as persons; are sub-persons. 
The mind goes antagonizing on, and never prospers but by fits. 
Let us treat the men and women well, treat them as if they were real: perhaps they are. 
Life is not intellectual or critical, but sturdy. 
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I have not found that much was gained by manipular attempts to realize the world of thought. 
You are one thing, but nature is one thing and the other thing, in the same moment. 
I know better than to claim any completeness for my picture.  I am a fragment and this is a 
fragment of me. 
Thy life is a flitting state, a tent for a night, and do thou, sick or well, finish that stint. 
Nature does not like to be observed, and likes that we should be her fools and playmates. 
Patience and patience, we shall win at the last.
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NOTES on SOURCES and REFERENCES
“How to live. What to do.” is the title of a poem by Wallace Stevens, one frequently cited by 
Joan Richardson in her seminar. 
“What you are and what to do about it” is the subtitle of Mabel Todd's book The Hidden You
“The more an image is joined with other images, the more often it flourishes” is an aphorism 
from Spinoza's Ethics.
The images of “houses  founded on the sea” comes from Emerson's essay on Montaigne,  in 
Representative Men; it  came to my attention through Barbara Packer's reading of that 
essay in Emerson's Fall.
The  man  on  horseback  with  scraps  of  paper  pinned  to  his  clothing  is  Jonathan  Edwards, 
beautifully  described  in  a  section called  “Errand” in  Susan  Howe's  The Souls  of  the  
Labadie Tract.
The  phrase  “the  sleep  side”  comes  from  Anne  Carson's  essay,  “In  Praise  of  Sleep,”  in 
Decreation. 
All of the sentences in the slide show SENTENCES (EMERSON) are from Emerson's essays, 
and come primarily from “Experience,” “Fate,” and “Nature.”
All the phrases in quotes in THE DIMMER FREER are from the “Rooms” section of Gertrude 
Stein's Tender Buttons.
“I am I because the abominable branch knows me” inappropriately combines the “abominable 
branch” described by Perry Miller in his biography of Jonathan Edwards and represented 
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by Mac Wellman in his essay “Speculations,” and a sentence from Gertrude Stein, “I am I 
because my little dog knows me.”
The navigational image of the pilot is a response to Joan Richardson's chapter  on Henry James in 
A Natural History of Pragmatism, in which she writes of his representation of thinking as 
navigating;  it  also  waves  to  Sara  Smith's  ongoing  interest  in  the  history  of  hot  air 
balloons.
All the titles and phrases in VACATION SLIDE SHOW and some of the images in THE SLEEP 
SIDE are section names, phrases, figures, or titles from my old plays and dances:
The  Cosmoplane  Wall  is  the  speaking  of  an  endlessly  bifurcating  universe  in  my  rabbit 
cosmogony ASTRS, the bifurcating image of which is taken from the passages of Louis 
Auguste Blanqui's writing quoted in Walter Benjamin's Arcades. Blanqui appears in that 
play as Augustus B. Rabbit, also called Militant B. Rabbit. The Green and Pink City is 
also from ASTRS and is located in the 53rd State of the Union, but is also something like 
Baltimore as seen from a moving train, and is also something like Philadelphia. 
The moon's room is an image from Walter Benjamin's  Berlin Childhood Around 1900 which I 
adapted into a short performance called  For Every Spot Appeared Wholly Occupied By  
What Once Had Been, some of the dance material of which is incorporated into both the 
Cartographer Dance and Another Tree Dance. 
Glaz-Go-Paso, Luzerne,  and AOIRT were the subtitles of the three  dances in my  Studies of  
Nothing series, and much of the movement from these three dances was recombined into 
the section here called Another Tree Dance.
Orange and Sad Orange were dances from my tragicomic skit play Four Fruits. That play also 
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included a dance called Plum, which rhymes with glum. 
The chamber of moles is from the end of my failed spooky land epic Talpidae! Talpidae! The 
scene is supposed to take place at Wookey Hole, which is a real cave in England.
The pigeon, defeat, and processional are from Islander my adaptation of Shakespeare's Antony 
and  Cleopatra.  The  processional  particularly  nods  to  C.P.  Cavafy's  poem,  The  God 
Abandons Antony.
The humiliated men and howling mice are from Some Things Cease, my puppet play about four 
dead,  very  early  kings  of  England  waiting  to  pass  into  the  beyond.  So  are  the 
declamation, renunciation and apology. 
The rabbit is held by a man in a picture in my interview play My Address is Still Walton, a play  
for the set of Charlie Rose. The line “for the picture to work” is also from this play, and 
means the felicity  of fiction,  but was sourced from a political  analyst's comments on 
Hilary Clinton's public persona in the run-up to her 2008 presidential campaign.
The older lady of my imagination, the woman walking on the floor of the forest with a dog, is  
Linda, the heroine of a novella I wrote while gestating both my son and this dissertation. 
Heapism is  an attitude of  reception to  the innumerable  senses and contexts of  words that  I  
described in a manifesto about the material experience of words called I, Heapist. But A 
Heap of What's Mine is a song about lying down and dying that the caretaker character 
Mathilde sings in my dead-king puppet play Some Things Cease.
The line “I will shine” is the lyric of a song from my building consciousness play Montgomery 
Park, or Opulence. The Goldfinch wall is a talking wall from this play. The building on 
fire also comes from Montgomery Park's interior chamber opera, Fire Story, but the house 
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on fire is from a song in one of my Basement Tapes, also included in the soundtrack for 
my video I'm a Plant.
Dim O is the name of the fourth section of my play Do Not Do This Ever Again, a section that 
took the form of a house tour proceeding from an outside entrance to an upstairs interior 
chamber with no windows, modeled on Deleuze's description, in  The Fold, of Leibniz's 
image of the soul. The first section of that play was called More Important Mail. 
Charles from Oklahoma, Texas, and points west, is from Cowboy Loves His Mom, a quartet by 
Chris Yon, Zach Steele, Jeff Larson and Justin Jones, and which I scored, made at Ur, a 
dance palace co-founded by Chris and myself (2003-5).
Morning, then fires, then dances is a sequence of events that repeats and repeats in my first tree 
dance, Tenderenda, also made at Ur. The hole in the world is a feature of the landscape of 
that play. Sara Smith was in that play. She danced the part of a tree. 
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I did not mean to spend all this time
reading Ralph Waldo Emerson, but
he arrested me. I found I recognized
him from these rooms of following,
waiting, making, remaking, these
rooms of infinitesimal attractions.
When I started reading, I meant to
make a secret history of these rooms.
I followed attractions that suggested
subterranean kinships. And as I fol-
lowed those attractions, Emerson’s
sentences  would recur, insist, illu-
minate, expand. So I spent all this
time reading Emerson. 
My Ralph Waldo Emerson
A reading in the form of a gallery from
ANOTHER TREE DANCE
Drawings by Sara Smith
Coloring by Luke Hegel-Cantarella
Captions by Karinne Keithley Syers
APPENDIX ONE
Card Deck from Another Tree Dance
Fig. 1. Cover card, front and back. 
Fig. 1. “Ralph Waldo Emerson,” front and back. 
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The Topiarist, who coaxes one out
of another.
Emerson speaks for the relations that
link us to unsuspected cousins, to the
recurrence of patterns that make my
pelvis like the whale's pelvis, my eye a
birds eye, the curve of my neck like the
curve of cousin fern, my intelligence
the intelligence that grows grass; for
being in nature as feeling the plants
waving to us, and ourselves waving
back at them; for both the elevating
delight and the leveling effect of these
relations which at once identify us with
all matter, and refuse us the illusion of
possessing any particular significance.
The Projectionist, who hovers a line
across space, a concentration.
Emerson speaks for giving attention to
thinking, says the hardest act is to think
when so much of our intelligence comes
in at the edges, moves unassisted by
our direction; for persisting in conver-
sation until it introduces us into new
regions and a picture rises up, a picture
we hold steady, for a time, until new
pictures come; for the projectors who
hold the pictures long enough for us
to read them, to let them strike us.
Fig. 4. “The Projectionist,” front and back. 
Fig. 3. “The Topiarist,” front and back. 
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The Collector, who is satisfied with
accidental and partial gains. 
Emerson speaks for a wisdom that is
not a total possession or transcendental
success, but a capacity to find completion
in the day, and then again in the next;
for relinquishing the idea of some final
and true way; for finding the experience
of being partial to be good enough, a
belonging, and so finding also enough
goodness and pleasure in the parts, in
the accidental vistas; for having the
day, welcoming its unsuspected and
unlooked-for influences. 
The Collector, who knows the pleni-
tude of the ordinary, the sufficiency of
the day.
Emerson speaks for the emergence of
delight or power from the low, the fa-
miliar; against professing to know from
what corner real profit comes; speaks
for an art that is everywhere and that
teaches others to be artists until there
are no artists because no place is exempt
from the patterns that build and evolve
our world, no place but where our at-
tention is lost to petty addictions and
repetitions that ossify into blinders.
Fig. 6. “The Collector (B),” front and back. 
Fig. 5. “The Collector,” front and back. 
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The Collector, who gathers and reuses
and relinquishes too. 
Emerson speaks for an acquiescence
to the passing of the world, for enjoying
momentary successes and delights,
"the evanescence and lubricity of all
objects"; speaks against holding and
for a lighter touch that matches our
temporary habitations; for understand-
ing loss as characteristic of all growth,
all experience, and so for the small re-
hearsals of release which form habits
that might guide all our thinking.  
The Sonographer, who signals the
depths.
Emerson speaks for the depths of one's
being as not a primordial foundation
but something more like a pool of
groundwater, a space of incursion where
the most private gives way to the most
public, and the most public becomes
a resource for the most private; for sub-
terranean channels along which life
flows, channels we might have the luck
or the patience to find ourselves exposed
to; for keeping one side open to these
abyssal and shifting foundations.
Fig. 8. “The Sonographer,” front and back. 
Fig. 7. “The Collector (C),” front and back. 
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The Sonographer, who transmits
noise and reads in its return the distances
of distances.
Emerson speaks for the rays of relation
that connect all things to all other
things, for the consonance of distant
shapes with those close at hand; for
the intuition that recognizes that we
sit within a vast field of transmission,
gathered as a temporary home for a
thought called "I" that is repeated, with
difference, across that field; for the
knowledge that these consonances,
mark the claim of the world on me,
and my claim upon the world. 
The Surveyor, who measures in hands
and feet, who knows the rules for the
restoration of lost and obliterated cor-
ners. 
Emerson speaks for attending to the
calls that come from near at hand and
prompt their followers to discover on-
wardness and growth without imagining
it to be a property only of some other
richer place; for a suspicion of property
lines and for going out walking taking
a property in the horizon, along meas-
ures only discovered as they rise up
into new pictures.
Fig. 10. “The Surveyor,” front and back. 
Fig. 9. “The Sonographer (B),” front and back. 
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The Radiographer, who receives the
incoming and unknown, who knows
the spooky, active far places.
Emerson speaks for an awareness that
what we know is a reception, an incur-
sion, an entertainment of pictures; for
a view of intelligence as visiting us,
and for thinking as a work of tuning
our instruments, meeting those recep-
tions, a work of fine participation; for
the possibility that these incoming pic-
tures move through doors we cannot
locate or predict; for the terror and de-
light of receiving these signals.
The Pilot, who knows invisible chan-
nels, knows a violence we can travel by.
Emerson speaks for the violence of di-
rection that marks all forms of life with
particular excesses and tendencies; for
the possibility that the invisible tracks
of coordination and force might pass
under our feet, cross our village trails
and send us with their salutary under-
tow from deep to lower deep.
Fig. 12. “The Pilot,” front and back. 
Fig. 11. “The Radiographer,” front and back. 
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The Turning Man, who takes the way
of abandonment.
Emerson speaks for the health of turning
away, of aversion from conformity, not
just with others, but conformity with
our own ideas of who we are, with the
settlements that obstruct our reception
of both the feeding forward of the old
patterns that build, and the wholly
strange and new conditions in which
we find ourselves, one year to the next;
speaks for onwardness as a willingness
to undergo the transformation of this
loss as a condition of growth. 
The Sleep Side, for I do not possess
myself.
Emerson speaks for a self-image that
balances what we can think with what
thinks through us; for the recognition
of the incursion of something we can't
fully compass into any thought that
seems to be our own; for the intelli-
gences that we rest in, experience, and
employ, that come from somewhere
below or beyond the lit room of a con-
scious idea.
Fig. 14. “The Sleep Side,” front and back. 
Fig. 13. “The Turning Man,” front and back. 
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The Dimmer Freer, for tiny attractions
quietly moving.
Emerson speaks for heeding the call
of the old household genius who shows
a glimmering and shifting in our settled
places; for an attention and receptiveness
to infinitesimal attractions; for working
to increase our capacities to sense and
to notice; for taking up this work here
where we find ourselves, at home,
amidst our most tender buttons, our
tenderendas. 
The Tree Dance, for patience.
Emerson speaks for patience, for be-
ginning again, for enduring; for a win-
ning at the last which is winning by
lasting, a small success of persisting in
the embrace of an ongoing process;
for experiences whose value we only
recognize after a long time; against
the expectation that we can author our
periods; for an optimism that we might
some day if only for a moment, experi-
ence practical power.
Fig. 16. “The Tree Dance,” front and back. 
Fig. 15. “The Dimmer Freer,” front and back. 
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Another Tree Dance, because it choos-
es me. 
Emerson speaks for the continuous re-
assertion of our natural history, for the
world as being in a state of return; for
the commitments we can make to the
things that characterize our particular
temperaments; for finding out what it
is that is our peculiar work, and doing
it by listening for the awakening call of
our genius, not that romantic possessive
notion of genius but the household
gods that figure the company of new
with old.
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Fig. 18. “Further Reading,” front and back. 
Fig. 17. “Another Tree Dance,” front and back. 
Fig. 1. Grid score from Another Tree Dance.
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APPENDIX 3: PERFORMANCE PHOTOGRAPHS
ANOTHER TREE DANCE
performed by Karinne Keithley
created in conversation with Sara Smith
The Chocolate Factory Theater, New York, NY
Oct. 1, 2013
photos by Brian Rogers
lighting design by Kathy Couch
set design by Luke Hegel-Cantarella
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Fig. 1. READING SONG 
Fig. 2. MEYERS VACATION SLIDE SHOW
Fig. 3. titles for a VACATION SLIDE SHOW 
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Fig. 4. A HISTORY OF READING “Do your work and I shall know you.” 
Fig. 5. A HISTORY OF READING   I choose The Topiarist.
Fig. 6. A HISTORY OF READING   I choose The Collector.
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Fig. 7. THE CARTOGRAPHER DANCE (beginning of a curve)
Fig. 8. THE CARTOGRAPHER DANCE (crossing pathways)
Fig. 9. THE CARTOGRAPHER DANCE (tracing a line with the head)
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Fig. 10. THE COLLECTOR (vaulting structures)
Fig. 11. THE COLLECTOR (women on stairs)
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Fig. 12. THE COLLECTOR (three figures in foreground)
Fig. 13. THE COLLECTOR (building and tree)
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Fig. 14. THE COLLECTOR (ships in mist)
Fig. 15. THE COLLECTOR (urban waterways)
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Fig. 16. THE SONOGRAPHER (The chains were released, I floated)
Fig. 17. THE SONOGRAPHER (I felt I was committed to the waves.)
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Fig. 18. THE SONOGRAPHER (placing a signal lantern)
Fig. 19. INCOMMUNICABLE THINGS (singing, turning, clapping)
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20. SLIDE SHOW (SINCERELY) (two-color slide)
21. SLIDE SHOW (SINCERELY) (single-color slide)
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22. ANOTHER TREE DANCE (underwater plant)
23. THE SLEEP SIDE (beginning in the shape of a tree drawn by a child)
324
24. THE SLEEP SIDE (green and blue windows)
25. THE SLEEP SIDE (a face in the palm of the foot)
325
26. SENTENCES (EMERSON) (“Where do we find ourselves?”)
27. THE DIMMER FREER (“Giving it away, not giving it away.”)
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